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ABSTRACT 1

This dissertation argues that there is an agreed upon commonsense view of violence, but
beyond this view, definitions for kinds of violence are essentially contested and non-neutrally,
politically ideological, given that the political itself is an essentially contested concept defined in
relation to ideologies that oppose one another. The first chapter outlines definitions for a
commonsense view of violence produced by Greene and Brennan. This chapter argues that there
are incontestable instances of violence that are almost universally agreed upon, such as when an
adult intentionally smashes a child’s head against a table, purposefully causing harm. It is also
claimed that, because political, ideological distinctions between kinds of violence arise from the
creation of moral equivalences to the commonsense view of violence, political ideology is the
source of disagreement. The second chapter argues that the concept of violence and of the
political are essentially contested concepts. Gallie’s criteria for what counts as an essentially
contested concept are utilized in order to argue that violence is an essentially contested concept
at the level of the political, though not at the level of the commonsense view of violence. In fact,
the paradigmatic cases that the commonsense view of violence pertains to serve as the core cases
that are then interpreted as kinds of violence at the ideological level. To define violence as
altogether wrong, or to define kinds of violence as acceptable and others as wrong is itself a
politically ideological move to make, such as when liberalism defines its own uses of violence as
1 In this dissertation, I draw on a number of ideas/passages that appeared earlier in my paper “The Efficacy of
Scapegoating and Revolutionary Violence," in Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions: A Journal of the World
Union of Catholic Philosophical Societies, ed. William Sweet, 10(2014), 203-219. I am grateful to the editors
of the journal for permission to draw on this material here.
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justified and legitimate, and its enemy’s violence as unjustifiable and illegitimate. The World
Health Organization and Bufacchi’s definitions for violence are presented, as are the definition
for terroristic violence defined by Nagel. Erlenbusch’s critique of a liberal view, such as that of
Nagel and the World Health Organization, is addressed as a reflection on the fact that, beyond
the commonsense view of violence, violence is an essentially contested concept for which an
ideologically, politically non-neutral definition is unlikely. The third chapter outlines numerous
definitions produced by various philosophers, historians, and theorists, such as Machiavelli,
Arendt, Hobbes, Kant, Treitschke, Weber, Bakunin, Sorel, Žižek, and Benjamin. The definitions
produced by each demonstrates that person’s political ideological assumptions. Their definitions
demonstrate an ongoing disagreement, in the sense of Rancière’s formulation for what counts as
a disagreement in that each theorist defines kinds of violence under the yoke of their own
political ideology. They all might agree that a single act is violent, under the commonsense view
of violence, but they disagree concerning what kind of violence it is. So, though they may point
to the same events and actions as examples of violence, what they mean fundamentally differs,
and this means that they disagree. Their disagreement arises due to their respective political
ideologies. This disagreement shows that there is no neutral justification for the neutrality of a
state, particularly if a neutral state must defend itself. The state is instead defined in historically
contextual terms of how the state relates to kinds of violence, and the distinctions between kinds
of violence are not themselves politically, ideologically neutral. So, the concept of violence,
beyond the commonsense view, is an essentially contested concept for which a non-neutral
definition is unlikely. Beyond the commonsense view, political ideology is inextricably bound
up within distinctions between kinds of violence. The fourth chapter then examines arguments
on the question of whether nonviolence counts as a kind of violence. If distinctions between
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kinds of violence are essentially contested and non-neutrally defined, and nonviolence is defined
as distinct from violence, then it follows that nonviolence is an essentially contested concept for
which no non-neutral definition is possible, at least beyond a commonsense view of nonviolence.
A commonsense view of nonviolence is defined as the assumption that nonviolence is not
violent in the way that the commonsense view defines violence. That is, nonviolence occurs
when there is no action or event that most people would define as a violent one. Definitions for
nonviolence, civil disobedience, nonviolent political actions, and nonviolent direct actions are
then outlined. These definitions aim at showing that the doctrine of nonviolence does not merely
refer to nonviolent acts, but to a strategy that is a means to defeating violence. Given that what
counts as the nonviolence that defeats violence is ideologically a matter of disagreement,
nonviolence, in this sense, can count as a kind of violence. The fifth chapter concludes, raising
questions concerning how violence can be valued, the degree to which a state cannot neutrally
justify its neutrality, and the degree to which, beyond the commonsense view of violence, there
ever could be agreement concerning what counts as kinds of violence.

vi

CHAPTER ONE: THE COMMONSENSE VIEW OF VIOLENCE

1.1 Introduction: A Commonsense View of Violence
There is a difference between a commonsense view of violence and distinctions between
kinds of violence. A commonsense view, in the sense meant here, typically defines violence as a
physical means intentionally used by a person to produce physical or psychological harms or
destruction. It is a commonsense view in that most people agree that the action or event is an
instance of violence. For example, most agree that an adult’s intentionally smashing a child’s
head against a table for the sake of causing harm is an instance of violence. Most people react to
such actions and events by defining them as violent ones. Most people consider these to be
wrong. Likewise, hitting, punching, slapping, beating, torturing, raping, murdering, shooting,
exploding, and other things that harm or destroy a person or group of people, physically or
psychologically, fall under this commonsense view of violence.
Disagreements arise when we claim that, although violence is wrong, some violence is
not wrong because it is justified, or when distinctions between kinds of violence are defined.
The issue is that, though there is common agreement that violence, in paradigm cases, is wrong,
indeed is the paradigm of wrongness, there is disagreement concerning what kinds of violence
are not wrong, and how kinds of violence are to be distinguished. For example, one might claim
that defensive violence is not wrong, but is legitimate and legal, but another can question
whether an instance of violence is defensive, and thereby can define the violence as illegitimate
and illegal. So, though there is agreement on the wrongness of the paradigm cases of acts of
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violence, there is a disagreement concerning what counts as equivalent to the paradigm cases of
violence.
A commonsense view of violence is based on the uncontested fact that there are
paradigmatic actions and events that all agree are instances of violence. The paradigmatic cases
serve as those kinds of actions that are raw examples that are commonly agreed upon as counting
as instances of violence. The action or event is itself, at the same time, conceptualized as
“violent.” However, as noted in the previous paragraph, there is disagreement concerning when
violent actions and events are equivalent to things like self-defensive violence, legitimate
violence, and oppressive violence. An argument should be produced in order to demonstrate that
a violent action is equivalent to self-defensive violence, but only examples can be given,
inductively showing that major accounts of this kind are political. When a person has
demonstrated that an act of violence is equivalent to self-defensive violence, for example, the
person has produced a justification for that act of violence by claiming that it is not equivalent to
the paradigm cases. Though violence is entirely wrong, according to a commonsense view, the
act of violence that is defined as morally equivalent to self-defensive violence is justified.
Justifications built upon equivalence claims like this one move away from the paradigmatic cases
that define violence as wrong. As another example, when a theorist defines some violence as
legitimate, the theorist defines its legitimacy in moral equivalence relationships to other things,
such freedom, justice, or the existence of a state. These moral equivalence definitions for kinds
of violence produce definitions for violence that do not unite the concept of a kind of violence to
the act of violence in the same way that the paradigm cases do. Instead, because violent acts and
events are defined as equivalent to other things, which are then defined so that these violent acts
and events are justified, these definitions serve as grounds for disagreements. Unlike the
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paradigmatic cases, for which the act or event itself is that which defines them as paradigmatic
cases, distinctions between kinds of violence extend the concept of violence, connecting some
instances of violence to some things, while disconnecting some other instances of violence from
those same things.
For example, in the context of slavery in the United States, John Brown’s 1859 raid of
Harper’s Ferry in Virginia, which involved violence in the form of people being shot, in
accordance with the paradigm examples of violence, can be defined as a justified kind of
violence by producing moral equivalence relationships to other things, such as self-defense. The
violent actions of Brown and his raiding party could be defined as terroristic, or as emancipatory
by connecting it to other things, such as to an attack on the United States, or to the higher and
anti-violent good of the abolition movement, respectively. The violent actions of the soldiers,
likewise, can be defined as oppressive or as legitimate in relation to the experiences of slaves or
to the United States, respectively. So, a paradigm case core conception of violence is that which
is agreed upon, and distinctions between kinds of violence extend this view of violence to other
things, producing moral equivalence relationships between some acts of violence and some other
things.
There is a paradigm case core conception of violence, and there are distinctions between
kinds of justifiable violence. This dissertation aims to show that, in the case of all the standard
major philosophical accounts of violence, these distinctions between kinds of violence are
produced in relation to particular political ideologies that oppose one another. Altogether this
shows that, despite agreement upon a paradigmatic examples of violence, violence, in the
standard philosophical literature, is an essentially contested concept due to the dependence of
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each of these conceptions of violence on opposed political ideologies that fundamentally
disagree within one another.
An ideology is “a systematic scheme of ideas, usually relating to politics, economics, or
society and forming the basis of action or policy; a set of beliefs governing conduct.” 2 An
ideology is “political” insofar as it constitutes the set and system of beliefs pertaining to a
collective of people, their common interests, or to what they conceive of as “good.” Though
there is no disagreement at the level of the paradigm case core conception of violence,
distinctions between kinds of violence are essentially contested. Furthermore, agreement with a
distinction between kinds of violence is a belief in that distinction, and does not eliminate the
essential contestedness of concepts of kinds of violence that are not themselves the paradigmatic
examples of violence. In other words, agreement with a distinction between kinds of violence
suggests one’s political ideology, though not necessarily. Agreement with a distinction between
kinds of violence does not, in principle, mean that one shares the same political ideology of the
person who defines distinctions between kinds of violence. Political ideology reflects a belief in
a distinction between kinds of violence. However, because there are various, opposed ways that
kinds of violence can be defined in moral equivalence relationships to political ideologies,
definitions of kinds of violence are not neutral. A neutral definition would be one that does not
favor any particular political ideology. Because distinctions between kinds of violence are
produced from the perspectives of theorists situated historically in their respective contexts, a
neutral definition is not possible. This suggests, but cannot establish that a neutral distinction
between kinds of violence cannot be achieved, given opposed distinctions between kinds of
violence. The argument here is necessarily inductive, based on the extant theories of violence.

2 “Ideology,” Oxford English Dictionary, accessed October 21, 2016,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/91016?redirectedFrom=ideology.
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But the pattern strongly suggests that no alternative account of violence that extends beyond the
paradigm cases will not also be dependent on political ideologies. So, in short, the thesis of this
dissertation is that, in consideration of a necessarily incomplete set of examples of definitions
that define violence as equivalent to other things, it is likely that no defined kind of violence is
politically neutral, except, perhaps, the paradigm case core conception of violence, which defines
actions as violence based on the wrongness of intentional uses of physical means for the sake of
causing physical or psychological harms or destruction. This list is necessarily incomplete
because novel ways of defining violence can always be produced by defining violence as
equivalent to other things. Because this list of definitions is necessarily incomplete, the
conclusion cannot be proven with certainty. However, in relation to one another, definitions for
kinds of violence show that the concept of violence is essentially contested. And, since any
essentially contested concept is not politically neutral, no definition for violence is politically
neutral.
In order to analyze commonsense views of violence, the definitions of commonsense
views of violence produced by Joshua Greene and Jason Brennan are discussed next. Greene
argues that the human brain neurologically defines what counts as commonsensical,
“prototypical” violence, and Brennan focuses on what he considers to be the commonsensical
wrongness of violent killings. Brennan means to argue that private citizens are justified to use
defensive violence against government agents and officials, even in liberal democracies. Once
their arguments are discussed, then it is shown that their definitions agree at the level of the
paradigm case core conception of violence, but disagree when their respective discussions
concerning violence move beyond the paradigm conception of violence, thereby becoming nonneutral, politically ideologically speaking.
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1.2 Joshua Greene on the Moral Psychology of Prototypical Violence
In his book, Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap between Us and Them, Greene
argues that humans have a “dual-process” moral brain, neurologically at work, automatically
producing emotional gut reactions, on the one hand, and manually reflecting upon those
automatic reactions, rationally calculating what should be done, on the other. 3 He means to
argue that the dual-process theory indicates that humans should adopt “deep pragmatism,” i.e. a
utilitarian, manual-mode approach to compromising and cooperating with groups of people
(“Them”) who are not of our tribe (“Us”). 4 In order to show that people neurologically,
automatically, and emotionally react to uses of personal, violent force in particular, Greene
utilizes The Trolley Problem, which was first introduced by Philippa Foot, and later discussed by
Judith Jarvis Thomson. 5
For our purposes here, only two versions of the Trolley Problem are needed, namely the
switch dilemma and the footbridge dilemma. In the switch dilemma, a trolley is running down a
track toward five people, and the subject has the option of throwing a switch so that the trolley
goes onto an alternative track, but kills one person. In the footbridge dilemma, a trolley is
running down a track toward five people, and the subject is standing on a footbridge next to a
man wearing a backpack, and has the option of pushing this man in front of the trolley so that his
backpack and body stop the trolley from killing the five people. In both cases, one person is

3 Joshua Greene, Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap between Us and Them (New York: Penguin Books,
2013), 14, 120. Greene’s intention, in this book, is to produce an argument for what he calls “deep pragmatism,”
which is a kind of utilitarianism that can be used for the sake of globally and domestically serving the greater good,
resolving “Us vs. Them” disagreements, and not only for serving the greater good of one's own people (“Us” or
“tribe,” in Greene's terminology). It is only the moral psychology concerning how people typically respond to
violence that is relevant here, insofar as it shows how people share a commonsense view of violence.
4 Ibid. 14, 153-4, 289-294.
5 Ibid. 113-6. See Philippa Foot, "Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect," Oxford Review 5(1967): 1-5;
and Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem,” The Monist 59(1976): 204-217; “The
Trolley Problem,” Yale Law Journal 94(1985): 1395-1415; and, “Turning the Trolley,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs 36(2008): 359-374.
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killed so that five can live. A utilitarian, rational calculation would have the subject decide to
save the five people in both cases. However, studied subjects are typically unwilling to push the
man from the bridge (only 31% said they would push the man), but are typically willing to throw
the switch (87% said they would throw the switch). 6
Using the data he gathers, Greene argues that the different responses produced by
subjects are due to the human brain's ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and amygdala,
which are responsible for emotional responses. 7 Greene had people read and respond to the
switch and footbridge dilemmas while their brains were scanned using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI). In the switch dilemma, there is only the utilitarian commitment to
serve the greater good, which is an unemotional calculation. However, in the footbridge
dilemma, because the subject is directly pushing the man with the backpack to his death, the
automatic, emotional response to this action provides an explanation for why people are typically
unwilling to push.
In both dilemmas, there is an increase of activity in the VMPFC (an emotional response
is triggered), but in the case of the footbridge dilemma the increase is greater and the result is
less people willingly pushing one person to his death in order to save five. 8 In contrast, in the
switch case, there was increased activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), which is
responsible for cognitive control (“the ability to orchestrate thought and action in accordance

6 Ibid. 222. Greene and his colleagues utilize numerous variations of these two dilemmas in order to test whether
their results are accurate, and whether the brain neurologically causes people not to want to push the man in front of
the trolley. Some of these variations involve the subject being at a distance from the man and some of them involve
the subject’s touching or not touching when pushing him in front of the trolley. They found that it is not spatial
distance, but the personal touching that matters. See pages 214-6.
7 Ibid. 118, 124. Greene argues this because he and others have studied subjects with a damaged VMPFC or
amygdala, and the responses of these subjects demonstrate less emotional concern for pushing the man off the
footbridge. See especially page 125, but also 118, 122, and 142.
8 Ibid. 120.
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with internal goals”). 9 In the switch dilemma, despite that the studied subjects know that they are
killing one person to save five, 87% of them find this acceptable because they do not touch the
person who is killed. 10 In contrast, in the footbridge dilemma, the subjects directly touch the
victim who is pushed to his death, which explains why only 31% are willing to push. 11 The
footbridge case is “personal,” and the switch case is not. In the end, Greene argues that the
studies show that “emotional responses cause people to say no to the footbridge dilemma.” 12
The evidence produced from these studies leads Greene to argue that his dual-process
moral brain theory is confirmed. The human brain has automatic, emotional settings and a
“manual-mode” that is cognitive control. 13 The automatic settings are efficient and inflexible
because they immediately respond to stimulants and consistently respond in the same way. The
manual mode is inefficient but flexible because it more slowly thinks through what the person
experiences, and can do in order to achieve goals, evaluating positives and negatives in utilitarian
terms. Emotions are fast and automatic in the sense that a person cannot choose to have an
emotion, but can only trigger that emotion by thinking of things that bring the emotion about. 14
Emotions, though, also exert pressure on what a person does, or is willing to do, despite what the
manual-cognitive-decision-making mode would tell the person to do. 15 Reasoning and emotions
are not independent from another because emotions can influence what a person decides to do,

9 Ibid. 119-20. This is neuroscientist Jonathon Cohen's definition of “cognitive control,” Greene’s colleague.
10 Ibid. 216. Greene used variations of the footbridge and switch dilemmas, in which the subjects are either more
closely touching, or less closely touching, or not touching the one person who is killed to save five. His results
show that the more closely a person has to touch the one person to kill him and save five lives, the less the subjects
are willing to perform the action. See pp. 215-6.
11 Ibid. 124-6.
12 Ibid. 125.
13 Ibid. 133.
14 Ibid. 134.
15 Ibid. 135.
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and decisions can trigger emotions. However, can reject emotional urges through the use of
manual-mode cognitive control. 16
What is common amongst people, Greene assumes, is that they generally want to have
positive experiences, and tend to have the same kinds of automatic, emotional, moral settings,
such as “empathy, anger, disgust, guilt, shame, and discomfort with certain forms of personal
violence.” 17 Pushing a man from a bridge is a use of personal, physical force, which is
commonly, negatively reacted to. Pushing a man from a bridge is not an experience that people
typically want to have (69% of the time, according to results of the footbridge dilemma). The
significant factor that makes a difference toward why people are willing to switch the trolley to a
different track and kill someone to save five, but are not willing to push a man from a footbridge
to save, is “the direct application of personal force (pushing vs. hitting a switch) and whether the
victim is harmed as a means versus side effect.” 18 That is, the studies show that what matters is
how these factors are combined. 87% of people approve of using personal force that indirectly
kills someone as a side effect (the switch dilemma). When a person is directly harmed as a
means, but not through a use of personal force and instead as a side effect (such as when the
switch is thrown and the trolley kills one instead of five), this is also acceptable to most people.
However, “if you harm someone as a means and you use personal force, then the action seems
wrong to most people,” as with the footbridge dilemma. 19 Commonly, the use of personal force
in order to cause direct harm upon another person produces an emotional reaction that influences
the decision not to use personal force that will cause direct harm. These are paradigm cases of

16 Ibid. 136-7.
17 Ibid. 194. My italics. I return to the significance of Greene’s claim that people commonly want to have positive
experiences below, in relation to how the common view that violence is wrong is transformed into something good.
18 Ibid. 222. The death of the man wearing the backpack is used as a means to stopping the trolley to save five,
while the man standing on the alternative track, to which the train is switched, dies as a side effect.
19 Ibid. 222.
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violence. Most people agree that these acts are violent, and most people refuse engaging in them
because most people consider such acts to be wrong.
An issue that arises, for Greene, concerns the fact that many of the things we do not do
result in others being harmed. However, he argues that people typically consider harms caused
by direct actions, and as results of uses of means, to be worse than harms of omission, which
occur when certain actions are not performed. 20 His reason for this lies in the means vs. side
effect distinction. For example, people would typically not directly starve a person to death, but
will allow it to happen anyway, fully knowing that there are starving people in the world. Such
people do not act toward alleviating starvation, and thereby indirectly, and possibly
unintentionally, cause harms, but these harms are side effects of each person’s pursuit of his or
her own goals. Omissions, such as not feeding starving people, may produce worse harms than
direct actions, such as directly starving one or a few people, but Greene’s point is that the brain
plans and is goal-oriented, which means that it is not thinking of all the things omitted from the
plan and its possible side effects. Instead, the brain only thinks of a limited number of actions
performed as means to goals. A person’s ability to think of only a limited number of things
when planning actions as means to goals indicates that a person is unable to think of all the
things she is not doing, or that might happen as side effects. 21 This indicates that “harmful
omissions don't push our emotional moral buttons in the same way that harmful actions do.” 22
Omissions are not directly enacted, so, they do not trigger the automatic, emotional response.
So, commonly, in Greene’s view, people automatically, emotionally respond to direct uses of
personal force as a means to producing harm, and not to omissions nor side effects.

20 Ibid. 240.
21 Ibid. 241.
22 Ibid. 245.
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Greene’s evidence for the existence of a commonsense view of violence arises from his
inference that humans commonly have an alarm system that automatically tells them what not to
do, and which protects people from the vengeance of others, and stops them from engaging in
indiscriminate uses of violence, thereby supporting cooperation. “An automated antiviolence
system in our brains” makes it possible for people to inspect action-plans, assessing possible
means to goals, for the sake of avoiding being casually violent because, emotionally, people take
seriously their own direct uses of personal violence as means to goals. 23 This alarm system stops
us from engaging in what could be dangerous plans.
Greene adds that “to say that this automatic alarm system responds to violence probably
gets things backwards... [Instead,] our conception of violence is defined by this automatic alarm
system.” 24 That is, people like the 69% of subjects who automatically, emotionally reject the
violence of pushing a man from a footbridge have an emotional responses that define what
counts as violence. Increased activity in these areas, when deciding what to do with the
footbridge dilemma, means the brain neurologically, emotionally responds in a causal way.
However, neurologically, we are not all the same. 25 As his studies show, if some part of the
brain has been damaged, then whether a person rejects uses of personal force depends upon
whether the person's emotions are functioning “normally” in the way the emotions of the 69%,
who rejected pushing the man from the footbridge, function.
The antiviolence alarm system, Greene adds, “may respond more to harms caused using
personal force not because personal force matters per se, but because the most basic nasty things
that humans can do to one another (hitting, pushing, etc.) involve the direct application of

23 Ibid. 226-7.
24 Ibid. 248.
25 Greene and his colleagues test people with frontotemporal dementia, Alzheimer’s, and damage to their
ventromedial prefrontal cortext (VMPFC). See 121-6.
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personal force. 26 “The most basic nasty things” are included in the things people can do, and
these are the negatively evaluated, rejected instances of “the direct application of personal
force,” which implies that there is nothing nastier than this direct use of personal force that a
person could do. In this sense, “our alarm gizmo responds to actions that are prototypically
violent – things like hitting, slapping, punching, beating with a club, and...pushing.” 27 This
prototypical violence that our brain's “alarm gizmo” automatically, emotionally responds to is a
direct use of means of personal force for the sake of causing harm. Prototypical violence
corresponds to what has been thus far referred to as paradigm examples of violence.
However, Greene adds that anyone whose “antiviolence gizmo” does not function in this
way is abnormal. 28 “If you don't feel that it's wrong to push the man off the footbridge, there's
something wrong with you,” he writes. 29 The “antiviolence gizmo” normally functions as a part
of the planning of means toward goals, tracking direct uses of personal force and the active
harms that may result, such that the passive, indirectly produced harms that result from side
effects and omissions matter less. This is a neurological claim, and not a prima facie moral or
political one. Most people, normally, refuse to perform actions that require their own personal
use of direct force for the sake of causing harm. This refusal is the core response that identifies
the immediate negative evaluation of violence, on which all accounts of violence depend.
For example, one person is sacrificed in the switch dilemma, but Greene does not
criticize those who decide to throw the switch as having something neurologically wrong with
them. He assumes that what is normal, neurologically speaking, is what most people exhibit. In
the switch case, the death of one person is a side effect, and since this does not produce increased

26 Ibid. 249.
27 Ibid. 247.
28 Ibid. 249-50.
29 Ibid. 251.
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activity in the areas of the brain responsible for emotion, it is “normal” for people to decide to
throw the switch. However, by claiming that there are normal people he implies a group of
abnormal people. Despite that 31% were willing to push the man from the footbridge, these
people are abnormal and have something wrong with them, neurologically speaking.

1.3 Does the Automatic Antiviolence System Provide a Commonsense Definition for
Violence?
The prototypical violence defined by Greene fits a paradigm case core conception of
violence. If one responds to prototypical violence automatically and emotionally, then one is
normal, descriptively speaking, and also has what can a normal, commonsensical view that
intentional (direct) uses of physical means (personal force) for the sake of producing physical
harms should not be used. However, Greene does not address psychological harms.
Psychological harms might not be thought of as consequences of one’s actions. They might
result from uses of hurtful words. Such harms might be kinds of “side effects,” and so perhaps
they produce no emotional impact when one decides how to act or speak, but Greene’s studies do
not address this.
If there is an alarm gizmo that automatically, emotionally responds to intentional, active,
and direct uses of personal force that results in harms, then this provides evidence for a
commonsense view of violence. However, even if there is a normal, commonsense view of what
counts as violence at the neurological level of automatic, emotional rejection of kinds of actions
that characteristically involve a use of personal force as a direct means to harming someone, the
commonsense view and the automatic, emotional rejection of kinds of violent actions do not
address the fact that prototypical violence is also that which can be defined as a normal, good,
legal, and legitimate means to use. This also does not capture other ways that harms are
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produced unintentionally and nonphysically. Distinctions between defined kinds of violence do
capture these other ways of defining kinds of violence. That is, distinctions between kinds of
violence do explain how what might otherwise count as abnormal uses of personal force for the
sake of causing harms, can count as normal, and even as desirable. So, the automatic alarm
gizmo corresponds to a paradigm case core conception of violence, which can count as a
commonsense view, but beyond this, the automatic alarm gizmo does no explain how instances
of paradigmatic cases of violence are justified normatively.
In Greene’s study, 69% refused pushing the man in front of the trolley, and 31% chose to
push the man because the wrongness of the action did not produce emotions that were strong
enough to lead them to choose not to push the man. The automatic, emotional response of those
who chose to push was not strong enough to stop them from deciding to push. This decision to
save five by pushing one takes place manually, as a rational utilitarian calculation, but Green
argues that this is abnormal, given the results of his research. If Greene is correct that emotions
cause decisions, then those who decided to push the man from the footbridge were either able to
transform a negative emotion associated with pushing the man into a positive one, or they were
unable to have the emotional response in the first place. If the studied subjects did have the
negative emotion, then it seems that the goal of saving the other five people overrode the
strength of this emotion, but the neurological studies do not explain why or how this happens.
At the level of the definition of prototypical violence and a commonsense view of violence, this
revaluation of the negative emotional response to an act of violence into something positive is
neurologically abnormal. At the level of distinctions between kinds of violence, kinds are
evaluated as not entirely wrong in ways that transform the abnormal into a justified kind of
violence.
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Greene bases his distinction between normal and abnormal responses to violence on the
authority of his scientific studies. His focus on prototypical violence, as defined by the
automatic antiviolence system, limits his ability to make sense of why people still choose to use
and justify violence. He can only claim that those who push the man from the bridge are
abnormal, if they do not feel that it is wrong to do so.
Like the paradigm case core conception of violence, Greene negatively evaluates
violence based on the increased activity in the VMPFC that occurs in 69% of the studied
patients. The paradigm case core conception of violence evaluates violence as wrong, but does
not need neurological evidence of increased emotional activity in the brain in order to do so. The
paradigm case core conception of violence is defined by those actions and events that most
people consider to be wrong. Greene argues that a person is abnormal if they do not feel that it is
wrong to push the man. This may have some descriptive accuracy. Normatively, the wrongness
of the pushing of the man from the bridge does not necessarily follow from his evidence. There
is only increased activity in the VMPFC, which amounts to brute scientific data that might
explain why people choose not to perform certain actions. Whether or not this data indicates the
normative wrongness of prototypical violence itself is not necessarily within the scope of his
data. So, when Greene says that those who do not feel this wrongness are abnormal, he points to
the paradigm case core conception of violence, but why we need this neurological evidence in
the first place is questionable, given the common agreement concerning paradigmatic examples
of violence.
Since the automatic antiviolence system demonstrates increased emotional activity in the
VMPFC, it is not clear that it defines prototypical or a commonsense view of violence in the way
Greene claims. What would be interesting is to see what happens when the studied subjects are

15

asked about performing actions that are not captured by the paradigm case core conception of
violence, but that might still be claimed to count as violence. For example, some might claim
that violence occurs when a person draws a cartoon of something offensive (such as of a
religious figure performing a debaucherous act), or when someone is unable to afford the
medication that would save her life. Perhaps the choice would be for the patient to decide
whether to draw the cartoon, or whether to withhold the funding that the person needs in order to
afford her medication. The point is that it is not clear that this automatic antiviolence system
would reject these actions, which some people might count as kinds of violence. The trolley
problems already involve what many would consider an act of violence that falls under the
paradigm case core conception of violence. So, it is not clear that the automatic antiviolence
gizmo can tell us very much about violence beyond the paradigm case core conception. Perhaps
it does, perhaps not, but the paradigm case core conception of violence persists nonetheless.
Most people would agree that killing a person is itself a violent act and wrong, and whether or
how they emotionally respond to having to decide to kill a person is irrelevant.
In the next section, Jason Brennan’s argument concerning the justification for uses of
defensive violence is discussed next, particularly in light of the distinction between violence as a
wrong and violence as not-wrong. As soon as we begin to distinguish between whether violence
is wrong or not-wrong, we are no longer defining violence itself, and have moved beyond the
paradigm case core conception of violence. Given that distinctions between kinds of violence no
longer address violence itself, there is disagreement between opposed distinctions between kinds
of violence, politically ideologically grounded in the way that distinctions between kinds of
violence are connected to other things. The automatic alarm gizmo does not address or explain
how kinds of violence are evaluated as justifiable.
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1.4 Brennan on Killing as Defensive Violence
Jason Brennan produces a definition for a commonsense view of violence, in his article
“When May We Kill Government Agents? In Defense of Moral Parity.” 30 Brennan's definition
differs from the one given above, particularly in that he is only concerned with showing that,
though violence is altogether wrong, it is sometimes permissible in liberal democratic societies
for private citizens to kill government agents, leaders, and police officers in self-defense, or in
the defense of others. He writes, “violence in self-defense and defense of others is warranted, on
commonsense moral grounds, only to protect oneself or others from severe harm or injustice.” 31
Though he assumes “commonsense moral grounds,” Brennan is not defining violence itself in
terms of a commonsense view. Instead, Brennan begins from a normative evaluation of
violence, namely that it can be “warranted” when used defensively.
Here, we see what Brennan considers to be commonsensical:
Killing is wrong. However, a person can become liable to be
killed by performing certain wrongful or unjust actions. A person
is liable to be killed when he is doing something deeply wrong,
unjust, or harmful to others, and when killing him would serve a
defensive purpose, such as self-defense, the defense of others, or to
prevent him from causing greater injustice. Killing is also
restricted by a doctrine of necessity: at minimum, when a
nonlethal alternative is equally effective at stopping someone from
committing injustice, it is not permissible to kill him. 32
Brennan begins with the general assumption that “killing is wrong,” but then immediately
indicates when killing is not wrong. Killing, of course, is a kind of violence, and not violence
itself, according to the paradigm case core conception of violence. Killing can serve as a
paradigmatic example of violence, but as an example, it is not a definition for violence. So,
30 Jason Brennan, “When May We Kill Government Agents? In Defense of Moral Parity,” Social Philosophy and
Policy 32(2016): 40-61.
31 Ibid. 49. Brennan argues that this commonsense moral view is common because it is a part of the tradition
handed down from English common law, which includes doctrines of defense and self-defense. See page 44.
32 Ibid. 44.
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Brennan begins from the assumption that killing is wrong, and immediately posits an exception
to the general assumption that “killing is wrong.” A person may be killed, if the person has
performed a “wrongful or unjust action,” and self-defense or the defense of others is necessitated
as a last resort. The wrongfulness of killing can be justified when used defensively against a
person who does wrong to others. Self-defense and the defense of others, when no other
alternative is available, are the conditions that qualify an action counting as an exception to the
rule that “killing is wrong.” However, the commonsense view of violence as described by
Brennan does not define violence itself as wrong. It does not define killing as wrong. Brennan
assumes a commonsense view that is supposed to provide a point of agreement upon which he
can argue in favor of a justification for defensive violence. Brennan’s claim that there is a
“common moral ground” assumes normative evaluations of violence that are beyond the
paradigm cases of violence.
Brennan adds that there is a liberal democratic assumption that only government agents
and officials may kill for the sake of defending lives from threats, to uphold the law, and attain
justice. In liberal democratic societies, Brennan argues, the typical assumption is that killing is
wrong, but because these societies assume that killing should never occur, they assume that
“only nonviolent resistance to state injustice is permissible...[and that] we must defer to
democratic government agents, even when these agents act in deeply unjust, harmful, and
destructive ways.” 33 Brennan's intention is not to urge people to kill government agents, but is
instead to show that such people can be justifiably killed. He means that, even if we should aim
to nonviolently combat injustices, it is incorrect to infer that citizens can never justifiably kill
state leaders, agents, and police. So, he wants to show that the commonsense view of defensive
violence in liberal democratic societies is incorrect in its assumptions.
33 Ibid. 40.
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In Brennan’s view, the exception that allows for killing to count as “defensive,” and as
not-wrong, applies in all cases and not only in those cases when a defensive killing is used
against private citizens. If a government official, agent, police officer, etc. is not killing for the
sake of defending herself or others, then those against whom the intention to kill is directed are
justified to kill in defense of themselves and others. This suggests that even a commonsense
view of violence that allows for self-defense itself requires political premises in order to
distinguish genuine self-defense from self-defense which is not properly regarded as self-defense
because it is illegitimate. With this concept of defensive violence, we come to political
questions.
In terms of legitimacy, from the perspective of the state, the state can (because it is
“permitted” in Brennan’s sense of the term ‘legitimacy’) make the claim that private citizens can
justifiably use violence in self-defense and defense of others against other private citizens, but
not against government agents. 34 The authority of the state’s legitimate claim is lacking, in his
view, because private citizens will not necessarily, obediently submit to it, particularly when
needing to defend themselves or others from government officials and agents whose violence is
not self-defensive or in defense of others. Brennan writes, “it is a part of commonsense moral
thinking…that we are presumed not to have a duty to follow unjust orders. This duty must be
justified.” 35 That is, it would be unjust for a government to demand that private citizens
obediently submit to government agents, police officers, and military personnel when they kill
private citizens. The state bears the burden of providing justification for why citizens must
obediently submit to its government officials and agents who aggressively, and not defensively,

34 Ibid. 34.
35 Ibid. 53.
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kill private citizens, but the state’s justification might not bear weight when a government agent
or official is aggressively aiming to kill oneself or others.
Brennan argues that violence is only justifiable, and not wrong, when used defensively.
However, that a use of violence could count as defensive in the first place, and as not wrong, is a
matter of disagreement because the justification for a use of violence against government agents
is political. This violence is not wrong, but is justified, if it is used in response to unjust acts,
where “justice” is defined in the political sense relating to just authority, which is itself defined
in accordance with Brennan’s political ideology. If it cannot always be shown for certain that a
private citizen or government official was using defensive violence, then whose violence counts
as defensive, and as not wrong, is an issue that is not easily settled.
For example, the issue concerning whose violence is defensive is irrelevant, at least for
pacifists, because an authentic pacifist’s strict commitment to peace and nonviolence would not
endorse any kind of violence as justified, whether it is defensive or not. Defensiveness does not
indicate that an instance of violence is not wrong because violence is completely wrong, in a
pacifist’s view. The pacifist’s commitment to nonviolence, peace and to the view that violence
is only wrong means that the pacifist disagrees with every justification for violence. Brennan’s
so-called commonsense moral thinking is contestable. Whose violence counts as defensive and
as not wrong is contestable. Beyond his defined commonsense view, Brennan’s view encounters
disagreements concerning kinds of violence, wrong and not wrong ones, and defensive and
aggressive instances of it.
The view that violence is wrong is the view of the paradigm case core conception of
violence, but political ideologies appropriate this wrongness when they justify kinds of violence.
Disagreements emerge when, from the perspectives of political ideologies, violent acts and
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events are defined as equivalent to other things for the sake of justifying those actions and
events. The violence that is claimed to be not wrong and defensive is defined as an instance of
killing a government agent in self-defense or in defense of others. The connection between
killing being not wrong when used defensively, but wrong otherwise, is a condition for
disagreement.

1.5 The Obscurity of Defensive Violence
One approach toward determining whose violence is defensive is to attempt to answer the
question, who started it? Is the government official, police officer, or military personnel
defending himself and others from a private citizen, or is the private citizen using defensive
violence against the violence of these government officials, officers, and personnel? Any answer
to these questions will favor one side over another, and requires an analysis of what happened, in
what order, and such analyses cannot always perfectly reproduce a sequence of events. If there
are others who can be referenced as those for whom the violence is defensive, then the difficulty
of knowing whose violence is defensive increases. We can imagine a heated exchange between
involved individuals taking place such that one party claims to be defending a group of people
from the other party, and this other party claims to be defending the very same people. If
violence is not only defensive when self-defensive, but also when used to defend others, then
claims can be made concerning whose violence was defensive in relation to some group of
people whose situation required defensive violence. Whose violence counts as defensive, then,
is a ground for political disagreement.
The point is that, though a commonsense view of morality may consider violence to be
wrong, except when used defensively, it does not itself distinguish between defensive and
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aggressive violence. Whether an act of violence is defensive depends on how that action is
evaluated, and such evaluations will connect events together in ways that could be connected in
other ways. For example, if a government official intentionally and aggressively causes
psychological harms to private citizens by threatening them with physical violence that is not
actually used, and these are not immediately obvious to others because they are psychological
harms that these others have not themselves experienced, then for the private citizens who suffer
these harms, their own violence may count as defensive violence from their own point of view,
but not from the point of view of those who did not experience those psychological harms.
Likewise, a victim of rape and sexual assault, particularly women, who kills the perpetrator may
consider her own killing to be defensive, but a judge might decide that the killing of the
perpetrator was not defensive, for whatever reasons, but namely because the judge connects the
events together in a different way. For those who use violence (in the sense that a commonsense
view defines it), they might evaluate its use as a defensive one, while others see it as not being a
defensive use of violence, and as “wrong,” because they evaluate the event differently, from an
opposed perspective or from another context. When this is the case the violence is and is not
defensive, which obscures what defensive violence is.

1.6 Violence as a Wrong
As noted, Brennan’s version of the commonsense view of violence first assumes that
violent killings are wrong, but then indicates that defensive violence is an exception and not
wrong. The first assumption is a generalization about all violence being wrong, which many
probably commonly share as an assumption. The second assumption focuses on a particular kind
of violence that many likely agree counts as not-entirely-wrong, defensive violence. However, if
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a particular kind of violence is not wrong because it is defensive, then the general assumption
that all violence is wrong seems incorrect. To define violence as a wrong is not to objectively
define violence, but is instead to evaluate violence, but commonly, people do consider violence
to be wrong. This is why there are paradigmatic examples of violence. Most everyone agrees
that a gang rape is an instance of violence, for example.
The point of looking at these claims concerning the wrongness of violence and its
relationship to defensive violence is that the paradigm case core conception of violence does not
make sense of these relationships. A commonsense view would be limited to the paradigm cases
that are unambiguously wrong. But, the commonsense views characterized by Greene and
Brennan extend the paradigm conception of violence into claims concerning when violence is
wrong and when it is not wrong, and when people are normal, despite that they kill a person, and
when abnormal. These evaluations extend the paradigm conception of violence.
The core of any commonsense view is that, in paradigm cases, violence is wrong.
Evaluations in which violence is defined as not wrong are likely to generate disagreements.
Distinctions between when violence is wrong and when it is not wrong can be produced, but
these distinctions are not necessarily matters of common agreement. Distinctions between kinds
of violence are inevitable because the core notion of violence in the paradigm cases does not
itself value kinds of violence as not wrong. It instead defines what counts as violence based on
the wrongness of the events and actions that involve an intentional use of physical means for the
sake of causing physical or psychological harms or destruction. When the core of the paradigm
cases of wrongness is extended into versions of a commonsense view, and also into distinctions
between kinds of violence, though all violence is wrong, some is defined in the standard
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philosophical literature as not wrong, and disagreements emerge from these evaluations of the
wrongness of violence that transform that wrongness into a valued not wrong kind of violence.

1.7 Disagreements Concerning a Commonsense View of Violence
There are competing commonsense views of violence, as we have seen. But, at the core
of these conceptions of violence are paradigmatic cases that most people agree count as violence.
To think of such events as not counting as violence would be odd, and “abnormal,” as Greene
puts it. Greene’s research indicates who is normal and abnormal, neurologically speaking,
according to how the brains of subjects respond to situations in which they have a choice to use
“prototypical” violence. Prototypically, violence is defined by the automatic antiviolence
system, and a normal, common thing people do is emotionally reject this violence. Brennan,
though, begins with the common assumption that violence (which he defines in terms of
“killing”) is wrong in order to show that defensive violence is justifiable, even against
government officials and agents. Greene’s definition defines violence, in a commonsense way,
and Brennan’s definition evaluates killing, in a different commonsense way. Brennan and
Greene’s assumptions concerning commonsense violence are embedded within their respective,
neuroethical and political projects, which cannot be separated from how they define
commonsense views of violence.
On the other hand, these disagreements over what the commonsense view is indicate why
there is disagreement concerning kinds of violence. Disagreements arise due to how violence
itself is valued. Evaluations of kinds of violence distinguish between wrong and not-wrong,
defensive and non-defensive, legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, emancipatory and
oppressive, normal and abnormal, vengeful and sacrificial violence. This list is incomplete
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because there are many other ways that kinds of violence could be distinguished. However, what
we see is that these evaluations generally follow a formula. A positively evaluated kind of
violence is defined as superior in relation to the negatively evaluated kind of violence. The
positively evaluated kind of violence (such as defensive violence) is superior because it is
defined as that which defeats the inferior kind of violence. Yet, an opposed view can define
those very same actions and events in an inverted way. What counts as defensive violence, from
the perspective of a private citizen, can be defined as illegal, and criminal from the perspective of
the government agent that the private citizen attacks. Even though it may be commonly agreed
that the action or event itself is violent, the kind of violence it is depends upon what one connects
the violence to. The government agent connects the private citizen’s use of violence to a
violation of law, and the assumption that private citizens cannot use violence against public
officials. The private citizen connects his use of violence against the government agent to his
own right to defend his life, or that of others, possibly because there is a duty to protect life, or to
the claim that it is natural for life to protect itself. These connections between kinds of violence
and other things, evaluated in relationships of superiority and inferiority produces conditions for
disagreement.
In fact, this shows that commonsense views of violence are not neutral. The wrongness
of violence is extended so that kinds of violence reflect this wrongness, some of them being
entirely wrong, and others not being entirely wrong because they are defined as that which
defeats the kind of violence that is entirely wrong. Agreement that violence is an intentional use
of physical means to cause physical or psychological harms or destruction does not mean that
everyone will always agree in each case that an event or act is violent. Instead, there are
divergences within commonsense views of violence.
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1.8 The Politicization of the Concept of Violence
Commonsense views arise as reactions to the wrongness of paradigmatic cases. Without
the general recognition of the wrongness of these paradigmatic cases, there would be no
commonsense view. The paradigmatic cases, such as smashing someone’s face for the sake of
causing harm, are altogether wrong, but it is also generally agreed that when such actions are
instances of self-defense, then they are justified. However, what counts as self-defense is
defined in connection to other things, which opens the door for political disagreements
concerning whose violence is self-defensive, and therefore, justified. For example, if one
prioritizes the role of defense played by police violence, proletarian violence, or anarchistic
violence, then it is because one believes these to be superior to other things, particularly those
things these kinds of violence are defined as capable of defeating, because these are defined as
connected to things that need defended. A commonsense definition for violence may be useful
to garner agreements in relation to which people form groups. And it also seems to be the case
that whether an act of violence, in a commonsense view of the term, is a kind of violence
depends upon which group, community, society, or state one belongs to and believes in. It might
be that the act or event is evaluated negatively as a kind of violence, if it interferes with the goals
and vision the group, community, society, or state has of itself, so that for example, if our
violence achieves our freedom it is good, but the violence of them is bad, even if they also aim
toward freedom. Because a group of people, whether as a community, society, or state aims
toward sustaining their existence as a people, in the name of the good, justice, freedom, rights,
religion, or something else, these “group-vision” distinctions between kinds of violence are nonneutrally political.
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Brennan explicitly politicizes his justification for defensive violence used against
government agents and officials when he reveals his political preference for liberal democratic
regimes, despite that he justifies violence against the agents who are representative of those
regimes. He explicitly indicates what he is not endorsing. He writes, “totalitarian communist
regimes do not value individual human life,” and then he uses as evidence the assassinations of
four US Presidents, thirteen US congresspersons, as well as the targeting of these kinds of people
to indicate that liberal democratic regimes handle assassinations of government agents and
officials much better than “totalitarian communist regimes” who respond to attempted
assassinations by terrorizing their citizens, such as when Fanni Kaplan failed to assassinate Lenin
in 1918. 36 His point is that defensive violence used against government officials and agents
within liberal democratic regimes is more likely to be handled well than in totalitarian
communist ones. Anyone who agrees with this may be led to agree that in liberal democratic
regimes defensive violence against government officials is not as bad as in totalitarian
communism itself. This evaluates defensive violence in liberal democratic regimes as superior to
totalitarian communist regimes. Of course, someone who prefers an opposed political ideology
could agree with Brennan that private citizens may justifiably kill government agents in selfdefense or in the defense of others, but disagree with his claim that liberal democratic regimes
handle this better. This demonstrates how a definition of a kind of violence is politicized in
relation to the groups of individuals who agree with the definition and in relation to those who do
not.
Despite common agreement upon paradigm cases of violence, no commonsense
definition of violence or distinction between kinds of violence is politically neutral because even
here there are disagreements concerning what counts as a kind of violence. The disagreements
36 Brennan, 60-1.
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within the commonsense views of violence are extended in the philosophical literature and in the
writings of political ideologists. There are many accounts of violence produced by diverse
figures situated in particular historical contexts. For everyone, and not only these figures, the
question is, whose account is believable, and therefore legitimate? As a historical matter,
legitimacy is contingent on beliefs and beliefs are held within the particular contexts that
influence having them.

1.9 Definitions for Violence and a Logic of Exception
Distinctions between kinds of violence, including those within commonsense views of
violence, are formulated according to a logic of exception. In general, an action or event counts
as violence or a kind of violence, except when X, where X is anything that the definition does not
capture. For example, the paradigm case core of commonsense views of violence identifies
violence with an intentional use of physical means for the sake of causing physical or
psychological harms or destruction. Commonsense views of violence already extend this
conception to allow for exceptions. If an action or an event is an exception to this definition,
then that action or event does not count as violence. This means that some unintentional uses of
physical means that result in harms or destruction do not count as violence. Likewise, if there is
the intentional use of physical means, but no harms or destruction result, then no violence has
occurred. Unless an action or event fits a definition, it is excluded from counting as violence, or
as a kind of violence.
It is also in this sense of this logic of exception that definitions for violence are not
politically neutral, including commonsense views. Distinctions between violence and
nonviolence, legitimate and illegitimate violence, legal and criminal violence, prototypical and
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atypical violence, and defensive and aggressive violence, for example, operate according to this
logic of exception. An act or event is a kind of violence, except when it does not fit that kind of
violence, and whether it fits that kind of defined violence depends upon whether one or a people
connect that act or event to a kind of defined violence. Since another person or people can
connect that act or event to an opposed kind of defined violence, the opposition between these
people demonstrate that definitions for violence and kinds of violence are not politically neutral.
For example, if legitimate violence is that which law defines as legitimate violence, and
the law defines legitimate violence by excluding illegitimate kinds of violence that threaten law's
power (its ability to dominate over lives), then no violence is legitimate except that violence that
defeats the illegitimate violence that threatens law's power. That is, no violence is legitimate,
except the violence law defines as legitimate in relation to law’s power. This logic of exception
is the way in which definitions for violence exclude some things, except those things that are
included, as counting as kinds of violence. By focusing only on what is obviously violent and
that most people would agree counts as violence, a commonsense view apparently excludes
political evaluations of kinds of violence. Instead, it is a definition that includes the criteria that
an act or event is violent only if there is an intentional use of physical means for the sake of
causing physical or psychological harms or destruction. People agree with this definition
because people generally, immediately and emotionally, reject such actions and events as wrong.
When exceptions are considered, as they inevitably are even within a commonsense view, they
rest on other considerations.

29

1.10 Transforming the “Abnormal” Failure to Reject Prototypical Violence into a
“Normal” Approval of Kinds of Prototypical Violence
A person can begin from the paradigm case core conception of violence, and then
distinguish it into kinds so that not all prototypical violence, in Greene’s sense of the term, is
objectionable. This is exactly what Brennan has done. When some individuals act violently
against government officials, their violence is not objectionable when it is defensive. Brennan
achieves this by defining violence as wrong, but then indicates the exceptional cases in which it
is not wrong. Police violence, for example, can be assumed to be defined as good in relation to a
goal of successful law enforcement, which is itself defined as a good. This violence is not
wrong, but justified in relation to the goal that is itself evaluated positively. Any use of violence
except this use is neither justified, nor good. Definitions for kinds of violence, in this way,
transform the violence that would typically be rejected into something that is approved for a
reason that is itself defined in connection to a use of a kind of violence. The definition of a kind
of violence as good and justified in relation to a goal, such as freedom for example, is that which
conceptually transforms violence into something positive, thereby overriding the automatic
antiviolence alarm system Greene infers from his research. That is, distinctions between kinds of
violence transform the abnormal into the normal. The “normal” emotional rejection of personal
uses of violence has to be overridden, and doing so requires a sufficient amount of positive
meaning defined in relation to a kind of violence.
A simple kind of transformation of abnormal violence into normal violence occurs when
some violence is defined as that which defeats violence. The violence that defeats violence is
defined in positive value terms of its ability to defeat violence, and the negative evaluation of
violence in general is transformed into kinds of violence, that which defeats violence and that
which does not. The logic of exception, here, is that violence is wrong, except that violence that
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defeats violence. But, when is violence not wrong? If the answer is when violence defeats
violence, then because there is disagreement concerning the violence that defeats violence, a
commonsense view of defensive violence (that it is not-entirely-wrong) is already participating
in producing a distinction between kinds of violence.
However, it is possible to define more complex relationships between kinds of violence.
For example, a kind of intentional use of personal force that is defined as emancipatory, good,
and brings about or is a manifestation of freedom, rights, or justice because it causes harms
serves to transform the violence that people typically reject into a positively valued means
against that which is excluded from counting as that which brings about or is emancipatory,
good, freedom, rights, or justice. Defined distinctions between kinds of violence transform the
assumed wrongness of violence into something that is sometimes, in particular situations, in the
hands of some people, not wrong. However, whether these kinds of violence actually are what
one defines them as, and are connected to what one claims them to be connected to, is a matter of
disagreement, and depends upon what political ideology one believes in.
Again, legitimate violence is itself defined in a way that serves to rationally justify uses
of violence (those kinds defined by the paradigm case core conception of violence), and thereby
override the automatic rejection of the wrongness of uses of personal force as means to goals.
This legitimate violence is justified because it is defined in terms of its connections to other
things. Power, the state, and a legal order can be valued as superior. If the law defines police
violence as that which enforces law, maintains a legal order, and is therefore legitimate, then it is
difficult to question the legitimacy of police violence without also simultaneously putting the law
itself into question because the legitimacy of police violence and the legal order constitutive of
the law that police violence maintains are defined as essentially connected.
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So, in connection to one another, terms like “power,” “legitimate,” “violence,” and other
terms like “freedom” and “justice” are defined in terms of its relationships, and the definitions
follow a logic of exception. For example, the violence that defeats illegitimate violence is not
itself illegitimate violence because it is an exception that proves the rule, namely that legitimate
violence is that which is defined as not being illegitimate violence. Without law being defined as
connected to power and legitimacy, the law cannot justify uses of legitimate violence. This does
not indicate what violence is, but only indicates that there are kinds of violence valued in diverse
ways, in essential connections to other things, and thus transforming kinds of violence into
normatively negative wrongs and normatively positive not-wrong kinds.

1.11 Willem Schinkel’s Rejection of the Claim that Violence is an Essentially Contested
Concept
In the following chapter, it will be argued that, beyond the paradigm case core conception
of violence, violence is an essentially contested concept. Willem Schinkel, in his “Regimes of
Violence and the Trias Violentiae,” argues that there are four strategies that social theorists and
social scientists utilize when addressing violence, one of which is the strategy arguing that
violence is an essentially contested concept. 37 He argues against the assumption that a
commonsense view of violence is sufficient. Instead of a commonsense view, he argues that
there is a “regime of violence,” which is “the regime of regulation through which different forms
of violence become discernible in the first place.” A regime of violence controls which forms of
violence are acknowledged as violence, and which not. In other words, what counts as violence

37 Willem Schinkel, “Regimes of Violence and the Trias Violentiae,” European Journal of Social Theory 16(2013):
311. The other three strategies include the strategy of not defining violence, the strategy of “enumerating a number
of acts among which some form of family resemblance is found to exist that is then called ‘violence,’” and the
strategy of stipulating a definition that “specifies, usually at an ontic and not an ontological level what counts as
violence.”
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depends on those who define it.
Schinkel also argues that the strategy of arguing that violence is an essentially contested
concept does not work. He writes that “approaches intent on regarding violence as ‘essentially
contested’…lose the ability to contest…[the] contingent outcomes [of variously defined kinds of
violence] and in practice they will be led to observe violence only where private violence and
state violence clash.” 38 So, Schinkel rejects a commonsense view of violence as insufficient, and
rejects the view that argues that violence is an essentially contested concept. His main point is
that there is a regime of violence that regulates what is recognized as kinds of violence, including
the violence of the state and the violence of private individuals. In particular, he argues that
recognition of this regime of violence is “a refusal to reify and ratify state conceptions of
violence.” However, Schinkel’s rejection of the view that the concept of violence is essentially
contestable is itself reflective of his own political ideological assumption that only his definition
of a regime of violence can effectively scrutinize a state’s ability to distinguish between kinds of
violence. That is, Schinkel’s rejection of the view that the concept of violence is essentially
contestable is itself contestable, and non-neutrally political.

1.12 Conclusion: The Persistence of the Core of the Commonsense View of Violence
Two definitions can agree that an event or action is violent, according to the paradigm
case core conception of violence, but disagree on the kind of violence it happens to be, and on
what kind of value the violence bears. One’s preferred political ideology is indicated by the way
in which one distinguishes between valued and disvalued violence, in connection to other things
that are also valued and disvalued. Likewise, social-political and historical context influence the
way in which one defines kinds of violence. Kinds of violence exist only insofar as one defines
38 Ibid. 323.
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them as such in relation to other things. Yet, the paradigm case core of commonsense views of
violence persists.
Given the persistence of the general agreement on what paradigmatically counts as
violence, the question is why is there less agreement concerning kinds of violence? Why is it
that the anarchist's violence is illegitimate according to democratic liberalism, if they both aim
for freedom? Why is it that the same action, such as blowing up a building, can count as both
terrorism and as emancipatory? How can freedom be valued, but when an adversary pursues
freedom, his violence is disvalued, while one’s own use of violence toward freedom is valued?
Perhaps it is because, beyond the paradigm case core, distinctions between kinds of violence are
essentially contestable, and this implies that they are not politically neutral. Two opposed
political ideologies can agree upon a goal, such as justice or freedom, but consider one another's
uses of violent means toward that goal as illegitimate. The following chapter will pursue this
line of thought, arguing that violence, beyond the paradigm case core conception of violence, is
an essentially contested concept.
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CHAPTER TWO: WHEN VIOLENCE IS AN ESSENTIALLY CONTESTED CONCEPT

2.1 Introduction
The paradigm case core of the concept of violence involves cases of the intentional use of
physical means for the sake of causing physical or psychological harm or destruction. Most
people would agree with this definition, and it would be unusual for someone to disagree with it.
Most people consider violence to be a wrong. For example, it would be unusual for someone to
think that no violence has occurred when a person has intentionally crushed another person’s
skull with a cinder block. This is an instance of an intentional use of physical means (the body
of the person who crushes with the cinder block, the body/skull of the person who is crushed by
the cinder block, and the cinder block itself) for the sake of causing harm and destruction (the
crushing of the skull, and likely, the death or severe cranial damage of the victim). Assuming
that most agree that this is a violent act or event, this example serves as a paradigmatic example
of violence. However, as soon as we ask if this action is wrong, or why the action took place, or
if it was a justified act, we are confronted with a disagreement because we are valuing the kind
of violence we believe it to be. Perhaps the action is justified, and perhaps not, but either way,
the action will be evaluated by a person in its connection to other things. This indicates that,
though there is agreement concerning a core of paradigm cases of violence, as soon as we move
away from this core to consider justifications of violence, disagreements emerge.
The political ideologies of liberalism, nationalism, communism, and anarchism all justify
the uses of violence, explicitly or implicitly, as a means toward their goals. The issue is that
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justifications for uses of violence, such as those given within the purview of these political
ideologies, conflict with one another. These political ideologies sometimes compete against one
another theoretically, and in actual practice, vying to gain their goals, and to destroy one another.
They can fundamentally disagree with one another politically ideologically, and they can
disagree with one another’s uses of violence toward goals. Each considers its own depiction of
human existence, and of relationships between humans, to be the correct or best one. These
opposed political ideologies agree on the wrongness of violence in the paradigm cases, but
disagree upon what kind of violence those actions and events happen to be. Examples of
definitions of violence produced by Vittorio Bufacchi, the World Health Organization, Thomas
Nagel, and Verena Erlenbusch are outlined in order to show that Walter Bryce Gallie's and
Alasdair MacIntyre's characterizations of essentially contested concepts are fulfilled by the
concept of violence.
Here, two points are made concerning distinctions between kinds of violence. First, what
counts as kinds of violence is essentially contested, and second, because there is agreement
concerning the wrongness of violence in the paradigm cases, the concept of violence plays a
special role within political philosophy. Because there is agreement in relation to wrongness
with respect to the paradigm cases, it is rhetorically effective to extend the concept to apply to
other kinds of acts.

2.2 Vittorio Bufacchi on What Violence is Not
Vittorio Bufacchi, in his recent (2013) encyclopedia entry “Violence,” distinguishes
violence from what it is not, namely, power, coercion, harm, and force. 39 He means to zero in on
one defining set of characteristics that is unique to violence, and that significantly distinguishes
39 International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Hugh LaFollette, (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), s.v. “Violence.”
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violence from power, coercion, harm, and force. On power, for example, he conceives of it as “a
dispositional concept, something that people who possess it have the option to use,” and violence
as “not something we possess or [do] not possess; it is not a capability we either have or [do] not
have. Instead, violence is something we do; it is an act.” This indicates that there is a difference
between a person's ability to act and a person’s performance of that act. A person has the power
(ability) to be violent, and then when the person is violent, that power is enacted as an act of
violence. This means that power precedes violence, and is connected to violence, but is not
violence itself. Violence is not something that is possessed as a capability, but is instead an
act. 40
On the distinction between violence and coercion, Bufacchi explains that “while violence
can be used to coerce, in which case violence is a form of coercion, not all acts of violence are
necessarily acts of coercion, since it is possible for coercion to occur without violence.” This
distinction between violence and coercion amounts to the claim that violence and coercion can
occur together, but not necessarily. Violence is sometimes coercive, but not always. Bufacchi
adds the distinction that “coercion is...by definition an act that undermines voluntariness,” and
violence does not always “undermine voluntariness.”
On the distinction between violence and harm, Bufacchi writes that, ““harm” is a term we
use to describe the consequences of violence, but it is not necessarily what constitutes the act of
violence in itself. In other words, the experience of harm is a consequence or sign of violence; to
define violence in terms of the harm is to mistake the symptom for the disease.” Here, Bufacchi
is distinguishing between actions and what results from them. First there is the power (ability) to

40 Bufacchi also provides reasons for thinking of violence as distinct from “excessive force,” which are the same as
the reasons he gives for thinking that violence is distinct from power. He writes, “force (as with power) is a
dispositional concept, to the extent that it refers to an ability or potentiality.”
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be violent, then the violent act itself is performed, and then harms result. Violence produces
harms, but we should not refer to the harm itself as violence. So, altogether, violence is
sometimes coercive and sometimes “undermine[s] voluntariness,” but not always; violence is an
act and is not possessed as an ability in the way that power is possessed as an ability; violence is
not the harms that result from violent acts.
In addition to indicating what violence is not, Bufacchi adds that “violence is an
evaluative concept, perhaps even a normative concept.” This means that an action is evaluated
as counting as a violent act. As indicated in the discussion above concerning the paradigm case
core conception of violence, an action or event may commonly count as being a violent one, but
beyond the core cases, there are distinctions between kinds of violence. So, in addition to this
evaluation of an action as counting as a violent one, there are also evaluations of the kind of
violence the action happens to be, which Bufacchi does not discuss. Instead, he next focuses on
defining violence on the basis of its etymological relationship to the concept of violation.

2.3 Newton Garver's Influential Argument Concerning the Relationship between a
Violation and Violence
In order to relate the concept of violence to the concept of “to violate,” Bufacchi utilizes
Newton Garver's influential What Violence Is because Garver defines violence in terms of a
violation, and notes that “following Garver, many contemporary theorists of violence have
converged on the idea of defining violence in terms of a violation, although there seems to be
some disagreement about what exactly is being violated when an act of violence takes place.” 41

41 Newton Garver, “What Violence Is,” in Violence: A Philosophical Anthology, ed. Vittorio Bufacchi (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 5338. Here is Garver on the relationship between the concept of violence and the
concept of violation. He writes, “Violence in human affairs is much more closely connected with the idea of
violation than with the idea of force. What is fundamental about violence is that a person is violated...because a
person has certain rights which are undeniably, indissolubly, connected with being a person. One of these is a right
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There may be convergence on this etymological relationship, but disagreement persists. Perhaps
this disagreement persists because we tend to use the word ‘violence’ in many ways. For
example, we might say that a person violently slams on the breaks of his car to avoid a collision.
However, whether the braking mechanism, the car itself, or the possibility of a collision are
violated is highly debatable. So, the etymological relationship between violence and “to violate”
may be informative, but does not indubitably establish what counts as violence.

2.4 An Etymological Relationship between Violence and Violate
The etymological relationship between 'violence' and 'violate' exists because the terms
share the Latin root ‘vis.’ The term “violent” comes from the Latin violentus, which is composed
of vis and -olentus. Vis means “strength, force, power, energy, [and] hostile strength.” 42 olentus means “having in quantity, full of.” So, violentus means “forcible, violent, vehement,
impetuous, [and] boisterous.” 43 The Latin word for “violation” is violātus, which is the
participle of violo. Violo means “to treat with violence, injure, dishonor, outrage, violate.” 44 So,
there appears to be a strong etymological relationship between the terms “violation” and
“violence,” but this relationship constitutes only one way of thinking about what violence is. It
only tells us that violence and violate have an etymological relationship. It does not tell us what
violence is. Also, the Latin root, 'vis,' includes “force” and “power,” which disagrees with
Bufacchi’s distinctions between violence and power. This etymological relationship does not
provide a static, agreed upon definition of the concept of violence. All it does is relate the word

to one’s body…Apart from a body, what is essential to one's being a person is dignity…[and] autonomy is essential
to being human.” A violation of a body, of dignity, or of autonomy counts as violence.
42 Charlton Thomas Lewis, An Elementary Latin Dictionary (New York: American Book Company, 1890), 924.
43 Ibid. 922.
44 Ibid. 922.
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'violence' to the word 'violate' on the vague foundation of their share root, 'vis.' There is a
difference between an etymological relationship between concepts and how those concepts are
used.
Additionally, in order to rebut a claim that this etymological relationship indicates a
definition for violence only requires finding an instance in which we claim that violence has not
occurred, but a violation has, or that a violation has not occurred, but violence has. If such
situations are tenable, then the etymological relationship is not a strong one. We can separate the
concept of violence from the concept of violate in a way that erodes the claim that the
etymological relationship is significant. As long as it is debatable whether every instance of
violence involves a violation, and whether every instance of a violation involves violence, this
etymological relationship does not serve as a ground for a definition of the concept of violence,
and does not reveal what violence is.

2.5 Bufacchi on Three Kinds of Violence
Bufacchi distinguishes between (1) a Minimalist Conception of Violence (MCV), which
equates to a deliberate use of physical force for the sake of producing suffering or injury, (2)
psychological violence, which does not necessarily involve a use of physical force, and (3)
structural or institutional violence, which he refers to as “the Comprehensive Conception of
Violence” (CCV). 45 The general distinction between MCV, and CCV, is that the prior entails a
“notion of excessive force,” while the latter implies “the notion of a violation of rights.” One
commonsense view of violence, discussed earlier, includes the first two kinds of violence
45 Bufacchi, 5339. Garver characterizes four kinds of violence: “Violence in human affairs amounts to violating
persons. It occurs in several markedly different forms, and can usefully be classified into four different kinds based
on two criteria, whether the violence is personal or institutionalized, and whether the violence is overt or covert and
quiet.”
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Bufacchi defines. Here, Bufacchi relates “excessive force” to violence, however, he also
associates “force” with power on the grounds that force and power are dispositional, in the sense
of abilities and potentialities. So, he argues that because force “is a dispositional concept, to the
extent that it refers to an ability or potentiality,” and because “violence is an evaluative concept,”
these concepts are distinct. It is difficult to see how violence can be defined in a politically
neutral way, in that excessiveness is relevant to the goals in question.
Bufacchi also suggests a “third way” to define violence “as a violation of integrity,” and
an “integrity” is “something that has not been broken, or that has not lost its original form.” 46 It
is “integrity as wholeness or completeness.” That is, “violence can be defined as a violation of
integrity to the extent that violence damages or destroys a pre-existing unity.” The paradigm
case core conception does not depend on notions of integrity, unity, wholeness, or completeness.
We might ask why does there have to be a damaged or destroyed integrity in order for it to be
said that violence has occurred? If it is the case that whenever something is a pre-existing unity
that has been violated or broken, violence has occurred, then it could be said that there is a lot of
this kind of violence that occurs. The violence of disrupting a serene pond, the violence of an
airplane flying through a cloud, the violence of eating a sandwich. Perhaps poetically, this
makes sense, but it does not agree with paradigmatic cases of violence, such as when one person
purposefully uses a sledge hammer to break the ankles of another person.
In relation to CCV (the Comprehensive Conception of Violence), which implies “a
violation of rights,” again there arises the problem with establishing what rights are. If socialpolitical and historical context matters, and there is no reason to think it does not, then what
counts as a violation of rights is going to vary from one place in history to another. Under a kind
of slavery, for example, if a slave has no legal rights, but is merely considered the subhuman
46 Ibid. 5340.
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property of an owner, a slave might not count as suffering “structural or institutional violence”
because the slave does not even count as a full-fledged right-bearing human in the way that we
would say the person does suffer this once slavery is abolished. The point is that, whether there
is a violation of rights, and an occurrence of “structural or institutional violence,” can depend
upon historical and geographical context to the point that on one day, a person does not suffer
this kind of violence, but the next week the person does suffer it. So, whether a person is
violated, and suffers “Comprehensive Violence” is not clear, given the various ways that people
are and are not considered rights-holders within specific places and times.
Historical and geographical context also applies to the second kind of psychological
violence Bufacchi distinguishes, because whether a person is psychologically violated depends
on the psychology of that person in relation to the historically contextual understanding of
psychology and practice of social norms at a particular time and place. Verbal castigations,
deception, and coercion may or may not count as psychological violence, if the people in the
context in which these take place consider them to be more or less “normal” things for one
person to say or do to particular others. In relation to the paradigm case core conception of
violence, Bufacchi’s distinctions between these three kinds of violence, though useful for
critiquing social practices, institutions, and governments, are not likely to be commonly shared.
What counts as psychological or comprehensive violence from the perspective of one person, or
a group of people, may not count as these kinds of violence from the perspective of another
person, or group of people.
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2.6 Bufacchi's Definition of Violence
Disregarding for now the criticisms that can be raised against Bufacchi's distinctions
between kinds of violence, force, excessive force, and power, let’s look at how he actually
defines it. Bufacchi writes,
An act of violence occurs when the integrity or unity of a subject
(person or animal) or object (property) is intentionally or
unintentionally violated, as a result of an action or omission. The
violation may occur at the physical or psychological level, through
physical or psychological means. A violation of integrity will
usually result in the subject being harmed or injured, or the object
being destroyed or damaged.
This definition extends far beyond the paradigm case core conception of violence, given that it
includes unintentional violations of an integrity or unity, and omissions. It also specifies that
violence can occur against objects. Bufacchi's aim with this definition of violence is to
comprehensively cover a variety of kinds of violence so that anything that could qualify as an
instance of violence is accounted for.
Additionally, Bufacchi indicates that an act of violence can be psychological,
unintentional and an omission, which means that whether we are aware of this violence is
relative to whether it ever even becomes clear to us that this unintentionally missing thing is
psychologically affecting us. That violence can be psychological, unintentional, and an omission
opens the door to a variety of possible claims concerning kinds of violence. For example,
events, or significant things that happen within the course of history, are significant in relation to
someone who thinks of them as significant. If an event is significant because it did not happen,
or unintentionally happened, or only happened psychologically, then there are many significant
things not taking place that destroy some kind of possible integrity or unity. This means that,
given all the things that are unintentionally not happening, and that are psychologically affecting
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us because they are not happening, there is a lot of violence taking place in nonphysical ways of
which we are unaware.
One can always point out that something did not occur due to no one's direct intention,
and that one suffers “psychological violence” or “comprehensive violence” as a result, but this
could result in too many things being described as violence that we might otherwise not count as
violence. For example, a person might complain that they did not receive a good upbringing, not
because the person's parents intentionally neglected that person, but because they unintentionally
forgot to buy the person the right kind of shoes, which caused psychological issues in relation to
the person's friends who have high standards when it comes to the shoes one wears.

2.7 Bufacchi on the Identity and Consequentialist Arguments for Justified Violence
Bufacchi goes on to argue that “violence is bad and prima facie wrong, yet there are
times when, at least in principle, violence can and ought to be justified,” and this means that we
are justifying an “evil” when we justify violence. But, he adds that we might think of violence as
both good and bad, depending on how it is used. In order to indicate what he means, Bufacchi
produces an “Identity Argument,” which says that “violence is good if, through an act of
violence, the perpetrator is able to reestablish his or her own identity as a person of equal moral
value, deserving the respect of others.” But, he adds that this Identity Argument “makes it too
easy to justify violence,” since someone could use it as an excuse. The Identity Argument
assumes that violence can be good when it defeats other kinds of violence. According to this
Argument, violence is justified and good only when it reestablishes a person’s identity such that
the person is deserving of respect. Otherwise, a use of violence is bad. The person’s identity is
reestablished when that person is “of equal moral value.”
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In contrast to the Identity Argument, which assumes violence to be both good and evil,
but good only when it reestablishes a person’s identity such that the person is deserving of equal
moral respect, Bufacchi also produces a “Consequentialist Argument,” which considers violence
to be evil, and only justifies violence “when it is a necessary evil, an indispensable means
toward preventing an even greater evil and/or promoting a greater good.” This Consequentialist
Argument justifies violence only if violence is necessary toward eliminating something worse. It
considers all violence to be evil. It follows from this Consequentialist Argument that violence
can only be known to be a necessary evil, and not merely evil, retrospectively. It has to be
shown that the violence does not merely make things worse, but eliminates something worse,
which cannot be known at the time the violence occurs. If the violence eliminates something
worse, then this can only be known after the violence has occurred. So, the point at which
violence becomes a necessary evil, and not only evil violence cannot be the point at which the
violence is used. A use of violence can be defined as a necessary evil only on the assumption
that one knows what will happen when that violence, but this can only be confirmed after the
fact.
Overall, then, Bufacchi's distinctions between violence and other things such as power,
force, coercion, and harm, as well as his definitions of kinds of violence extend far beyond the
paradigm case core concept of violence, and do not only focus on intentional uses of physical
means for the sake of causing physical or psychological harms or destruction. The Identity
Argument and Consequentialist Argument are each ways in which violence could be justified.
Both arguments evaluate violence, defining it as evil, but sometimes as good, or sometimes as a
necessary evil. In the next section, Bufacchi's definitions are compared to the definition of
violence produced by the World Health Organization.
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2.8 The World Health Organization's Definition of Violence and the Role of Intentions
The World Health Organization defines violence as “the intentional use of physical force
or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community,
which either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm,
maldevelopment, or deprivation.” 47 The obvious difference between Bufacchi's definition and
this one is that the WHO does not include unintentional violence, violence as an omission, and
violence against objects. The WHO only includes the criteria of “the intentional use of physical
force, threatened or actual” as that which distinguishes what counts as violence. One significant
difference between the definitions produced by the WHO and Bufacchi is that the WHO requires
the intention to use violence as a criterion for an action to qualify as an act of violence, while
Bufacchi does not. According to the WHO’s definition, an unintended threat to cause harm,
destruction, or damage does not count as violence. Despite the fact that intentions are
psychological, and are not always obvious for that reason, the WHO's definition relies on a
transparency of intentions. However, the WHO’s definition reflects the universally agreed upon
wrongness of paradigmatic cases of violence.
The WHO, and most versions of commonsense views of violence, reflect an assumption
that people are only ever violent when they intend to be. Bufacchi’s definition, in contrast,
counts unintentional uses of excessive force that results in harms or destruction as kinds of
violence. Bufacchi’s definition thus has a political implication: it makes it possible to hold
individuals and collectives of people accountable for the harms and destruction they produce,
even if they did not mean to produce those harms and that destruction.

47 “Health Topics: Violence,” World Health Organization, accessed March 14, 2014,
http://www.who.int/topics/violence/en/
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2.9 Diverse Perspectives, Ideology, and Fundamental Disagreements
The point is not that the definition of violence produced by the WHO is worse in relation
to Bufacchi's. My goal here is not to produce some sort of hierarchy concerning better and
worse kinds of definitions of violence, but only to indicate that there is a fundamental
disagreement concerning what violence is. That is, beyond the paradigm case core conception of
violence, distinctions between kinds of violence are essentially contestable. There are
similarities between the definitions produced by various individuals, particularly in that violence
is typically treated as a means, intentions can but do not necessarily matter, and something is
harmed or destroyed, but the differences between definitions abound, and these indicate that the
concept of violence is an essentially contested one.
The issue is that definitions for violence, beyond the paradigm case core conception of
violence, differ. From the perspective of one definition, some act or event can count as a violent
one, but not necessarily from the perspective of other definitions. Likewise, from the
perspectives of a person, collective of people, state, or institution, what counts as violence, and
as a kind of violence is not always what everyone would agree is violence. The violence of an
individual differs from collective violence, state violence, and institutional violence. The four of
these do not necessarily correspond to any commonsense view of violence, if the violent acts and
events these produce are something other than an intentional use of physical means for the sake
of causing physical or psychological harms or destruction. To complicate matters, there are
kinds of violence besides those that produce physical or psychological harms or destruction,
intentionally or unintentionally. We have already seen, via the Identity argument and
Consequentialist Arguments discussed by Bufacchi, that violence can be defined and justified, as
a good, even if it is evaluated as an evil, or wrong. Definitions can be produced for symbolic,
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linguistic, objective, subjective, creative, destructive, legal, illegal (criminal), legitimate,
illegitimate, vengeful, and emancipatory, and revolutionary violence. Later, in the fourth
chapter, it is also argued that non-violence itself can count as a kind of violence. Whether an
action or event counts as a kind of violence, and possibly as justified, depends on the definition
one agrees with. The core paradigm case conception, because it evaluates all cases that fit the
paradigm violence as wrong, does not serve to justify any kind of violence, though it could be
used in order to indicate what is and is not violence. The paradigm core cases may be useful for
establishing an agreement upon what counts as violence, but in relation to other definitions for
and distinctions between kinds of violence, one can disagree, arguing that a given definition does
not account for other kinds of violence. Given the diversity of possible perspectives pertaining
to kinds of violence, it appears that distinctions between kinds are possible, but these distinctions
extend the paradigm case core conception of violence as a wrong.

2.10 The Application of Gallie's Criteria for Essentially Contested Concepts to the Concept
of Violence
In his seminal article, Essentially Contested Concepts, Walter Bryce Gallie argues that an
essentially contested concept is a concept that is used in different ways within arguments
produced by theorists such that it is obvious that “there is no one clearly definable general
use...which can be set up as the correct or standard use.” 48 I will apply Gallie's argument to the
concept of violence because violence is a concept “the proper use of which inevitably involves
endless disputes about [its] proper uses on the part of the users.” 49 Despite that there is common
agreement concerning paradigmatic examples of violence, the proper use of the term ‘violence’

48 Walter Bryce Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56(1955-6):
168.
49 Ibid. 169.
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beyond this paradigm case core conception of violence is inevitably disputed. From the
standpoint of one political ideology, the concept of violence can be defined, evaluated, and
justified in a way that is “proper” according to that political ideology, but “improper” according
to a different political ideology. So, since a proper use of the concept of violence is contestable,
the actions and events that are claimed to be instances of kinds of violence, and therefore as
justified or not, are not necessarily agreed upon as being instances of those kinds of violence.
In order to qualify as an essentially contested concept, the concept of violence must meet
seven conditions, outlined by Gallie, which reveal that violence is an essentially contested
concept, and not merely a concept about which theorists are radically confused. These
conditions that qualify a concept as an essentially contested one are first outlined, and then the
concept of violence is shown to satisfy each of these seven conditions.
1. [The concept] must be appraisive in the sense that it signifies or
accredits some kind of valued achievement.
2. This achievement must be of an internally complex character,
for all that its worth is attributed to it as a whole.
3. Any explanation of its worth must therefore include reference to
the respective contributions of its various parts or features; yet
prior to experimentation there is nothing absurd or contradictory
in any one of a number of possible rival descriptions of its total
worth, one such description setting its component parts or
features in one order of importance, a second setting them in a
second order, and so on. In fine, the accredited achievement is
initially variously describable.
4. The accredited achievement must be of a kind that admits of
considerable modification in the light of changing
circumstances; and such modification cannot be prescribed or
predicted in advance...[T]he concept of any such achievement
[is] “open” in character.
5. Each party recognizes the fact that its own use of [the concept]
is contested by those of other parties, and that each party must
have at least some appreciation of the different criteria in the
light of which the other parties claim to be applying the concept
in question. More simply, to use an essentially contested
concept means to use it against other uses and to recognize that
one's own use of it has to be maintained against these other
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uses. Still more simply, to use an essentially contested concept
means to use it both aggressively and defensively.
6. [There must be a] derivation of any such concept from an
original exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all the
contestant users of the concept, and
7. The probability or plausibility, in appropriate senses of these
terms, of the claim that the continuous competition for
acknowledgment as between the contestant users of the concept,
enables the original exemplar's achievement to be sustained
and/or developed in optimum fashion. 50
In short, an essentially contested concept is one that is “an appraisive term [that] signif[ies] an
achievement that is internally complex, variously describable and “open”...[and is] used both
“aggressively” and “defensively.”” 51 The penultimate and final conditions, (6) and (7), indicate
that the concept is not merely “radically confused,” but actually is an essentially contested one. I
will first discuss conditions (6) and (7) in order to show that we are not dealing with a radical
confusion here. Then, I return to conditions (1) through (5) because these are the conditions that,
without exception, arise within the political, ideological assumptions of theorists who write on
violence, defining and evaluating it in ways that extend beyond the paradigm cases of violence.
Condition (6) indicates that a concept is contested, and not radically confused, because
there is some exemplar upon which all agree that the concept is applicable. In contemporary
society, the events of 9/11, and the nuclear bombing of noncombatants in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki both serve as exemplars that are variously described as violence. The paradigm case
core conception of violence defines these as violent events, just as it defines someone’s
intentionally smashing another person’s knee cap with a hammer as violence. Such examples
serve as exemplars, paradigmatic examples. The events of September 11, 2001 often serves as a
primary exemplar in contemporary literature, though the actions of ISIS/ISIL (The Islamic State
in Syria/The Islamic State in Libya), mass shootings in the United States by US citizens, the
50 Ibid. 171-2, 180.
51 Ibid. 180-1.
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killing of unarmed citizens by police, and wars in general are discussed as well. Ideologues,
such as Thomas Nagel and Verena Erlenbusch, who are discussed below, produce criteria,
according to which such exemplars qualify as violence, and as kinds of violence. In short,
though, the paradigm case core conception of violence that pertains to actions and events that
most everyone agrees count as instances of violence serve as the exemplars, and this means that
disputes concerning the meaning of the concept of violence are not due to radical confusions.
Condition (6) only shows that disagreement occurs not because of a radical confusion.
Instead, the meaning of the concept of violence is contested. Condition (6) is not alone sufficient
for the concept to be an essentially contested one. Together with condition (7), a concept fulfills
the conditions set out by Gallie for qualifying as an essentially contested concept. All could
agree that an exemplar for a concept exists, but not continuously compete with one another. In
this case, the concept would not be contested essentially. Without continuous competition for
recognition of the ways ideologies define and distinguish kinds of violence, the concept of
violence would not be essentially contested. Historic tradition in the philosophical literature
demonstrates an ongoing competition between rival political philosophies concerned with kinds
of violence. Their claims and definitions are in competition. If competition were to cease, this is
no indication of an agreement, but is instead only a temporary time period in which novel
definitions and distinctions are not produced.
The concept of violence satisfies conditions (6) and (7). There is an ongoing contest
between political ideologies that describe and define why and how the concept of violence
applies to particular exemplars. The disagreement between the WHO’s definition and
Bufacchi’s definitions is only one amongst many. They might not explicitly acknowledge one
another’s definitions, but the fact that they define violence in ways that conflict with other
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definitions demonstrates that they acknowledge that violence must be defined. That is, if there
were an agreed upon definition for violence, then it would be superfluous that either of them
make an effort to define violence. If there were an agreed upon definition of violence, then it
could be assumed.
Furthermore, the other five conditions required for the concept of violence to be an
essentially contested one are fulfilled. That is, the concept of violence is appraisive, insofar as it
is applied in relation to some achievement that is itself assessed as violence, no matter whether
the achievement is a use of means, or an achieved goal. Means used toward goals, and goals
themselves can be appraised as violent. Likewise, in accordance with the second condition, the
achievement explained by the use of a concept of violence is itself “internally complex” because
the assumptions, descriptions, evaluations, and argumentation produced on the basis of political,
ideological assumptions contribute to the whole of the evaluation of an achievement as an
instance of violence. For example, political ideological assumptions, such as those concerning
how human freedom, laws, a state, police and a military relate to one another altogether
contribute to the evaluation of a use of violence, and to the evaluation of that which the violence
achieves. If we are to understand why and how a political ideology justifies a use of violence,
then these internal complexities have to be fully considered.
The third condition pertains to violence insofar as that which is achieved, and declared to
be violence, is not only “internally complex,” but is also variously describable. This means that
what is referred to as violence is dependent upon whether achievements, in the forms of means
and goals, fit within the political ideological assumptions of a theorist who is concerned with
defining what violence is. Multiple political ideologies, for example, each concerned with
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freedom, justice, the rule of law, and the role of violence can describe these in various ways that
rival one another.
Additionally, since there are a variety of ways that theorists can construct their political,
ideological perspectives, and there is a variety of ways that they can evaluate the means and
goals that they define as violent, there is no way to predict which future use of means and gain of
goals will count as violent, and this satisfies the fourth condition. A use of violence today may
be considered good, right, and legal, but in the future, this same use of violence may later be
valued as evil, wrong, and illegal. The concept of violence, in this sense, is “open.” One cannot
always indubitably know now that a use of violence is what one defines it as, and one cannot
declare that a use of violence will achieve what is expected in the way that one expects.
Nevertheless, because the concept of violence is essentially contested, it is possible to
depict violence as capable of achieving, and as having successfully achieved a goal, even if the
means used are not considered to be violent by everyone. Political ideologies aggressively and
defensively use the concept of violence, each in their own way, in opposition with one another,
and this satisfies the fifth condition. Therefore, violence qualifies as an essentially contested,
given the seven requirements produced by Gallie.

2.11 MacIntyre on Essentially Contested Social Concepts: The Continuously Developing
Debate Concerning the Concept of Violence
Alasdair MacIntyre, in his article, The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts,
points out that some concepts, particularly within the social sciences, are essentially contested in
ways that do not occur in the natural sciences. 52 In the natural sciences, “decisive and effective
answers which are inseparable from the formulation of certain key generalizations” are

52 Alasdair MacIntyre, “The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts,” Ethics 84(1973): 1.
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produced, if even temporarily, in ways that the social sciences do not produce key
generalizations. 53 MacIntyre refers to Friedrich Waismann's notion of “the open texture of
concepts,” which, MacIntyre argues, “depends upon a contrast between the application of criteria
(i) in what have been up to now normal circumstances, (ii) as a result of experience in standard
conditions...and their application in abnormal or radically new situations.” 54 MacIntyre
considers this distinction to be similar to one made by Hilary Putnam, who “shows that to
convey the normal use of a word involves certain sets of what [Putnam] calls “core facts.”” 55
Overall, MacIntyre's reason for referring to Putnam and Waismann is that together they
demonstrate that even though “there is not a finite and determinate set of necessary and sufficient
conditions which determine the application of a concept...or a word...[we] in normal
circumstances and in standard conditions...behave as if there were such a finite and determinate
set.” 56 He means that we use some concepts, even though we lack a full-fledged understanding
of the conditions that qualify uses of the concepts, because it would otherwise be impractical to
use those concepts. Such concepts are “indefinitely debatable” because they are essentially
contested. To argue that these concepts, such as violence, are not “indefinitely debatable” is to
prove that they are “indefinitely debatable” and essentially contested. The paradigm case core
conception of violence serves as the definition with which people typically and commonly refer
to particular actions and events as violent ones. Many can point to the same action or event and

53 A triangle is a three-sided figure, for example, and nothing more is necessary for understanding what counts as a
triangle.
54 Ibid. 1-2. See also Friedrich Waismann, D. M. McKinnon, and W. C. Kneal, “Symposium: Verifiability,”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 19(1945): 101-164. Here, Waismann argues that
“open texture is a very fundamental characteristic of most, though not all, empirical concepts, and it is this texture
which prevents us from verifying conclusively most of our empirical statements.” In relation to the concept of
violence, when it is used to refer to some experienced thing, the only way in which one can avoid vagueness, is by
more stringently defining the rules that indicate why the concept of violence applies, though this does not eliminate
the fact that it has an “open texture,” in that there are other ways those rules could be defined. See especially p. 23.
55 MacIntyre refers to Hilary Putnam, “Is Semantics Possible?” Metaphilosophy 1(1970): 187-201.
56 MacIntyre 2.
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say that it is “violent,” but this is the initial moment from which emerges the question, “why and
how is it violent?” and there begins the disagreements.
MacIntyre adds that essentially contested concepts are “indefinitely debatable” because,
unlike concepts used within the natural sciences, in the social sciences “beliefs are partially
constitutive of at least some central social institutions and practices, and such beliefs always
involve some version of a concept of the institution or practice in question.” 57 These beliefs are
ideological insofar as they correspond to and “are partially constitutive of at least some social
institutions and practices...[and] affect their relationships to those institutions and practices,
and...consequently affect the character of such institutions and practices,” particularly in the case
of political parties. 58 This means that, within a political party, for example, certain beliefs and
behaviors constitute the “character” of the party, but there can be disagreement concerning what
these beliefs and behaviors are, and there can be disagreement concerning what exactly is the
topic of disagreement. 59 These disagreements occur not only verbally, but also in practice.
Political parties may agree that something is violent, but disagree on the kind of violence it
happens to be. So, though we can refer to political groups by name, their uses of terms such as
‘violence’ that relate to their shared beliefs, but that they disagree upon, leads to their actions not
being in agreement. People act in relation to those things they define in relation to their beliefs.
If there is agreement that an action is violent, but disagreement concerning the kind of violence it
happens to be, then how people act in relation to this action differs. Even though a political party
may seem to have one motive, and shared belief, this belief is articulated and enacted in various
ways. So, whether something is violent, and what kind of violence it happens to be, depends
upon the beliefs, ideological and political, of the person, institution, or state that applies the word
57 Ibid. 3.
58 Ibid. 3.
59 Ibid. 4.
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'violence' to some event or action. Even if two or more agree on some things, they will disagree
on other things, and there is no guarantee that when they utter the word 'violence' in relation to
the same thing that they agree on anything other than that the word 'violence' applies in the sense
of the paradigm case core conception of violence.
MacIntyre also argues that disagreement arises because the actions and ideas that pertain
to the social sciences are ones that may be identified, but their identity is not something that can
be indicated in reference to some “law-governed” example. 60 Actions and ideas are identifiable
because there is a “continuity of institutionalized argument, debate, and conflict,” but this
identification is not possible because of some agreed upon way in which these actions and ideas
are identified. 61 That is, there is no one, law-like way, for example, in which 9/11 can qualify as
having involved a kind of violence, even though most people might say that 9/11 involved
paradigmatic violence. For these reasons, every instance of someone's declaration or definition
of what a concept is amounts to an instance that makes it clear that there is disagreement
concerning the concept. A person who declares, “violence is X,” or that “X is violence” does not
define violence and settle the debate, but instead, contributes to a continuous debate concerning
the concept of violence.
Disagreement, in this way, sustains the existence of the relevance of the contested
concept. Disagreement does not continue in the same particular way forever, but transforms into
new kinds of disagreements in relation to discontinuous breaks that are introduced when
individuals produce novel arguments and ways of thinking of some social concepts. The
meaning of such concepts is not settled, and if it seems as if the concept's meaning has been
settled, then this is only a period of time during which there is a lack of a production of

60 Ibid. 4-5.
61 Ibid. 5.
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discontinuous breaks and novel arguments. Disagreement will arise again, though, even if it
seems as though the matter concerning some concept, such as violence, is settled.
Furthermore, MacIntyre argues that “innovations help to define new sets of alternatives
which create new occasions for decision and for conflict over decisions,” and none of these
innovations could have been predicted according to some agreed upon concept. 62 It follows that
“normative debate is ineliminable from the question of how the concept...is to be applied. [So, it
is] essentially contestable.” 63 The point to take from MacIntyre is not that theorists are getting
better at conceptualizing violence, but that they are merely engage in an ongoing debate
concerning the concept of violence, innovating ways in which violence is defined. It should be
noted that the same is the case for other terms as well. Freedom, democracy, rights, legitimacy,
and justice, for example, are concepts for which there is agreement at one level, in relation to
particular exemplars, but beyond the common agreement, there is disagreement concerning what
should be evaluated as freedom, democracy, rights, legitimacy and justice, and there is
disagreement how these should be evaluated. Any attempt to “operationalize” such concepts
(including violence) so that it is “amenable to scientific procedure” would be trivial, ad hoc, and
only serves to contribute to an ongoing debate, not to ending it, since any one way of declaring
that a social concept should be used would be an operationalization of the concept only for the
sake of operationalizing it. 64
For example, one might declare that a concept should be used restrictively, but this would
be a restriction that is made simply for there being a restricted use of the concept, and to
maintain that only this one use of the concept qualifies as a use of the concept is trivial and ad
hoc. Any restriction that is ad hoc in this way is unwarranted because it trivializes the concept.
62 Ibid. 5.
63 Ibid. 7.
64 Ibid. 8.
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So, strict definitions for social and political concepts are not desirable. 65 From this perspective,
it follows that the definitions produced by the World Health Organization, and Bufacchi are ad
hoc, and trivial.

2.12 Willem de Haan on Violence as an Essentially Contested Concept
Professor of criminology Willem de Haan agrees that violence is an essentially contested
concept. In his Violence as an Essentially Contested Concept, de Haan argues that
criminologists should move beyond “one of the most common ways of defining violence [which
is] to argue that violence is the use of force that has been prohibited by law” because
For a criminologist it is more fruitful, both theoretically and
methodologically, to consider definitions of violence to be
essentially contested, to accept that, depending on the specific
contexts of discovery and contexts of justification, valid arguments
are feasible for either inclusive or restrictive definitions of
violence, and that a proper definition of ‘violence’ should not a
priori be seen as a starting point for empirical research but as a
temporary outcome, which may or may not prove to be useful in
future research. Exploring a diversity of definitions is fruitful
because by means of adjusting concepts scientific progress can
[be] made [sic]. 66
De Haan’s aim is to convince criminologists to avoid approaching violence from the restrictive
view of the law. Legally defined kinds of criminal violence are insufficient for addressing what
counts as violence.
Though de Haan does not explicitly state this, there is a political motivation for
criminologists to approach the concept of violence more inclusively. The legitimacy of law’s

65 Ibid. 8.
66 Willem de Haan, “Violence as an Essentially Contested Concept” in Violence in Europe: Historical and
Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Sophie Body-Gendrot and Pieter Spierenburg (New York: Springer-Verlag,
2008), 27, 38.
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definition of criminal violence can be questioned, and this is not a politically neutral point for de
Haan to make. He writes,
Occupational groups like the police…have a vested interest in
ensuring that ‘violence’ is an issue for which they can claim
professional competence and which they can use to preserve the
image of their jobs as dramatic and dangerous…[They] evinced
interest in defining actions so that they fall either inside or outside
‘violence.’” 67
The police want to appear to be authorities on violence, but because the police consider things to
be violence, which others might not consider violence, the police reveal the need to avoid
defining violence only in relation to uses of force that are prohibited by law. De Haan points out,
as an example, that while the police claim violence to have occurred when an elderly person
slaps a nurse, nursing home workers refuse to call this action violent. If criminologists only
account for criminal violence as defined by law, and only when the police claim it to have
occurred, then this is a non-neutral, political restriction within the state’s political, ideological
assumptions, concerning its justification for its legal order, namely the assumption that the
imposition and enforcement of laws is not itself productive of kinds of violence.
De Haan’s concern reflects a political, ideological one because people who commonly
agree on a definition of violence, or on distinctions between kinds of violence may overlook
other kinds of violence, or claim some kinds of actions to be violent, while other groups would
not. In relation to other groups, these disagreements concerning what violence is and the
distinctions between kinds of violence are essential. This suggests that there is no neutral
definition of violence, nor are there neutral distinctions between kinds of violence. Not even the
commonsense views of violence are politically neutral in that they only define those kinds of

67 Ibid. 38. De Haan is also referencing how workers at nursing homes differentiate between their patients being
violent, when they slap someone, and when they are not violent when they slap someone. He argues that police
“dramatize” by referring to all slaps as violence, in a way that nursing home staff do not.
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actions and events that people commonly agree count as violent ones: the philosophical theories
discussed here are critiques of the commonsense view. In the following section, I utilize Thomas
Nagel, and Verena Erlenbusch's arguments concerning the concept of “terrorism” because
terroristic violence is itself an exemplary case of a kind of violence that is non-neutrally,
politically defined.

2.13 Thomas Nagel on the Concept of Terrorism
Soon after September 11, 2001, Thomas Nagel wrote the article, “What is Wrong with
Terrorism?” 68 Here, he asks, “what makes terrorist killings any more worthy of condemnation
than other forms of murder?” He rejects appraising the concept of terrorism, and condemning
terrorists in relation to the goals they seek. Instead, Nagel focuses on the means used because,
generally speaking, it is not the goals of terrorists that are condemned, but the particular way in
which they utilize means. The goals of terrorists are not always condemned, and do not help
toward defining terrorism because they are goals that are sometimes the same goals that nonterrorists also pursue, such as freedom or justice. So, when terrorism is condemned it is not the
goals themselves that are condemned, but the means used.
Terroristic means, though, have to be of a particular kind so that they are distinguishable
from other non-terroristic uses of means that may prima facie appear to be the same. Nagel
commits to the distinction that portrays terrorists as those who intentionally kill noncombatants.
Non-terrorists do not intentionally kill noncombatants. This distinction enables Nagel to sustain
the view that “collateral damage” (the killing of noncombatants) is justifiable when states use
violence, particularly when doing so is “unavoidable – and morally permissible.” Terrorism is

68 Thomas Nagel, “What is Wrong with Terrorism?,” Project Syndicate, November 19, 2002, accessed October 3,
2014, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/what-is-wrong-with-terrorism-
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condemned, in other words, because it directly aims to kill noncombatants, and does not
accidentally produce collateral damage. This raises the issue concerning why it is considered
morally permissible for noncombatants to be killed as “collateral damage,” but not morally
permissible for the use of terroristic means to kill noncombatants. This is particularly
problematic, if there are no noncombatants, given that indirectly, citizens can contribute to the
development and strengthening of combatants, which might mean that they are also combatants,
at least in an indirect sense. Lastly, it is also problematic because Nagel denies that a terrorist
could accidentally, unintentionally produce collateral damage.
In order to explain why it is wrong for terrorists to kill noncombatants, and acceptable for
states to kill noncombatants in the sense of “collateral damage,” Nagel refers to the exemplary
case of the bombing of Hiroshima. The intentional killing of noncombatants, in this case, is
contested as a case of terrorism. The United States, some might argue, did not intend to kill
noncombatants, despite that President Harry S. Truman knew that noncombatants would be
harmed as a result of bombing Hiroshima. 69 In this case, the killing of noncombatants is not
accidental. The use of the atomic bomb, in this case, is not considered terrorism because the US
did not directly intend to kill these noncombatants. That they were harmed, or killed, was not the
intended result, but an unfortunate consequence. Thus, their victimization is defined as

69 Three days after Hiroshima was bombed, on August 6, 1945, and on the day that Nagasaki was bombed, on
August 9, 1945, President Truman gave a speech from the White House at 10:00pm, in which he states that “The
world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished
in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians. But that attack is only a warning of things to
come. If Japan does not surrender, bombs will have to be dropped on her war industries and, unfortunately,
thousands of civilian lives will be lost. I urge Japanese civilians to leave industrial cities immediately, and save
themselves from destruction.” Obviously, President Truman was thoroughly aware that the atomic bomb would
destroy the lives of civilian noncombatants, since he publicly admits that the military aimed to avoid civilian
casualties. See “Radio Report to the American People on the Potsdam Conference,” Harry S. Truman Library &
Museum, accessed July 29, 2016, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/?pid=104 It is on this assumption that
since Hiroshima was a military base, which Truman targeted first, less civilians would be there, that leads Nagel to
reference this event rather than Nagasaki. It appears to be a case of Truman’s intention to avoid killing and injuring
noncombatants.
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“collateral damage.” The US is not morally condemnable, some could say, because the
victimization of noncombatants was not what the US meant to do.
The paradigm case core conception of violence and the WHO’s definitions are relevant
here, since the US political leadership claimed its intentions. Almost everyone will agree that
the use of an atomic bomb to attack, harm, kill, and destroy people and property is an instance of
violence. However, not everyone will agree that this action-event counts as one that produces
collateral damage, particularly since the US knew that noncombatants would be harmed and
destroyed, as well as killed, by the use of the atomic bomb.
Nonetheless, Nagel then adds that the difference between intentional and non-intentional
uses of violence against noncombatants rests upon an assumption that each individual deserves
“minimal basic respect,” in the sense that, unless an individual is “a danger to others,” each
individual may not be killed “just because it would be useful to do so.” Any violation of this
“minimal basic respect” is wrong. So, the question concerning the use of the atomic bomb
centers on whether the US thought it to be useful to use violence against harmless
noncombatants. If the US knew that the harmless noncombative residents of Hiroshima were not
a “danger to others,” then did the US violate Nagel's “minimal basic respect” requirement? If so,
then the bombing was an act of terrorism, and wrong.
The issue is that, during warfare, noncombatants are injured and killed, but this is not
necessarily considered terrorism because a state never declares its intention to kill them, and can
deny it intended to do so. The state can always declare that it never intended to harm
noncombatants, and if it does so, then these deaths are “collateral damage.” In the case of
terrorism, though, the killing of noncombatants is the explicit, intended aim. So, the issue
concerns whether there is an intention to use violence against noncombatants. The significance
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of the role played by intentions makes it possible for Nagel to define the term “terrorist” such
that a terrorist is one who intentionally aims to use violence against noncombatants.
Nagel's definition of the concept of terrorism sets out three conditions: First, an act of
terrorism is one that is intentionally directed toward innocent, noncombatants. Second, terrorism
does not aim to minimize civilian casualties. And, third, terrorism does not demonstrate a
minimal basic respect for (human) life. 70 So, Nagel's characterization of the conditions for
violence counting as terrorism portrays the bombing of Hiroshima, which the US leadership
knew would harm noncombatants, as not being an instance of terrorism, and the events of 9/11 as
an instance of terrorism. When the US bombed Hiroshima, it did not intend to kill
noncombatants, but instead aimed to minimize civilian casualties, which indicates its minimal
basic respect for human life, despite that the US knew that it would kill noncombatants, that
civilian casualties would be produced, and that the use of the atom bomb completely destroys, or
at least significantly disfigures and poisons life.
At this point, it appears that Nagel's distinction concerning what counts as terrorism is
controversial. The paradigm case core conception of violence would define the dropping of an
atomic bomb on humans as a violent act or event. Whether or not it is justified is not something
that the paradigm conception of violence can argue. Instead, beyond the commonsense view of
violence, whether this action-event counts as terroristic is disputable, given that the US knew that
noncombatants would be killed or harmed. To define these killings and harms as collateral

70 “Human” is placed in parentheses here because Nagel's description of the moral condition, “minimal basic
respect for life,” is intended to only apply to humans here. In relation to wilderness, contemporary human society
could, on Nagel's terms, be depicted as terrorists, should one wish to point out the intentional destruction of the
environment, and the purposeful production of animals for the sake of their later destruction, which violates the
condition of “minimal basic respect for life.” I don't think that Nagel intends to extend this “minimal basic respect
for life” to non-human life. Furthermore, Nagel is implicitly utilizing the Doctrine of Double Effect. The intention
to respect life and to avoid harming noncombatants is defined. This makes it possible for states to define the deaths
and harms of noncombatants as “collateral damage.” Violence intentionally used as a means to harm and kill
noncombatants is terroristic.
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damage is to connect these to the concept of an unintended consequence, which itself is
contestable.
In the following, Verena Erlenbusch's argument concerning the ability of a state to define
who counts as a terrorist is discussed because this contests Nagel's definition for terroristic
violence. Not only does Erlenbusch argue that terrorism is an essentially contested concept, but
she also indicates how the ability to wield greater violence enables an entity, such as a state, to
act as an authority on what counts as kinds of violence. This indicates that terrorism is an
essentially contested concept because violence is an essentially contested concept. As a result,
neither Nagel nor Erlenbusch define what violence is, though they discuss terroristic violence at
length, and agree that actions and events like 9/11 are paradigmatic instances of violence.

2.14 Verena Erlenbusch on the Concept of Terrorism
In her Notes on Violence: Walter Benjamin's Relevance for the Study of Terrorism,
Erlenbusch argues that “if the theorist uncritically adopts the state's account of terrorism, [then
the theorist] occludes an important dimension of the phenomenon that allows for a rethinking of
the state's claim to a monopoly on legitimate violence,” which is that a state can declare any
threat to its own “legitimate” use of violence, or to its legal order, to be an act of terrorism. 71
Erlenbusch means that states have the ability to define uses of violence against them as terrorism,
71 Verena Erlenbusch, “Notes on Violence: Benjamin's Relevance for the Study of Terrorism,” Journal of Global
Ethics, 6(2010): 167. State leaders declaring their own uses of violence as not counting as terror has not always
been the case. For example, Maximilien Robespierre, the leader of the Committee of Public Safety that governed
France, urged uses of terror as a virtue of democracy and freedom. In his speech, On the Moral and Political
Principles of Domestic Policy, given on February 5, 1794, Robespierre states, “If the spring of popular government
in time of peace is virtue, the springs of popular government in revolution are at once virtue and terror: virtue,
without which terror is fatal; terror, without which virtue is powerless. Terror is nothing other than justice, prompt,
severe, inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is not so much a special principle as it is a consequence of
the general principle of democracy applied to our country's most urgent needs...Subdue by terror the enemies of
liberty, and you will be right, as founders of the Republic. The government of the revolution is liberty's despotism
against tyranny.” See Maximilien Robespierre, “Robespierre February 1794: Justification of the Use of Terror,”
accessed July 29, 2016, https://www.marxists.org/history/france/revolution/robespierre/1794/terror.htm
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despite that a state's own use of violence can be a similar use of violence to that which the state
declares to be terrorism. For example, a building can be blown up and people harmed and killed,
but if it is a state that performs this action, rather than non-state actors, then it is legitimate
violence, from the perspective of the state. If it were the non-state actors who produced this
violence, then states could define it as terroristic violence. The use of drones by the United
States in other countries, for example, which sometimes kill noncombatants, rather than the
intended targets, is not considered to be terroristic by the US, though if others were to use drones
on US territory in this way, odds are that the US would define this as an act of terroristic
violence. The actions themselves are defined as violence by the paradigm case core conception
of violence, but how they are evaluated as kinds of violence depends on the entity that
distinguishes between kinds of violence. The state’s distinctions mean that a state would never
define its own uses of violence as terroristic, but only as legitimate. However, rather than posit
intentions as a criterion, as Nagel does, Erlenbusch’s point is that a state that has a monopoly on
legitimate violence and this monopoly makes it possible for a state to distinguish between kinds
of violence, defending its own uses as legitimate ones.
Erlenbusch refers to Walter Benjamin's 1921 essay “Critique of Violence” in order to
ground her conception of terrorism and its relationship to a state's monopoly on legitimate
violence. 72 Her aim is “to examine the discursive portrayal of terrorism by governments and
mainstream media as an illustration of Benjamin's analysis of state power.” 73 She utilizes
Gallie's phrase, “essentially contested concept,” but does not mention Gallie's argument, nor the
conditions that qualify a concept as an essentially contested one. Erlenbusch also utilizes Max
Weber’s definition of a modern state as that which has a monopoly on legitimate violence within
72 Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, trans.
Edmund Jephcott (New York: Shocken, 1986), 277-300.
73 Erlenbusch, 167.
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a territory, though she does not mention this. 74 Nonetheless, we can ask about on what basis
Erlenbusch claims that terrorism is an essentially contested concept in relation to a state’s
monopoly on legitimate violence.

2.15 Terrorism as an Essentially Contested Concept
In order to test whether terrorism counts as an essentially contested concept, we have to
ask whether Erlenbusch qualifies “terrorism” as a concept that is “an appraisive term [that]
signif[ies] an achievement that is internally complex, variously describable and “open”...[and is]
used both “aggressively” and “defensively,” as Gallie puts it.75 Erlenbusch indicates that, “the
state has to impose a certain understanding of terrorism against other contesting interpretations...
[and] has to successfully portray a particular form of violence as terrorism,” but she also warns
that to simply adopt the perspective of the state on what constitutes terrorism is to be
“uncritical.” 76 This assertion can be directed against Nagel.
Nagel argues that the state's production of “collateral damage,” which is the unintentional
killing of noncombatants, is not an instance of terrorism. To agree with Nagel, from
Erlenbusch's point of view, is to uncritically side with the state. In order to understand the
concept of terrorism, and how it is essentially contested, how terrorists and states utilize violent
means must be addressed, but we should also take into account how the use of particular means
is itself usurped by a state such that the state authorizes itself as the only authority capable of
making the distinction between what counts as terrorism, and what does not. Terrorism is
warfare not conducted by, or recognized as, a legitimate state entity. Terrorists intend to kill

74 Max Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” in Weber: Political Writings, ed. by Peter Lassman and
Ronald Speirs (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 310-11.
75 Gallie, 180-1.
76 Erlenbusch, 167.
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noncombatants, while states do not. However, states are able to claim that they do not kill
noncombatants because they possess a monopoly on legitimate violence.
Here, we see relationships between the essentially contested concept of terrorism, and the
essentially contested concept of violence emerge: states enter into the continuously developing
debate concerning what counts as terroristic violence by claiming that only their own definition
of terrorism is the correct one. A state rejects the claim that its own use of violence is terroristic,
and rejects the claim that the violence that the state defines as terroristic is not terroristic. So,
this is a foundation for a fundamental disagreement, particularly when states use violence when
they know that noncombatants will be harmed or killed.
Both Nagel and Erlenbusch are concerned with the same events that occurred on 9/11.
This exemplar serves as the foundation for a disagreement. How they explain these events as
acts of terrorism differs. That they agree upon this exemplar indicates that their disagreement
concerning the concept of terrorism is not due to a radical confusion. Erlenbusch states that, “the
years following the events we call 9/11 have cemented a public understanding of terrorism as
political violence against states that is exercised by groups or individuals who do not belong to
recognized states and thus lacks [sic] legitimacy.” 77 The issue, in her view, is that “the concept
[of terrorism] has undergone a process of fragmentation that resulted in the potential
applicability of terrorism to all sorts of actions that are perceived as threats to the so-called
“Western” way of life.” 78 Since a state can define threats, and can define threats as terrorism, the
result is an “obscurity that underpins and troubles any effort that seeks to establish a once-andfor-all definition of terrorism.” There is a fundamental disagreement concerning the concept of
terroristic violence. Because states define, decide, and apply the concept of terrorism, a static,

77 Ibid. 173.
78 Ibid. 174.
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agreed upon definition of violence is impossible. What one state or collective of people define
as an act of terrorism, another state or collective of people can define as an act of war, or as
revolutionary violence, for example.
The consequence of this, according to Erlenbusch, is that “states tend to outlaw as
criminal those acts that are interpreted as terrorist...[and] rely on emergency decrees that allow
for the restriction of civil liberties and preemptive action.” Once terrorism or a potential for
terrorism is defined, civil liberties are curtailed for the sake of gaining an upper hand on the
state-defined means of potential terrorism. For example, if organizations defined as terroristic
utilize Internet platforms and telephones, then states may curtail privacy-rights for the sake of
tracking the communication that takes place within these terrorist organizations. The result of
states defining what counts as terrorism is twofold: (1) terroristic violence is rendered illegal and
illegitimate, in relation to the state's use of violence, and (2) states thereby endorse their own
“excessive and extraordinary measures to be taken against those designated terrorists; measures
that would normally lack both legality and legitimacy.” Though implicitly, Erlenbusch
significantly disagrees with a view like that of Nagel in that she takes into account that states
authorize themselves as the authorities that distinguish between terroristic violence and nonterroristic violence. Nagel's distinction between terroristic violence that intentionally harms
noncombatants, and state violence that produces collateral damage is a view produced from the
state's perspective, and it is this kind of view that Erlenbusch's distinction criticizes as an
uncritical view of how violent actions are defined as terrorism by states.
Erlenbusch's point can be put in these terms: It is only because the state has a monopoly
on legitimate violence that a state can declare the harms it produces upon noncombatants to be
collateral damage. If non-state actors had this monopoly on legitimate violence, they too could
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define their own uses of violence as legitimate and productive of collateral damage. Yet, as a
result of their not possessing this monopoly, non-state actors can always be defined as terrorists
by a state. This does not occur due to a state's animosity toward the non-state actors themselves,
she argues, but because the non-state actors produce an exception to the state's authority,
threatening that authority and the state’s existence. A state utilizes this threat to its authority and
existence as the reason for defining these threats as terroristic, and as a justification for its own
uses of violence against the non-state actors. Even if a state's use of violence is greater, and
more destructive than the terrorist's use of violence, this is for the sake of sustaining the state's
authority and existence against the threat produced by terrorists, and therefore, from the state's
perspective, the state’s violence is legitimate.
Also, Erlenbusch argues that intentions only play a role because states are able to openly
define their intentions. Nagel’s restriction to intentional uses of violent means supports a state’s
definition of its own uses of violence against noncombatants as collateral damage, and ignores
the state’s ability to openly define its own uses of violence. Anyone who produces violence
against a state, which might be defined as terroristic violence, is already demonized by the state,
and is not necessarily afforded an opportunity to openly declare intentions. 79 So, states have the
ability to distinguish between what is terroristic violence, and its own uses of violence because of
the greater monopoly on legitimate violence that secures the states’ authority to make these
distinctions. Erlenbusch can restrict a definition of terroristic violence to Nagel’s definition and,
at the same time, show that Nagel’s definition ignores the significance of a state’s monopoly on
legitimate violence. Both of their claims can be aggressively defended against one another, even
79 This point is complicated by the fact that some organizations, such as ISIS/ISIL, do openly declare their
intentions and take ownership of uses of violence directed against innocent noncombatants. In these cases, when
these organizations define themselves as using terroristic violence, it is difficult to disagree with them, though this
does not eliminate the fact that these organizations are unable to define their uses of violence as legitimate in
relation to the monopoly on legitimate violence possessed by a state.
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if they agree and use the word “terrorism” in reference to the same kinds of actions and events
defined by the paradigm case core conception of violence. So, because terroristic violence
evaluates kinds of violence, terroristic violence is an essentially contested concept.
Disagreement with the claim that terroristic violence is an essentially contested concept only
demonstrates that it is an essentially contested concept.

2.16 Conclusion
This chapter outlined various definitions for violence produced by Bufacchi and the
World Health Organization. The World Health Organization’s definition is akin to a
commonsense view concerned with paradigmatic examples of violence, and Bufacchi’s
distinction between kinds of violence extends beyond these paradigmatic examples. It was also
shown that, though there is an etymological relationship between the concept of violence and the
concept of “to violate,” this relationship does not define violence. Instead, at bottom, there are
paradigmatic examples of violence that are immediately understood to be wrong. Distinctions
between kinds of violence, including the view that violence is wrong, are evaluations of kinds of
violence that extend beyond the paradigm cases view. These evaluations, such as the distinction
between terroristic and legitimate violence, positively and negatively value kinds of violence.
These evaluations appraise actions and events as complex achievements that count as kinds of
violence, but these actions and events are variously describable, as shown by the outline of Nagel
and Erlenbusch’s definitions and discussions concerning terroristic violence in relation to the
state. These actions and events are also “open” in that they can be defined, described, and
evaluated in novel ways in the future. Furthermore, how and why actions and events, such as
9/11, count as kinds of violence is debatable, and both Nagel and Erlenbusch’s views can be
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aggressively and defensively used against one another. In other words, beyond the paradigm
case core conception of violence, distinctions between kinds of violence are essentially
contestable in the way that Gallie requires a concept to count as an essentially contested one.
The positive and negative evaluations of kinds of violence each arise from an assumed
political ideology. Political ideologies oppose one another, as seen between Nagel’s view that
supports a state’s claim that it produces collateral damage when the state’s violence harms or
kills noncombatants, and Erlenbusch’s critique of a state’s ability to make this claim only
because it possesses a monopoly on legitimate violence. Nagel’s supportive view reflects his
political ideology, and Erlenbusch’s critical view reflects hers. They fundamentally disagree
with one another. Their definitions of and distinctions between kinds of violence are not
politically neutral. So, beyond the paradigmatic examples of violence, distinctions between
kinds of violence are essentially contested, and non-neutrally political.
In the following chapter, various political ideologies are outlined from the perspectives of
specific, influential philosophers concerned with the existence of modern states. Their
distinctions between kinds of violence are shown to disagree with one another, demonstrating the
continuously developing debate, and the non-neutrally political character of their distinctions.
These disagreements reveal that the concept of violence is not only an essentially contested one,
but that these disagreements are non-neutrally political, which means that definitions for
violence and for kinds of violence are essentially, non-neutrally political. Agreement with any of
them likely reflects one’s own political, ideological beliefs, and if one believes in the correctness
of a definition or distinction between kinds of violence, then one authorizes that definition and
distinction as legitimate. The result is that what counts as legitimate is itself, therefore,
contestable. Because kinds of violence distinguished beyond the paradigm case core conception
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of violence are essentially contested, we cannot know for certain that uses of violence are what
we believe them to be because others can disagree with us.
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CHAPTER THREE: DISAGREEMENT CONCERNING POLITICAL VIOLENCE: A
LEGITIMACY ISSUE

Nicholas Machiavelli, to Lorenzo de' Medici: Iustum enim est bellum quibus necessarium, et pia
arma ubi nulla nisi in armis spes est. 80

3.1 Introduction
As we have seen, there is a fundamental disagreement concerning what counts as
violence, what counts as kinds of violence, what kinds of violence are legitimate and to what
violence is essentially connected. The previous chapter argues that, beyond the paradigm core
case conception of violence, distinctions between kinds of violence are essentially contested. In
this chapter, it will be argued that this disagreement is essentially non-neutrally political and that
defined kinds of violence are essentially non-neutrally political. Much of this has to do with the
fact that philosophers, historians, and scholars are concerned with the existence of the modern
state, and its relationship to violence, power, the political, freedom, justice, legitimacy, law, and
other things. Each individual person concerned with these kinds of things in their relation to the
modern state, produces moral equivalence claims, connecting these things in relationships to one
another in evaluative ways that fundamentally disagree with how others connect them. Each of
their views conflict with the views of others in ways that are politically ideological, and
therefore, are non-neutrally political. The result, it is argued, is that violence is an essentially
contested concept for which no definition in the standard philosophical literature is politically
neutral. Choosing one definition or distinction between kinds of violence reflects one’s belief in
80 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 110. “Because a necessary war is a just
war and where there is hope only in arms, those arms are holy.” Machiavelli quotes Titus Livius (Livy).
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a political ideology, even if one chooses one of the commonsense views. This is because
choosing how to define and value kinds of violence means believing in the legitimacy of that
definition or distinction between kinds of violence.
Hanna Arendt, for example, in her On Violence, argues that violence is not essential to a
state's political power because “power always stands in need of numbers, whereas violence up to
a point can manage without them because it relies on implements.” 81 She disagrees with
traditional political philosophy’s definition of violence, particularly in the form of war, as
essential to state political power, and intends to demonstrate the superior legitimacy of
nonviolent political power. By treating violence as essentially connected to uses of implements,
Arendt aims to demonstrate that violence is not essential to state political power, since state
political power can be construed as not necessarily requiring uses of implements. She argues,
“power is indeed of the essence of all government, but violence is not. Violence is by nature
instrumental; like all means, it always stands in need of guidance and justification through the
end it pursues. And what needs justification by something else cannot be the essence of
anything.” 82
In response to the view that violence is not essential to state political power, it will here
be argued that whether violence is essential to state political power cannot be settled because
there is a disagreement concerning what counts as kinds of violence. That is, there is a tradition
of disagreement concerning those things to which violence is essentially connected.
Furthermore, in response to the traditional liberal assumption that a state's uses of violence are
legitimate, it will be argued that what counts as legitimate uses of violence is also a matter of
disagreement, given that how a theorist defines kinds of “good” and “bad” uses of violence

81 Hanna Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 1970), 42.
82 Ibid. 51.
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mobilizes collectives of peoples who believe in a merely theoretical distinction between kinds of
violence. The liberal state’s definition of its own uses of violence as defensive is not politically
non-neutral because the liberal state’s definitions contribute to this continuously developing
debate. Belief in the legitimacy of a liberal state’s use of violence, on the ground that the liberal
state claims its own uses of violence to be justified in relation to things like freedom and justice,
does not eliminate the disagreement, but instead politically, and non-neutrally reproduces it.

3.2 Violence and the Political: Essentially Connected?
In a way that differs from Gallie’s approach to showing that some concepts are
essentially contested, in the “Preface” to his work, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy,
Jacques Rancière describes how disagreements occur, even when two or more people use the
same word in reference to the same thing:
We should take disagreement to mean a determined kind of speech
situation: one in which one of the interlocutors at once
understands and does not understand what the other is saying.
Disagreement...is the conflict between one who says white [for
example] and another who also says white but does not understand
the same thing by it or does not understand that the other is saying
the same thing in the name of whiteness. 83
We can substitute the concept “violence” for “white” in the previous sentence. Two persons can
both apply the word 'violence' to something, and understand that they both utter the same word in
relation to that thing, but can fail to understand what one another means to say because each has
his own reasons for speaking the word 'violence' in relation to that thing. Paradigmatic actions
and events are commonly referred to as violent ones, but the kind of violence people consider
them to be is a ground for disagreement. Each person agrees that the action or event is violent,
83 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, trans. by Julie Rose (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1999), x.
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enabling them both to apply the word 'violence,' but their appraisals of the action or event as a
kind of violence disagree.
Arendt, for example, disconnects violence from the “essence” of state political power so
that violence is essentially the instrumental use of implements or instruments as means to goals,
regardless of the various ends that are thought to justify their use. She does this in order to
elevate the legitimacy of the power of people acting in concert without uses of violence. She
thus separates “power” from the instruments of violence: “the extreme form of power is All
against One, the extreme form of violence is One against All. And this latter is never possible
without instruments.” 84 One individual can dominate the “All” only through uses of instruments
of violence. It is questionable whether “the All” is a politically meaningful concept. It implies
that no one rejects or deviates from this “power.” The power of a “people” is not of “All,” if it
defeats some minority or opposition group’s way of life. It is a form of domination, which could
itself be interpreted as violence.
Likewise, whether violence is essentially a use of instruments as means is disputable,
particularly because theorists, such as Walter Benjamin and Slavoj Žižek describe kinds of
violence, which are not in any way uses of implements and instruments, as is discussed toward
the end of this chapter. Still, Arendt’s claim that violence is essentially the instrumental use of
implements as means does not settle the question concerning what violence is, particularly
because what counts as an instrument of violence is itself disputable.
The concept of violence can commonly be applied to the same action or event, but people
can disagree upon why it applies. Authors connect the concept of violence to other things,
legitimating some uses rather than others, in relation to those things. An analysis of an author's
claims concerning what violence is connected to, and what not, demonstrates what an author
84 Arendt, 42.
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believes to be legitimate. Arendt’s emphasis on the superiority of the extreme case of a group
acting entirely in concert is that which she believes to be superior, and so she defines it as such.
Likewise, the disagreement between Arendt's definition of violence as a use of implements or
instruments by “one,” and Machiavelli's (re-)assertion (of Livy's claim), quoted above, which
translates as, “because a necessary war is a just war and where there is hope only in arms, those
arms are holy” reveals that Machiavelli means to show to Lorenzo de Medici what counts as a
superior kind of violence. The connections defined by Livy entail that, if war is a kind of
violence, and it is necessary, then the violence is necessary, and also “just.” However, this tells
us nothing of when violence becomes necessary, and ignores other possible disagreements
concerning the concept of “justice.” Justice itself can count as an essentially contested concept,
given various ways the term can and has been defined throughout history.
The addition that the holiness of war lies in the “hope...in arms” reflects a belief in the
ability of the “necessary” arms of warfare, i.e. violence, to successfully defeat some threat
against which violence is the only option. The superiority indicated of a necessary, just war is
elevated above other kinds of wars by this “hope,” which is a kind of belief in legitimacy, insofar
as the “legitimacy” of violence lies in the belief that the violence is what people believe it to be,
namely that which is believed to be capable of achieving the goals of those who believe in it.
Livy’s quote indicates that this hope is connected to the holiness of necessitated uses of violent
means of warfare. Machiavelli would never suggest to Lorenzo de Medici, his intended audience
of The Prince, that a prince can rely on the “power of his people acting in concert,” since it is
this itself that constitutes a rebellious threat, and the possible overthrow or demise of the prince’s
limited power. The power defined by Arendt, because it is the people acting in concert, limits
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the power of the prince, and is, perhaps, the reason why Machiavelli implies that Lorenzo should
believe in the holiness of necessary, just wars, i.e. uses of violence. 85
Of course, Machiavelli is thinking in terms of principalities, and not modern states or a
republic in his book, The Prince, and Arendt is thinking in terms of modern, liberal democratic
republics, but the point on which they disagree holds. There is no agreement concerning their
definitions of violence in its relation to power. Their disagreement arises because, for Arendt,
the power of the All is legitimately superior to the violence of an individual’s uses of violent
instruments, while for Machiavelli, the limited power of the prince is secured by his placing all
hope in necessitated uses of violent means of war, and certainly not in the people. 86 Their
disagreement lies in that, while Arendt places power in the theoretical possibility of a people's
united actions, which makes state power redundant, Machiavelli places power in the rule of the
prince, which is secured through uses of violence and cruelty. Legitimacy plays the primary
distinguishing factor in their disagreement. We do not gain a definition of violence, beyond the
paradigm case core conception of violence, but an indication of what they each believe to be
legitimate and superior in relation to illegitimate and inferior things. Were they to directly
engage with one another, Machiavelli and Arendt could both say that an action is violent, but
because they disagree on other things in connection to violence, they disagree on why and how
the action is violent.
Additionally, Rancière also explains that disagreements are “not misconstruction[s],”
since this would imply that an interlocutor “does not know what [s/he is]...saying. Or what the
85 Machiavelli, a former diplomat that served the Signoria of Florence when it was a republic, is also trying to
return to Florence, which had been transformed into a principality. The Prince is dedicated to Lorenzo de Medici for
this reason.
86 For example, in Chapter XVII of The Prince, Machiavelli argues that it is far better for a prince to be feared by
his people rather than loved because it is easier to control those who fear you, rather than to gain their loving
commitment to obediently following your commands. See pages 70-3. His point is that it would be folly for a
prince to think he can depend on his people's commitment to act in concert for the sake of the rule of a prince.
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other is saying.” A disagreement does not imply that someone is ignorant, deluded, or
misunderstood, and does not result from a lack of knowledge. Disagreements do not arise
because someone is not “getting things correct.” Instead, disagreements arise “wherever
contention over what speaking means constitutes the very rationality of the speech situation.” 87
In terms of the concept of violence, two people can disagree because they disagree about “what
speaking [the word 'violence'] means” such that what each says only makes sense on the basis of
there being a fundamental, inveterate disagreement. None of the interlocutors are confused or
misunderstood because there is a set of paradigmatic cases of violence that grounds the
disagreement. Were they able to speak to one another, both Machiavelli and Arendt could agree
that uses of weapons for the sake of causing harms and destruction are instances of violence, but
their disagreement would be (and is) how these instances of violence are connected to power.
In contrast to Machiavelli and anyone else who defines violence as connected to
something that has to do with a state, Arendt argues that violence can no longer be essential to
politics, particularly because, with the introduction of nuclear weapons, if violence were
essentially connected to politics, then the result would be “universal suicide.” 88 Her definition of
violence reflects her concern with advanced technological weaponry. She urges for the
separation of violence from politics because she fears a devastating outcome, which she
evaluates negatively, and this leads her to evaluate positively a kind of political power that lies in
the people, and not in the uses of violent means. Her argument is that, essentially, violence is not
essential to a state because state political power is essential to the concerted actions of a group of
people, and she believes in the superiority of “the All” over the violence of one.

87 Rancière, xi.
88 Arendt, 10.
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Arendt also adds another distinction between rational uses of violence as a last resort for
the sake of self-preservation, and irrational uses of violence, which are not instances of rational
uses of self-defensive violence. 89 However, this is still a definition concerning violence used as
a last resort. Violence used as a last resort is defined as an act of self-defense. The issue here
concerns what counts as self-defense. If a use of violence is rational because it is self-defensive,
but at some point it is no longer rational because it is no longer self-defensive, then
disagreements are possible, particularly concerning the point at which a rational, self-defensive
use of violence becomes irrational because it is no longer self-defensive. Everyone could agree
that an action is violent, but whether it is self-defensive depends upon how that violent action is
evaluated, and it is not necessary that everyone will agree that it is self-defensive. For
Machiavelli, waiting to use violence as a last resort and only in self-defense would possibly lead
to the failure of a prince to secure his limited power.

3.3 Rancière on the Logic of Disagreement
Now that some disagreements concerning violence have been discussed, we can look
more closely at Rancière's formulation of a logic of disagreement. The general logical structure
of disagreements can be formulated, as Rancière notes, in the following way: “disagreement is
where X cannot see the common object Y is presenting because X cannot comprehend that the
sounds uttered by Y form words and chains of words similar to X's own.” 90 Rancière describes
this as an “extreme” kind of disagreement because there are incommensurable assumptions held
on the part of the interlocutors. They fail to communicate with one another, despite that they
utilize similar words in relation to the same things. What appears as an agreement may be an

89 Ibid. 61.
90 Rancière, xii.
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agreement to disagree, but such an agreement is merely an avoidance of a more fundamental
disagreement. As shown via the disagreement between Arendt and Machiavelli concerning the
connection between violence and power, we can say that they use the same words, but because
they disagree in relation to other things, they do not agree on this connection. These
disagreements are essentially political, as is argued in the next section.

3.4 The Political as an Essentially Contested Concept
In contrast to Arendt, Carl Schmitt, in his The Concept of the Political, defines “the
political” as the condition for the state. 91 But, the political itself is distinct in that it is defined
according to criteria specific to the political, and not in relation to other things, such as “the
moral, aesthetic, and economic.” 92 The criteria for this “specific political distinction” is the
“friend and enemy” distinction. The distinction between friends and enemies is the condition for
the existence of the political, which is itself the condition for the existence of a state such that the
enemy is “existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with
him are possible.” 93 Schmitt defines the other as enemy, and only conceives of the political as
an antagonistic relationship between friends and enemies. Assuming Schmitt's definition of the
political, violence is a political concept, but this is only one way of defining the political. The
other need not be defined as enemy, and the collective interest of a group need not be unified by
a common enemy. The political, as the collective interests of a group, or as an agreed upon
“good” that a group pursues need not be defined in any one way. For this reason, the political

91 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, translated by George Schwab (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 2007), 19.
92 Ibid. 26.
93 Ibid. 27.
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itself is an essentially contested concept, as is violence, and other related concepts, such as
freedom, justice, power, and legitimacy, which cannot all be addressed here.

3.5 The Political, Ideological Disagreement between Hobbes and Kant on the Legitimacy of
the Liberal State
Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant’s agreement that the state secures individuals from
the violence of other individuals presents a useful way toward seeing how there is a
disagreement concerning what kinds of violence are superior in connection to other things that
are themselves defined as superior. Though both assume from the start a hypothetical
assumption of a naturally violent situation of anarchy, their agreement ends here. On the one
hand, Hobbes, in Chapter 13 of his Leviathan, defines the state of nature as a condition in which
“man is enemy to every man...[such that there is] continual fear and danger of violent death, and
the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” 94 However, in accordance with the
“fundamental law of nature...to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it,” an
individual will “be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth as for peace and defence of
himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so
much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.” 95 In the state of
nature, each individual has a “right to all things,” but in the interest of peace, in the form of
protection from the threats that other individuals pose, each individual agrees to submit to a
sovereign, and forfeits this “right to all things.” 96
Kant, on the other hand, in his Foundations for the Metaphysical of Morals, writes that

94 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: with Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668, ed. Edwin Curley,
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 76.
95 Ibid. 80.
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Before a public lawful condition is established individual human
beings, peoples and states can never be secure against violence
from one another, since each has its own right to do what seems
right and good to it and not to be dependent upon another's opinion
about this. So, unless it wants to renounce any concepts of right,
the first thing it has to resolve upon is the principle that it must
leave the state of nature, in which each follows its own judgment,
unite itself with all others (with which it cannot avoid interacting),
subject itself to a public lawful external coercion, and so enter into
a condition in which what is to be recognized as belonging to it is
determined by law and is allotted to it by adequate power (not its
own but an external power); that is, it ought above all else to enter
a civil condition. 97
In relation to the violent insecurity of the state of nature that exists before a “public lawful
condition” is achieved, once this “civil condition” is achieved, a united group of people, as
individuals, choose to subject themselves to the law's power to coerce. This civil condition is
The original contract [which] is only the idea of this act [the
formation of a state via a social contract], in terms of which alone
we can think of the legitimacy of a state. In accordance with the
original contract, everyone (omnes et singuli) within a people gives
up his external freedom in order to take it up again immediately as
a member of a commonwealth, that is, of a people considered as a
state (universi). 98
So, Kant conceives of the formation of a state in political liberal terms, like Hobbes. A kind of
freedom is secured through the existence of the state, and the state is that which is legitimate
because people believe in the state's ability to protect them from the violence of the state of
nature. They both assume that the state of nature is violent, and that exiting from the state of
nature is a means to defeating this violence. The common liberal assumption is that a social
contract, civil condition, or state, is that which secures an individual against this violence, and is,
therefore, legitimate.

97 Immanuel Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” in Practical Philosophy, ed. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood
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However, beyond this agreement, Hobbes and Kant disagree, as Howard Williams argues
in his Kant's Critique of Hobbes: Sovereignty and Cosmopolitanism. In particular, Hobbes's
liberalism tends toward “an absolutist form” such that the state is “unitary, [but] nonrepresentative and anti-republican,” while Kant’s republicanism rejects Hobbes's absolutist
liberalism as “insufficiently liberal and progressive.” 99 For the sake of what he defines as
liberal, Kant explicitly rejects Hobbes's work as insufficient. For example, in Kant's article, On
the Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory, but It is of No Use in Practice, Kant
presents “his own republican approach to political obligation...in stark contrast with Hobbes's
absolutism.” 100 Kant begins with the assumption that there is a need for a civil constitution, i.e.
social contract, but for goals and reasons that oppose those of Hobbes.
For example, Williams points out that “for Hobbes moral and political truth are one and
the same,” producing and applying political justice universally within the boundaries of each
state, while Kant is concerned with universally produced and applied political justice not only
within each state, but also between states, internationally. 101 Kant utilizes Hobbes's
universalization of moral and legal norms within a state as a catalyst toward universalizing moral
and legal norms between states. Thus, Kant “enters Hobbes's absolutist world [in order
to]...make his own republican ideas logically follow from [his] reading of Hobbes,” Williams
argues. 102 The disagreement is that, though both legitimate the existence of a civil state on the
basis of the state's securing its members from violence, Kant aims for security between states,
and not only within a state. This means that their definitions for a liberal state disagree with one

99 Howard Williams, Kant's Critique of Hobbes: Sovereignty and Cosmopolitanism (Cardiff: University Wales
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another because they relate the existence of the liberal state to the violence of the state of nature
in different ways.
This disagreement arises because Kant takes issue with Hobbes's view expressed in
Chapter 13 of the Leviathan, where Hobbes states that,
In the nature of man we find three principal causes of quarrel:
first, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first
maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third
for reputation. The first uses violence to make themselves masters
of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to
defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different
opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their
persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation,
their profession, or their name. 103
Opposed to this, Kant, as Williams argues, aims to “supersede” Hobbes's claims by
distinguishing two aspects of the human individual: “The human individual is part of two
realms: one where we regard ourselves from the standpoint of reason, where we can be guided
by moral laws; and, secondly, one where we regard ourselves from the standpoint of senseexperience, where we are moved by instinct, inclination, and desire.” 104 The disagreement
between Hobbes and Kant lies in that Hobbes only addresses the second, “animal” aspect of the
human individual, and not the first because a human’s desires, inclinations, and instincts leads
that human to submit to a sovereign in exchange for freedom from violence. However, they also
disagree in that, though they agree that there is some kind of social contract, for Hobbes the
social contract is a means to “happiness or felicity of the individual subjects,” while for Kant, the
social contract establishes a “civic constitution,” which is “an end in itself.” 105 Happiness is not
the goal, in Kant's view.

103 Hobbes, 76.
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Furthermore, for Hobbes, the social contract achieves “self-preservation and selfprotection,” which requires limits placed on freedom, which is transferred to the sovereign
body. 106 Kant agrees that freedom must be limited, except that the freedom of an individual is
not limited and transferred to the sovereign body for the sake of protection in exchange for
obedience, but is instead transferred to “the impersonal power of the law” itself. This raises the
issue of the legitimacy of coercion as an effective violent means to sustaining the legitimacy of
public power, particularly when that coercion is exercised by a public authority.
Kant defines coercion as “any limitation of freedom through another's choice.” 107 In
Hobbes’s Leviathan, the freedom of individuals living in the state of nature is absolute in the
sense that there is an “absence of external impediments,” but under a social contract, this
freedom is transferred to the sovereign state. 108 Individuals, in Hobbes view, agree to limit their
freedom in exchange for protection, but once they enter the social contract, they continue to be
coerced, insofar as they are “tie[d] by fear of punishment to the performance of their
covenants.” 109 So, as Williams points out, Kant disagrees with Hobbes's rationale concerning
why an individual would enter into a relationship with a covenant, particularly because the
reasons Hobbes gives for a person's entering a social contract are “expediency and prudence,”
while for Kant, an individual enters due to “the supreme or transcendent requirements of
reason.” 110 In Kant's view, freedom is restricted, and this restriction is coercion, but insofar it is
the law that restricts freedom, and a rational individual sees this restriction as a rational thing to
choose, this coercion is legitimate. For Hobbes, though, an individual escapes the state of nature
due to the “danger of violent death,” while for Kant, an individual escapes the state of nature and
106 Ibid. 17.
107 Kant, “Theory and Practice,” 290
108 Hobbes, 79-80.
109 Ibid. 106.
110 Williams, 17.
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in order to enter into a civic constitution because it is rational to enter into legal relationships
produced by “the law-making capacities of pure reason.” 111 This means that, for Hobbes,
entering a social contract is a means to an end, but for Kant, entering into a civic constitution is
an end in itself because it is rational to enter into rational (legal) relationships with other rational
beings. The reasonableness of morality is the motive for individuals acknowledging the need for
political obligations and coercion, for Kant, while Hobbes conceives of legal obligations as only
possible if there is a power that enforces law. 112 For Hobbes, the force of law is the ability of
power to coerce individuals to act as obligated to act, and this coercion works as a threat of
violent punishment or as the threat of exiling an individual to the violence of the state of nature;
for Kant, the force of law is reason itself. However, this does not mean that Kant dismisses
violence as something that is never needed.
For example, Kant argues in the “Doctrine of Right,” the first part of his Metaphysics of
Morals, that laws produce freedom by hindering obstacles to freedom. 113 In this way, actions in
accordance with law do not themselves violate freedom, but are freedom, in the juridical and
moral sense. Kant states, “If...my action or my condition generally can coexist with the freedom
of everyone in accordance with a universal law, whoever hinders me in it does me wrong; for
this hindrance (resistance) cannot coexist with freedom in accordance with a universal law.” 114
In other words, as long as a person's freedom does not infringe upon, or restrict another's
freedom, then those free actions are right, lawful actions.
It would seem that violence is wrong, since it is a kind of obstacle to freedom, but Kant
defines at least one instance in which violence is acceptable. In particular, if a person violently
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restrains or hinders the freedom of another for the sake of defending oneself, then this is
justifiable, violent coercion, even if the person who uses violence is not suffering violence. 115
Kant states, “the deed of saving one's life by violence is not to be judged inculpable...but only
unpunishable.” Kant does not define violence, but gives commonsensical examples, such as a
person's pushing someone out of the way in order to save herself. Such an action is
blameworthy, but a person cannot be punished for saving her own life through a use of a violent
push. In this sense, violence is only punishable when it does not occur for the sake of preserving
one's own life, i.e. in self-defense.
However, as with Arendt’s view that violence is only rational when it is self-defensive,
we can ask what counts as self-defense and when violence ceases being self-defense, and
various, opposed explanations could be given. To claim that an act of violence, in a
commonsense view’s definition of the term, is self-defensive, is to extend the paradigm case core
conception of violence. A violent action is evaluated as self-defensive, and such an evaluation is
not necessarily universally agreed upon without dispute. This indicates that, if the coercive
enforcement of law rights wrongs, and self-defense is a justified use of violence, then insofar as
the law and freedom are themselves violently defended, violence is sometimes justifiable, in
Kant's view. The legitimacy of law, of violent coercions, and of self-defensive violence lies in
that these are rational, universalizable, and uphold the freedom of individuals. Coercion, the
interference with freedom, is legitimate, as a kind of violence, so long as it occurs for the sake of
freedom, despite the fact that it restricts freedom.
The point is that the liberal state is conceived of as that which legitimates its own uses of
violence, but theorists of the liberal state disagree with one another concerning the legitimacy of
a state's use of violence, in terms of what that violence is connected to. The disagreement here is
115 Ibid. 392.
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that while Kant believes reason leads individuals into rational, universalizable relationships
because it is rational to avoid violence within and between states (though violence as selfdefense is legitimate because it is rational for freedom to defend itself), Hobbes believes in the
sovereign's ability to secure the individual from violent threats such that happiness is attained
only within a state. Both consider obedience to be that which is achieved in exchange for the
belief in the ability of a liberal state to achieve security from violence, and this constitutes their
agreed upon legitimation of the modern state's uses of violence, though they disagree upon the
reasons why this legitimacy exists. Their political ideologies disagree, so their distinctions
between how the violence of the state of nature is avoided disagree, and the legitimacy of the
states they describe is disputable. For both, security is achieved through the exchanges between
protection and obedience, but in Hobbes's view, the violence of a liberal state that secures
freedom is prudent, and in Kant's view, it is rational self-defense. In what follows, Treitschke’s
focus on the liberal state’s destined power and greatness is discussed next because this
demonstrates that there is not only this one way that disagreement arises in relation to violence
and the liberal state. Hobbes, Kant, and Treitschke are each concerned with the existence of a
liberal state, but how the liberal state relates to violence is a ground for their fundamental
disagreement even though they all implicitly agree upon paradigmatic cases of violence.

3.6 Treitschke on Military Violence as the Condition for the Power and Greatness of the
State
In agreement with Hobbes and Kant that the liberal state secures and protects obedient
citizens through uses of coercion and violence, Heinrich von Treitschke, in his Politik lectures,
argues that “the state would no longer be what it has been and is, did it not visibly girt about with
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armed might.” 116 For Treitschke, if a state is “incapable of drawing the sword when it sees fit,”
then the sustainability of that state's existence is uncertain. 117 The use of “armed might” and “the
sword” amount to uses of military violence. His claim is that it is necessary for a state to use this
kind of violence: “without war no state could be,” he says. 118 So, the use of armed violence is a
condition for the existence of a state.
The existence of a state requires military and legal violence, in Treitschke's view, to the
extent that any “blind worshiper of an eternal peace falls into the error of isolating the state, or
dreams of one which is universal, which [is]…at variance with reason.” This rejection of the
possibility of “eternal peace” disagrees with Kant's view. Kant, in his Perpetual Peace, outlines
six preliminary articles that are meant to lessen the likelihood of the conditions for the possibility
of war, the third of which is that “standing armies shall in time be totally abolished.” 119
However, Kant adds that armies may be used for the sake of peace, until peace is achieved, but
these armies must be used only for the sake of achieving peace, and not for the sake of punishing
enemies. 120 In Kant's view, reason itself, “the supreme moral legislating authority,” condemns
war as a means to making law, and dictates peace as a duty. 121 So, Treitschke disagrees in that
he considers a belief in the possibility of peace to be “at variance with reason” in such a way that
there is nothing commensurable between his and Kant's view concerning uses of military
violence and the possibility of peace. Treitschke considers war to be necessary for a state's
existence and peace to be a utopian dream, while Kant considers war to be needed only until
peace is established, assuming that it actually could be.
116 Heinrich von Treitschke, Politics, trans. Arthur James Balfour (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1916),
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Treitschke also argues that the state is power and greatness, which are both achieved and
upheld by the state's use of kinds of violence, in the forms of legal compulsion and military
force. On state power, he writes,
Since the state is power, it can obviously draw all human action
within its scope, so long as that action arises from the will which
regulates the outer lives of men, and belongs to their visible
common existence. Historical experience...teaches that the state
can overshadow practically the whole of a people's life. It will
dominate it to the precise extent in which it is in a position to do
so. 122
The state's power lies in its ability to dominate the lives of citizens through legal compulsion,
which is the will of the state that regulates the “outer lives” of citizens. In this sense, a state's
ability to dominate over the lives of its citizens is unlimited in its “attempt to dominate the outer
life of its members as far as it is able to do so.” 123 Treitschke considers this power, i.e. ability to
dominate, as a derivative of “its first duty,” which is “the double one of maintaining power
without, and law within, its primary obligations must be the care of its Army and its
Jurisprudence, in order to protect and to restrain the community of its citizens.” 124 The care of
the army and maintenance of its law are conditions for a state's remaining a state, and require
violence. The state only directly interferes with individual citizens, though, “in the domain of
criminal law,” to the extent that “the principles of common law are...absolutely binding,” and
“public servants have no option in the extent to which they exercise their functions,” which
means that they have no choice other than to fulfill their duty as defined by the laws of the state,
particularly when it comes to violently punishing criminals. 125
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Treitschke then argues that war is “the next essential function of the state,” since “the
protection of their members by armed force remains [a state's] primary and essential task,” and
this means that “war...will endure to the end of history, as long as there is a multiplicity of
states.” 126 However, given “the economic ravages of war,” civilized nations seek wars that are
“rarer and shorter,” but this is no indication that “wars can ever cease.” “They neither can nor
should,” he adds. 127 The point is that, as with other theorists discussed thus far, Treitschke
defines kinds of violence as essential to the existence of a state. Without violence, a state cannot
achieve its destined power.
On the greatness of a state, Treitschke writes that,
The greatness of the state [as that which] lies precisely in its power
of uniting the present and the future; and consequently no
individual has the right to regard the state as the servant of his own
aims but is bound by moral duty and physical necessity to
subordinate himself to it, while the state lies under the obligation to
concern itself with the life of its citizens by extending to them its
help and protection. 128
Present military violence is not only a condition for, but essential to achieving the existence of a
state now and into the future, and insofar as this occurs, the greatness of a state is achieved
through the unity of all of its uses of violence. Treitschke disagrees that any peace could be
achieved for the reason that the state only exists on the grounds of its uses of violence for the
sake of protecting its people and maintaining their existence from one generation to the next.
Treitschke's point is that wars fought in the past and in the present bring about “national honour,”
which each generation inherits from former ones such that, within a state the sacrifice of
individuals for the State is considered “positively sacred.” 129 All of this increases the
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“greatness” of the state. Uses of violence for the sake of the state, and the protection of its
people, is positively evaluated because it achieves “greatness.”
Treitschke adds that,
Most undoubtedly war is the one remedy for an ailing nation.
Social selfishness and party hatreds must be dumb before the call
of the state when its existence is at stake. Forgetting himself, the
individual must only remember that he is a part of the whole, and
realize the unimportance of his own life compared with the
common weal. 130
Through war, individuals sacrifice themselves, heroes emerge, and “the chaff is winnowed from
the wheat,” as “puny” citizens are “annihilated.” 131 The “whole” of a state exists not only in the
present, but as the unity of past, present, and future. Citizens must realize the superiority of the
state’s entire existence. Weak citizens must willingly be sacrificed for the sake of the greatness
of the state. So, in Treitschke's view, the state's uses of military violence, and willingness to
engage in war, through which “puny” citizens are sacrificed and heroes arise, is that which
achieves the state's power, and greatness, which the people of the state believe in, because they
have faith in the state's ability to protect their legally bound existence, in exchange for their
obedience.
This true belief in the state's power, secured through uses of violence, is that which
legitimates the state's uses of violence. If there were no such belief in the state's power, its
ability to protect its citizens in exchange for submissive obedience, and to sustain its existence
into the future, then the state's uses of violence would be illegitimate. Insofar as the people are
protected, the state's uses of violence are legitimate because the people correctly believe such
uses of violence to be that which secures their protection. Without the state's uses of violence,
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the people would lack security from internal and external threats, and the state’s existence would
lack power and greatness.
Considering the arguments outlined above produced by the others addressed thus far, it is
evident that legitimacy is at the heart of the disagreements that result from opposed political
ideologies, particularly because various theorists disagree on how, when, and why violence is to
be believed in. Treitschke, Kant, Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Arendt each describe violence as
connected to some kinds of thing(s). For Treitschke, violence is essential to the power,
greatness, and existence of the state; for Kant, there is the violence of the state of nature, of selfdefense of the freedom of an individual secured by universal laws, and of coercion; for Hobbes,
there is the violence of the state of nature and of the violent punishments utilized for the sake of
enforcing a social contract that secures individuals from the violent state of nature; for
Machiavelli, there is the rebellious violence that threatens a prince’s rule, and the necessitated,
justified, and holy violence required for the security of the prince's limited power; for Arendt,
violence is essentially uses of instruments as means to goals, which means that state political
power is not essentially violent. These kinds of violence, for the person who defines them, are
defined as legitimate or not to the extent that the violence is connected to the thing defined.
Without the paradigm case core conception of violence as the intentional use of physical means
for the sake of causing physical or psychological harms or destruction, these disagreements
would not make sense. Only with the paradigmatic examples of the violence of the state of
nature, the violence of self-defense, and the violent uses of implements, can these disagreements
arise because these paradigmatic examples, captured by commonsense views of violence, serve
as a fulcrum upon which distinctions between kinds of violence, positively or negatively
evaluated, can be defined. Despite these definitions of violence as connected and not connected
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to other things, no agreed upon distinction between kinds of violence is produced. Instead,
various kinds of violence are defined in relation to diversely defined things.
However, a commitment to one distinction or definition rather than another does not
mean that there is any one way to distinguish between kinds of violence, other than the definition
of the paradigm case core conception of violence. In the following, Max Weber’s
characterization of legitimacy as a kind of belief is discussed in order to develop the point that
definitions of the concept of violence and distinctions between kinds of violence constitutes a
legitimacy issue.

3.7 Weber on the State and its Connection to Violence
Max Weber argues in his The Profession and Vocation of Politics that legitimacy is
merely a belief, and nothing more. Weber defines a modern state in terms of the means “specific
to it,” such that “a state is that human community which (successfully) lays claim to the
monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory.” 132 In other words, the state
is that which possesses a monopoly on uses of violent means that count, for the relevant group of
followers, as “legitimate” uses of violence: “the state is a relationship of rule (Herrschaft) by
human beings over human beings, and one that rests on the legitimate use of violence. For the
state to remain in existence, those who are ruled must submit to the authority claimed by
whoever rules at any given time.” 133 The ruled must obey, however, they choose their obedience
on the basis of their belief in the state's possessing a monopoly on legitimate violence. So, like
Arendt, Weber exclusively defines violence only as a means, and not in relation to goals, which
contrasts with the other authors discussed. But unlike Arendt, Weber does not separate state
132 Max Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” in Weber: Political Writings, ed. by Peter Lassman and
Ronald Speirs (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 310-11.
133 Ibid. 311.
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political power from violence. Weber writes, “the decisive means of politics is the use of
violence,” and politics is the “striv[ing] for a share of power or for influence on the distribution
of power.” 134 “Politics operates with a quite specific means, namely power, backed up by the
use of violence.” 135 Altogether, Weber defines politics as that which uses violence, as the
struggle for power, and power as that which is backed up by uses of violence. Politics, power,
and violence are defined in these relationships, and not in relation to goals, though violent means
are a condition for politics and power.
On legitimacy, Weber distinguishes between three sources: the authority of tradition and
custom, the authority of charisma, and the authority of legality. 136 In each case, citizens are
obedient because they believe in tradition and custom, or in the charismatically presented goals
promised by a leader, or in the legal-normative realm established by the rule of law. These three
kinds of legitimacy constitute three kinds of rule. Given these three kinds of legitimacy,
legitimacy itself is contestable. For example, someone who believes in the authority of charisma
disagrees with someone who rejects the authority of charisma in favor of the authority of
tradition and custom. However, all three center on the role of belief. Legitimacy, in general, is
the belief in a political leader’s use of violent means as legitimate.
So, there is a fundamental disagreement concerning extended definitions of violence, and
how these extended definitions extend to disputed things. Next, it will be demonstrated that this
disagreement is reappears in connection with anti-state political ideologies. For example, a
legitimate use of violence by the state in the name of freedom is an “oppressive” or “bad” use of
violence from the perspective of revolutionaries who legitimate their own uses of violence
against the state in the name of freedom. Given this disagreement, liberal state theorists and anti134 Ibid. 360 and 311, respectively.
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state revolutionaries are, for one another, “enemies of freedom.” For each, there should be “no
freedom for the enemy of freedom.” However, their definitions of freedom disagree in the first
place, which means that though they utter the same word, ‘freedom,’ there is only a fundamental
disagreement, particularly in relation to whose freedom counts as violence and whose violence
counts as a means to freedom.

3.8 Bakunin and Sorel on the Violence of the State
Mikhail Bakunin and Georges Sorel agree that states are violent, but as revolutionaries
who desire the complete destruction of modern states, and not merely their reform, they consider
a state's uses of violence to be illegitimate in relation to revolutionary violence. For example, in
contrast to the liberal conception of the state's legitimate uses of its own violence for the sake of
defeating uses of violence the state considers to be a threat, anarchist Bakunin inverts the view
that “all that is instrumental in conserving, exalting, and consolidating the power of the State is
good...and vice versa, whatever militates against the interests of the State is bad, even if it be in
other respects the most holy and humanely just thing.” 137 In other words, from the perspective of
the state, its own uses of violence serve its interests, particularly its ability to secure the
protection of its people of whom it demands sacrifices. But, this is merely the state's perspective,
and its own justification for its own uses of violence. From the perspective of an anarchist, such
as Bakunin, the state's uses of violence are bad, and illegitimate, particularly because the state's
uses of violence violate natural freedom. This is a direct inversion of liberal political ideology
concerned with what a state does and why it exists. Bakunin argues on the assumption that
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natural freedom exists external to the state, and defines the state as that which destroys natural
freedom.
For example, in contrast to a claim that a state makes freedom possible, Bakunin argues
that the natural liberty (freedom) of individuals is immediately threatened by the existence of a
state. He defines the liberty of an individual human being such that “so long as men remain
isolated in their absolute individuality, enjoying all their natural liberty, recognizing no limits to
this liberty but those imposed by fact and not by right, they follow only one law – the law of
natural egoism.” 138 This definition of liberty as existing “naturally,” and independent from any
state enables Bakunin to criticize the typical “theoretical premise of the State,” which claims that
this natural liberty of individuals leads individuals to “insult, maltreat, rob, murder, and devour
one another,” which means that natural liberty “produces not good but evil, man being bad by
nature.” 139 In this sense, Bakunin’s view disagrees with Kant and Hobbes, who consider the
state of nature to be terrible. Kant and Hobbes portray the state as that which, via a freely
entered social contract, leads people to be good. However, Bakunin rejects this view, asserting
that, “the state...is not the product of liberty, but, on the contrary, the product of the voluntary
negation and sacrifice of liberty.” Furthermore, this “voluntary negation and sacrifice of liberty”
results in individuals becoming “slaves of the State.” So, Bakunin infers that, since “from the
point of view of the State the good arises not from liberty, but, on the contrary, from the
negation of liberty,” this negation of liberty constitutes the immorality of the state. 140 The state
is immoral because its existence is a negation and sacrifice of liberty. On the assumption that

138 Ibid. 143.
139 Ibid. 143.
140 Ibid. 143.
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“morality presupposes freedom,” since a state negates and sacrifices freedom, it destroys the
possibility for morality, and is itself immoral. 141
Bakunin's disagreement with the liberal conception of the state is precise. The
immorality of the state is its negation of liberty, which is a kind of violence, and provokes the
violence of individuals against the state. He argues,
Even when the State enjoins something good, it undoes and spoils
it precisely because the latter comes in the form of a command,
and because every command provokes and arouses the legitimate
revolt of freedom; and also because, from the point of view of true
morality, of human and not divine morality, the good which is
done by command from above ceases to be good and thereby
becomes evil. Liberty, morality, and the humane dignity of man
consist precisely in that man does good not because he is ordered
to do so, but because he conceives it, wants it, and loves it. 142
This is an inversion of the commands of a state such that, what is good from the perspective of
the state, is evil from the perspective of an individual human because the individual human is
capable of understanding what is good and evil independent from the state's commands. This
inversion disorients the legitimacy claims concerning a state's uses of violence, defining the state
as illegitimate, and the revolutionary violence that state commands and state violence provoke as
legitimate in its defined relation to natural liberty. Like others, Bakunin does not explicitly
define violence, but instead distinguishes kinds of violence that are then valued in relation to
other things.
The anarcho-syndicalist Georges Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, agrees with
Bakunin that the state's existence does violence to freedom, but disagrees insofar as Sorel
focuses on the violence of calculated, rationalistic laws of capitalism oppressively forced upon
an individual's internal freedom of creative consciousness. Sorel utilizes Henri Bergson's
141 Ibid. 145.
142 Ibid. 145.
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dualistic presentation of human existence, discussed in Bergson's Time and Free Will, in order to
emphasize internal and external selves constitutive of an individual human's existence. 143 Sorel's
point is that a person can freely reflect internally, for the sake of making a free decision to create
a new individuality, which is an inward, emotional decision that becomes an outward enacted
movement. 144 The emotional, inner decision moves into the world through action.
In terms of an enacted movement, he writes, “to say that we are acting, implies that we
are creating an imaginary world placed ahead of the present world and composed of movements
which depend entirely on us. In this way our freedom becomes perfectly intelligible.” That
which is imagined as a possible future is that which is acted toward, and this constitutes the
“movement” Sorel refers to. State-imposed laws and capitalistic relationships constitutive of
relations of production violently oppress and destroy this internal, emotional, creative freedom,
forcing a person's actions to conform to these laws and capitalistic relations despite a person's
decision. The decision to enact a revolutionary movement is decisive, therefore, in that it is a
condition for the revolutionary movement such that, without this internal, emotional, free and
creative decision, no such movement would be enacted.
Additionally, according to Sorel, the decision to act is motivated by indescribable myths
of a proletarian general strike, which “are not descriptions of things, but expressions of a

143 Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, trans. T. E. Hulme and J. Roth (New York: Collier Books, 1974), 47.
Bergson, it should be noted, discusses “violent emotions,” such as “acute desire, uncontrolled anger, passionate love,
and violent hatred,” noting that these always involve a kind of “muscular contraction” that grows in “intensity” the
“deeper and deeper” there is a “disturbance of the organism,” i.e. the human body. Bergson adds that, “there is...no
essential difference from the point of view of intensity between...deep-seated feelings...and the acute or violent
emotions which we have just passed in review. To say that love, hatred, desire, increase in violence is to assert that
they are projected outwards, that they radiate to the surface, that peripheral sensations are substituted for inner
states: but superficial or deep-seated, violent or reflective, the intensity of these feelings always consists in the
multiplicity of simple states which consciousness dimly discerns in them.” See pages 28-31 of Bergson's Time and
Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, trans. F. L. Pogson (London: George Allen & Unwin
Limited, 1950). Bergson treats violence as a kind of muscular tension that projects outward, as a kind of emotion. It
is these violent emotions that Sorel aims to mobilize.
144 Sorel, 48.
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determination to act.” 145 The myth of a proletarian general strike is indescribable because the
emotions that lead a person to imagine it are irrational, and cannot be formulated, or defined by
reason. For this reason, the revolutionary strike that destroys the capitalistic state cannot be
predicted or known by reason with any certainty. So, the myth of a proletarian general strike is
irrational, insofar as it is not subject to rationalistic calculations, but arises from an emotional
decision to act toward the total destruction of the state.
Violence is an issue, for Sorel, because violence is required for the total destruction of a
state's violence. The “myth of the “general strike”...implies an absolute revolution,” he writes. 146
His aim is to explain “the function of the violence of the working classes in contemporary
Socialism.” 147 However, in consideration of how violence functions, Sorel is not concerned with
the immediate effects of violence, but with “its distant consequences,” particularly in the class
relationship between workers and employers. 148 The destruction and harm that immediately
results from uses of violence is irrelevant in relation to the imagined future. These “distant
consequences” are that which is imagined in the ineffable myth of a proletarian general strike.
“The general strike must be taken as a whole and undivided, and the passage from capitalism to
Socialism conceived as a catastrophe, the development of which baffles description.” 149 Any
prediction or calculation of how the state would be overthrown is impossible. At best, it is a
complete destruction of the state and its violence. However, violence plays an important,
particular role in the present, insofar as “working class violence” produces fear: “doubtless fear

145 Ibid. 50.
146 Ibid. 27.
147 Ibid. 58-59. Sorel’s italics.
148 Ibid. 60.
149 Ibid. 148. His italics.
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is an excellent weapon,” Sorel says, but it must be used with reservation so that it does not
“provoke obstinate resistance” against the revolutionary movement. 150
Sorel also equates “working class violence” to “proletarian violence” and “strike
violence,” all three of which are conditions for “keep[ing] the revolutionary spirit alive.” 151 As
such, this violence is a “clear and brutal expression of the class war.” 152 If these kinds of
violence did not occur, then the “revolutionary spirit” would, presumably, cease to exist.
However, it is because these kinds of violence occur that Sorel considers it to be a fact that a
class war exists.
Proletarian violence also reveals the inevitability of class war due to the exploitative and
oppressive relationships between workers and employers under capitalistic relations of
production. Without proletarian violence, redemption from capitalistic relationships cannot be
achieved, and capitalistic relationships ensure that proletarian violence occurs. Additionally,
proletarian-working class violence is connected to “the experience of this great epoch [which]
shows quite clearly that in this warlike excitement which accompanies this will-to-deliverance
the courageous man finds a satisfaction which is sufficient to keep up his ardour.” 153 As long as
this epoch exists, the conditions for proletarian violence exist in the form of a revolutionary
movement that aims to emancipate itself from the capitalistic relationships of oppression
sustained by modern states.
Sorel also characterizes proletarian violence such that,
proletarian violence, carried on as a pure and simple manifestation
of the sentiment of the class war, appears...as a very fine and very
heroic thing; it is at the service of the immemorial interests of
civilization; it is not perhaps the most appropriate method of
150 Ibid. 68, 81.
151 Ibid. 90.
152 Ibid. 91. His italics.
153 Ibid. 37.
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obtaining immediate material advantages, but it may save the
world from barbarism.154
Since Sorel describes proletarian violence as that which “saves the world from barbarism,” he
elevates it to a superior position, as a legitimate kind of violence. He frames proletarian violence
as that which should be believed in. The most superior use of violence is that violence deployed
by the worker class because it transforms and destroys the state. He equates proletarian violence
to an army of worker-warriors intent on destroying the state, and not on merely reforming it. So,
in this sense, Sorel is opposed to liberal state theorists who legitimate state violence.
Sorel also explicitly defines violence in relation to other things, and in kinds. He writes,
“the term violence should be employed only for acts of revolt; we should say...that the object of
force is to impose a certain social order in which the minority governs, while violence tends to
the destruction of that order.” 155 Here, Sorel indicates the distinction between the force of
capitalistic relations of production and state laws imposed upon workers, and the superior
violence that is the inevitable ability of the workers to destroy that force. The force of capitalism
and laws destroys the inner, free and creative consciousness of workers, whose own violence can
defeat this force. There is, in this sense a hierarchy of kinds of violence, defined by Sorel, on the
basis of which kind defeats another kind. Sorel aims to usurp the concept of violence as superior
to the concept of force, embellishing his own political ideology with the superiority of violence.
In this sense, there is what Sorel defines as “a regime of violence:”
(a) On the lowest level, we find a scattered kind of violence, which
resembles the struggle for life, which acts through economic
conditions, and which carries out a slow but sure expropriation;
violence of this character works especially with the aid of fiscal
arrangements; (b) Next comes the concentrated and organized
force of the state, which acts directly on labor, ‘to regulate wages,’
i.e. force them within the limits suitable to surplus value making,
154 Ibid. 98.
155 Ibid. 171.
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to lengthen the working day, and to maintain the laborer himself in
the normal degree of dependence; this is an essential element of
the so-called primitive accumulation; (c) We have, finally,
violence properly so called, which occupies so great a place in
history of primitive accumulation, and which constitutes the
principle subject of history. 156
These three kinds of violence are hierarchically defined. From the lowest kind of violence that is
unorganized, “scattered,” and a “struggle for life,” to the “force of the state” that organizes labor,
to “violence properly so called” that is “the principle subject of history,” Sorel defines kinds of
violence. The superior kind of violence is the “subject of history,” i.e. proletarian violence,
insofar as “it represents the highest moral ideal ever conceived by man...[and is the] birth of a
virtue...which has the power to save civilization,” transforming history. 157 This embellishment
of proletarian violence extends far beyond the paradigm case core conception of violence. In
fact, Sorel writes that, “it is to violence that Socialism owes those high ethical values by means
of which it brings salvation to the modern world.” 158 So, though in agreement with Bakunin that
the state must be destroyed, and that its existence and uses of force and violence are illegitimate,
Sorel disagrees with Bakunin in that it is not only the state's immoral destruction of natural
liberty that provokes the need for its destruction, but also capitalism's oppressive forces imposed
upon workers as rational calculations of bare life, which exploit, but also guarantee proletarian
violence as a response to state capitalism. Proletarian violence, in short, is defined by Sorel as
the means to salvation from the barbaric imposition of state laws and capitalistic relations of
production.

156 Ibid. 172-173.
157 Ibid. 228.
158 Ibid. 249.
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3.9 Violence and a Logic of Domination
At this point, we've seen the logic at work, formulated by Rancière, namely that there are
disagreements that arise, not because there is a failure of interlocutors to agree on anything, but
because they agree only to the extent that the word 'violence' is commonly used in relation to
what counts as actions and events defined by the paradigm case core conception of violence.
Distinctions between kinds of violence are evaluations of kinds of violence, and extend the
definition of violence to include or exclude acts as wrong. There is violence itself, and then
there are kinds of violence positively and negatively evaluated in relationships of superiority and
inferiority.
Except for Arendt, state theorists and anti-statists agree that a state's existence is
connected to violence, but disagree on why there is this connection, on what a state’s violence
achieves, and on how it is valued. However, the liberal state theorists who agree on some things
disagree on other things, and anti-statists who agree on some things disagree on other things. It
is not that these theorists would be unable to acknowledge that one another speaks of or writes
the term, 'violence,' but that they disagree with what one another means when each uses the word
‘violence’ in relation to these other things. The term ‘violence,’ in these cases only makes sense
in terms of that person’s political ideology. Without the paradigm case core conception of
violence, this disagreement would constitute a radical confusion, but with paradigmatic
examples, this disagreement continuously develops in novel ways. Each of the discussed authors
distinguish between kinds of violence according to a logic of domination.
Karen Warren, in her The Power and Promise of Ecological Feminism, formulates a
“logic of domination” such that “for any X and Y, if X is morally superior to Y, then X is
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morally justified in subordinating Y.” 159 Though Warren's concern is to demonstrate that the
oppression and subordination of women and of the environment logically imply one another
because a patriarchal oppressive framework commonly utilizes this logic against them both, this
“logic of domination” is also useful for analyzing definitions of violence that characterize
violence as connected to other things. Kinds of violence are defined in relationships of
superiority and inferiority, and the superior is then believed to be justified in its subordination of
the inferior, based on a person’s politically ideological definitions. The above discussion
demonstrates that political ideological distinctions between kinds of violence are defined as
superior and inferior in relation to other things. Then, the defined superior kinds of violence are
defined as something to be believe in because they are superior, and justified toward destroying
the inferior kinds. Arendt's definitions, though they sever the connection between violence and
state political power, still work within this logic of domination. She defines violent uses of
instruments as inferior to the nonviolent power of people acting in concert, thereby justifying this
power’s subordination of the violence that can be produced by one.
Now, in the following, the issue for Arendt's definition of the power of people acting in
concert as essentially not requiring violence is addressed, namely because, according to Slavoj
Žižek, nonviolent actions like this can count as a kind of violence. Like others, Žižek defines
violence as connected to the state's existence by defining kinds of violence, and one kind of
violence he defines is the nonviolence that defeats the violence that is systemic, structural, and
linguistic. This systemic, structural, and linguistic violence is not only consistent with the
agreement of the All, but is typically a condition of collective agreement itself.

159 Warren, Karen, “The Power and Promise of Ecological Feminism,” in Environmental Ethics: Readings in
Theory and Application, 6th ed., ed. Louis P. Pojman and Paul Pojman (Boston: Wadsworth, 212), 591.
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3.10 Žižek on the Legitimacy of Nonviolence
Žižek's definition of nonviolence as a kind of violence hangs on his interpretation of the
kinds of violence defined by Walter Benjamin. In Benjamin's Critique of Violence, three kinds
of violence are defined in their relationships to one another such that a value-hierarchy is
produced, establishing the superiority of divine violence, which by definition is superior to the
merely human “All,” over law-making and law-preserving violence. Benjamin assumes that “all
violence as a means is either law-making or law-preserving.” 160 That is, when violence is a
means, it is law-making or law-preserving. If violence is not a means, then it is neither lawmaking nor law-preserving. He also distinguishes between how natural law, and positive law
regard violence.
Against positive law's distinctions between legitimate, legal violence, and illegitimate,
illegal violence, Benjamin characterizes a kind of “divine violence,” which is defined as “lawdestroying” because it expiates by destroying the instrumentalist, means-ends positive laws
produced and sustained by law-making and law-preserving violence. 161 Divine violence is not a
means because it is neither law-making nor law-preserving. Divine violence arises from a
position external to the means-ends, instrumentalist, legal relationships sustained by law-making
and law-preserving violence. Because it destroys law, divine violence eliminates state power,
and because state violence can only establish legal power, it does not attain justice. Instead,
divine violence, which destroys law “is the principle of all divine end making,” and attains
justice, Benjamin says. 162 From the perspective of a state, its power is attained through its
legitimate uses of violence against illegal violence, but the legitimacy of this violence is that

160 Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, trans.
Edmund Jephcott (New York: Shocken, 1986), 287.
161 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 297-300.
162 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 295.
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which is defeated by the justice of divine violence. 163 Benjamin depicts divine violence as
something capable of transcending and destroying the violence of a state and its laws. So,
though Benjamin agrees that violence is a condition for a state’s existence, Benjamin's
disagreement concerns the superiority of legitimacy.
Legitimacy only exists in so far as there is the belief in the superior ability of a kind of
violence to defeat other kinds of violence. Benjamin, though, defines the superiority of the
justice of divine violence above the legitimacy of a state's law-creating and law-preserving
violence. Divine justice, in this sense, overrides, dominates, and transcends legitimacy. Divine
violence is justice, which the inferior, legitimate violence of law does not attain, since violence
that makes or preserves law is not divine violence. If legitimacy is a kind of belief, as has been
argued here, then divine violence is that which no one can believe in because they cannot believe
in it as a means to anything, since divine violence is not a means, but simply happens.
Slavoj Žižek also distinguishes between kinds of violence in such a way that his
distinctions agree with others discussed above, namely in the sense that violence is a condition
for the existence of a state. In his book, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, Žižek distinguishes
between subjective violence, and objective violence, which splits into systemic, and symbolic
violence. 164 He also produces an interpretation of Benjamin's conception of divine violence, but
one that disagrees with Benjamin, particularly in the sense of the violence of nonviolence. If
nonviolence is a kind of violence, then we have come a long way from the paradigm core case
conception of violence.

163 Jacques Derrida, in his lecture on Benjamin's Critique of Violence, makes it clear that the relationship between
law and justice is such that justice is not law, is not achieved by law, and cannot be defined by law because whatever
law defines as just is measured by law, therefore, it is simply a rationally calculated extension of law. Ultimately,
any attempt to define 'justice' leads to an aporia, in Derrida's view. Jacques Derrida, “Force de Loi: le “Fondement
Mystique de l'Autorité”” (“Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority””), Cardoza Law Review, trans.
Mary Quanintance 11(1990): 919-1045.
164 Slavoj Žižek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections (New York: Picador, 2008).
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On objective and subjective violence, Žižek argues that objective violence (the symbolic
and systemic) is the condition for the possibility of subjective violence. 165 He defines subjective
violence as “directly visible,” and “performed by a clearly identifiable agent.” 166 Subjective
violence includes all those actions and events that we would typically refer to as instances of
violence, particularly because they are visible.
In contrast to subjective violence, objective violence is “invisible,” and is that which
sustains the “normal” as a “zero-level standard against which we perceive something as
subjectively violent.” That is, subjective violence is that which is “experienced... against the
background of a non-violent zero level” and disturbs the “normal,” or what is considered to be a
“peaceful” situation. 167 This “normal” is produced and reproduced by the repetitive actions of
individuals, which sustain the socio-political and economic framework that constitutes the
hidden, objective violence. Objective violence is invisible, and is not typically thought to be a
kind of violence, but Žižek disagrees, and argues that it is a kind of violence. That is, this
presumed “nonviolent” “normal” of everyday life involves a kind of objective violence, from
which subjective violence erupts as an “abnormal” disruption. The “normal” sustains a kind of
violence, though its appearance as “normal” veils its violence, which results in violence directed
against this “normal” appearing as “abnormal.” In this sense, objective violence is the
transcendental condition for the possibility of the abnormality of the abnormal, subjective
violence.

165 Ibid. 1.
166 Žižek’s conception of subjective violence is akin to the paradigm case core conception of violence, since
subjective violence is that which people typically refer to as violent.
167 Ibid. 2.
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Žižek distinguishes two kinds of objective violence: the symbolic and systemic. The
symbolic side of objective violence is violence “embodied in language and its forms.” 168 That is,
language is a kind of violence. Things said create, and sustain a symbolic realm of meaning,
“essenc[ing]” a “universe of meaning” that imposes a division upon the world in so far as what is
said of things divides things into what they are and what they are not, what they should be and
what they should not be, in terms of superiority and inferiority. 169 The things people say, and the
ways that people speak of things produces what seems to be a non-violent linguistic realm
constitutive of a non-violent normalcy, but this is only because this violence is invisible.
The systemic side of objective violence is the “often catastrophic consequences of the
smooth functioning of our economic and political systems.” 170 Political and economic orders
appear to be productive of “a comfortable life,” but such orders involve “subtle forms of
coercion that sustain relations of domination and exploitation, including the threat of
violence.” 171 Not everyone enjoys the “comfortable life” produced by a political or economic
order. This is particularly the case in capitalist societies, where class conflicts are symptomatic.
So, systemically and symbolically, an objective framework of invisible violence is structurally
sustained through everyday practices and linguistic expressions of individuals, which reproduce
this framework that is typically overlooked because it is accepted as “normal.” It is from and
due to this objective violence that subjective violence emerges as “abnormal” violence.
So, in agreement with those discussed above, Žižek depicts violence as a condition for
the state and relies on the paradigm case core conception of violence, but this is the limit of his
agreement. Žižek is not exclusively focused on military violence against other states, nor is he

168 Ibid. 1.
169 Ibid. 67-8.
170 Ibid. 2.
171 Ibid. 9, 12-3.

110

exclusively concerned with coercive or legal violence against criminals. Instead, the very
structures constitutive of a state's existence are kinds of violence. Since objective violence is
invisible, there is the potential that anything counts as a kind of violence because anything could
be the condition for the possibility of someone's being subjectively violent in a way that disrupts
a “normal” state of affairs.
Žižek interprets Benjaminian divine violence as a refusal that interrupts objective
violence, and the subjective violence it brings about, by means of a violent refusal to act.
Indeed, Benjamin describes revolutionary violence as that which serves as one possible example
of divine violence, but divine violence could occur in other forms, such as an earthquake or
volcanic explosion that destroys the laws of a state by literally destroying the state. 172
Revolutionary violence can count as divine violence, in Benjamin’s terms, but only if it is not a
means to some goal, and instead is suddenly a kind of eruption. Žižek, though, simply runs with
revolutionary violence as that which counts as divine violence, and conceives of the ideal
revolutionary violent action as one in which the agent intentionally does nothing for the sake of
passionately refusing one's participation in the systemic, linguistic, and symbolic structures that
constitute and uphold the existence of invisible, objective violence. Refusal defeats objective
violence, and appears as something “abnormal” against the “normal” of the symbolic and
systemic components of objective violence, but the refusal that is one's doing nothing when
otherwise expected to act is a kind of violent nonviolence.
Žižek writes that the “domain of pure divine violence…is the domain of sovereignty.” 173
Divine violence is not pathological, not a crime, not a sacrifice, not aesthetic, not ethical, and not
religious, in his view. Instead, divine violence is like the “bio-political disposal of Homini sacer:

172 Benjamin, 282, 300.
173 Žižek, 198.
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in both cases, killing is neither a crime nor a sacrifice,” and it makes no distinctions between
good and evil. Divine violence does not simply occur for the sake of producing a spectacle, and
is not subordinate to law, but transcends these as that which commands simply because divine
violence commands by freeing individuals from the guilt imposed upon them by law. In this
sense, divine violence is, at the same time, a refusal to submit, and a refusal to accept sacrifices.
However, Žižek adds that “those annihilated by divine violence are fully and completely
guilty: they are not sacrificed, since they are not worthy of being sacrificed to and accepted by
God – they are annihilated without being made a sacrifice.” They are guilty of merely living a
natural life – “divine violence purifies the guilty not of guilt but of law, because law is limited to
the living.” Divine violence simply commands and its commands are sovereign in the sense that
they are free from any possible subordination of divine violence to anything at all. Divine
violence is not any other kind of violence. It is not a means; it is violence that has no goal.
Divine violence is completely sovereign, independent, free, beyond good and evil, and expects
nothing in return. It is an end in itself that has no further end. Divine violence is freedom and
frees the living from the guilt of living. Divine violence brings to an end, but for no purpose.
So, divine violence is sovereign, but not in the sense of state sovereignty, since divine
violence does not produce a foundation for law. Instead, according to Žižek, divine violence
should be conceived in the sense of the old Latin motto: “vox populi, vox dei…as the heroic
assumption of the solitude of sovereign decision. It is a decision (to kill, to risk or lose one’s
own life) made in absolute solitude, with no cover in the big Other.” 174 Divine violence cannot
be used as a means because it is not a means. It is instead unconditional freedom from the
imposition of any universal norm that strikes ““blindly,” demanding and enacting immediate
justice/vengeance...strik[ing] out of nowhere, a means without end.” It is, so to speak, “a leap of
174 Ibid. 202. “Vox populi, vox dei” translates as “The voice of the people is the voice of God.”
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faith,” irrational, but as such, it works toward expiating individuals from their guilt under law to
their freedom from law.
Žižek also defines divine violence in relationships to a variety of things, particularly to
what various significant figures have claimed throughout history. For example, divine violence,
in relation to the words of Robespierre, strikes as “lightning,” immediately, passionately, and
with love. And, in relation to the words of Che Guevara, divine violence strikes with hatred, but
because it loves. 175 And, in relation to the words of Kierkegaard, on the Christian demand to
“love one’s enemy,” it is “the demand to hate the beloved out of love and in love.” So, given
these various characterizations of divine violence, it is beyond the domain of law and legal
power, and it arises from the domain of love, which law and legal power cannot control or force
into submission.
However, divine violence is also a revolutionary refusal to act. This love that strikes with
hatred is nothing in relation to law and legal power because there is nothing about a loving
refusal to act that law and legal power can respond to without resorting to a kind of violence
connected to law and legal power. However, as a non-violent, non-action, doing nothing refuses
law and legal power, and actively destroys law because the violence of law is not allowed to
dominate. In this way, the most effective action, “the first gesture to provoke a change in [a]
system is to withdraw activity, to do nothing.” 176 Žižek concludes, stating that “sometimes
doing nothing is the most violent thing to do.” 177 So, Žižek defines kinds of violence, and
defines nonviolence, and doing nothing as kinds of violence, evaluating these in relation to one
another, and assuming that subjective violence ought not to occur. Whether anyone agrees with
him is a matter of belief in the legitimacy of the distinctions he defines from the position of his
175 Ibid. 204.
176 Ibid. 214.
177 Ibid. 217.
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political ideology. Given other ways to define and evaluate kinds of violence, Žižek’s
definitions for divine violence, and objective violence, both symbolic and systemic, reveal kinds
of violence that extend the paradigm cases of violence, which are grounds for political
disagreement.

3.11 Conclusion
Recall Walter Bryce Gallie’s brief description of essentially contested concepts. An
essentially contested concept is “an appraisive term [that] signif[ies] an achievement that is
internally complex, variously describable and “open”...[and is] used both “aggressively” and
“defensively.”” 178 Rancière logic of disagreement was added to Gallie’s definition:
“disagreement is where X cannot see the common object Y is presenting because X cannot
comprehend that the sounds uttered by Y form words and chains of words similar to X's own.” 179
Now that the political ideologies pertaining to violence and the existence of kinds of states has
been discussed, it should be obvious that each person outlined above evaluates kinds of violence
defining kinds of violence in connection to other things that are themselves evaluated positively
and negatively in accordance with a logic of domination that serves to justify superior kinds of
violence dominating inferior kinds of violence. Machiavelli, Arendt, Hobbes, Kant, Treitschke,
Schmitt, Weber, Bakunin, Sorel, Benjamin, and Žižek each utilize a commonsense view of
violence, explicitly or implicitly, in such a way that the definition of what is commonly
considered to be a violent act or event is appraised in relation to other things, such as power,
greatness, the state itself, the political, law, justice, capitalism, freedom, the divine, and other
things. In the end, there are distinctions between kinds of violence that disagree with one

178 Gallie, 180-1.
179 Rancière, xii.
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another. One person’s distinctions between kinds of violence and those things they are
connected to can be inverted by another person so that what the first person defines as superior is
defined by the second person as inferior, even in relation to the same things, such as freedom.
Nonviolence, which commonsensically speaking, does not count as violence, is definable as a
kind of violence.
Altogether then, there are numerous definitions of kinds of violence. The definitions I
have discussed here, which are representative, but not exhaustive of the philosophical literature,
and include all the major examples, follow the same pattern. One person’s evaluation
fundamentally disagrees with another. Each person’s evaluation of kinds of violence reflect that
person’s political ideologies. Political ideologies disagree with each other. Except for the
paradigm cases of violence, distinctions between kinds of violence are essentially contestable.
Any attempt to stop this debate by defining kinds of violence is to reproduce the debate. To
attempt to stop the debate by only affirming a commonsense view of violence is also to
reproduce the debate. There are only opposed political ideologies. Finally, for these reasons,
these distinctions between kinds of violence are non-neutrally political and fundamentally
disagree with one another, except for the paradigm acts that most people define as wrong, and as
violence. Belief in any one way of defining violence or in one way of distinguishing kinds of
violence is merely a belief.
In the following chapter, I will consider what might on the surface appear to be an
alternative approach: starting not from the concept of violence, but from the concept of
nonviolence. But, given Žižek’s claim that nonviolence can count as a kind of violence, it
appears that even this starting point is contestable: nonviolence can count as a kind of violence.
If there is a logic of domination at work in the distinctions between kinds of violence, then this
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argument can be generalized: if nonviolence is evaluated as superior to other kinds of violence
and justified in its attempt to defeat them, then nonviolence must count as a kind of violence.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ON THE VIOLENCE OF NONVIOLENCE

4.1 Introduction
As indicated in the previous chapters, there is a paradigm case core conception of
violence, and various extensions of this conception. The core cases involve the intentional use of
physical means for the sake of causing physical or psychological harms or destruction.
Commonsense views are grounded on these core cases. This implies that a commonsense view
of nonviolence defines an action as nonviolent when it does not involve an intent to use physical
means for the sake of causing physical or psychological harms or destruction. A paradigmatic
example of violence is a person’s intentional slamming of another person’s head between two
bricks for the sake of causing harm and destruction. Similarly, there are paradigmatic examples
that most people would agree count as involving no violence, such as when a forest hiker who
intentionally leaves no trash behind, and aims to avoid disturbing wildlife and plants, for the sake
of not disturbing nature to the greatest extent possible. It would be unusual for someone to think
that a tidy, conscientious hiker like this one walking through the forest is being violent.
However, as shown in previous chapters, there are many extended concepts of violence,
based on claimed equivalence to paradigmatic violence, that define violence on the basis of the
wrongness of paradigmatic actions and events. Likewise, as will be shown in this chapter,
extended definitions for kinds of nonviolence can also be produced. Distinctions between kinds
of nonviolence evaluate those kinds of nonviolence, unlike a commonsense view of nonviolence
that only describes paradigmatic nonviolent actions and events. Also argued in previous
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chapters, distinctions between kinds of violence are essentially contestable, and there is a
fundamental disagreement concerning what counts as kinds of violence. Definitions for kinds of
violence are typically non-neutrally political. Kinds of violence are defined, for example, by
Heinrich von Treitschke, Mikhail Bakunin, Walter Benjamin, and others, as conditions for the
goals of the state, its power, greatness, its immorality, and the preservation of its law. 180 The
same occurs with distinctions between and definitions of kinds of nonviolence, beyond a
commonsense definition of nonviolence. That is, given that kinds of nonviolence can be defined
in connection to other things, and opposed political ideologies do not necessarily agree, we
should expect a political disagreement concerning what nonviolence is beyond the paradigm
cases of nonviolence.
Nonviolent actors who aim for their actions to be legitimate means used in relation to the
state, laws, justice, dignity, equality, freedom, or other things aim to produce a transformation
through a defeat or an undermining of something “normal” or status quo within a society, and
these nonviolent means may perhaps be defined as working in the way that violence is thought to
work as a legitimate means, often used toward very similar goals. If these nonviolent means can
be defined as kinds of violence, then nonviolence counts as a kind of violence. Since
nonviolence is simply that which is not violence, but is also construed as something that can be
used as a means to a goal, it is worth asking, if nonviolence is defined in a way that is not clearly

180 This is discussed in the previous chapter. The goals of the state's power and greatness are discussed by Heinrich
von Treitschke in his Politics, trans. Arthur James Balfour (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1916); the
immorality of the state's uses of violence and of the state's negation of liberty are discussed by Mikhail Bakunin in
The Political Philosophy of Bakunin: Scientific Anarchism, ed. G. P. Maximoff (New York: The Free Press, 1953);
and kinds of law-making, law-preserving, and law destroying violence are discussed by Walter Benjamin in his
“Critique of Violence,” in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, trans. Edmund Jephcott
(New York: Shocken, 1986): 277-300. Definitions for kinds of violence are defined in relation to other things. For
example, the state is violent because without violence, the state would cease to exist, but in ways unique to each
theorist, except that Hanna Arendt argues that the state is not essentially violent since it consists, in a hypothetical
extreme case, in people acting in concert. See this in Arendt’s On Violence. New York: Harcourt, Inc., 1970 (1969
originally), especially pp. 43-56.
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distinct from how violence is defined, and if it is impossible to guarantee that one's own actions
are nonviolent in relation to other things, then is nonviolence another kind of violence? Since we
are not referencing actions that just happen to be nonviolent, but ones that are defined as useful
means to ends, we are concerned with nonviolence used as a means and the effects it produces in
relation to other things that may themselves count as kinds of violence. This distinguishes
nonviolent action from the paradigmatic case of the forest hiker mentioned earlier.
We should ask whether it is possible for nonviolence really to be not violent when used
as a means particularly because there is a variety of diverse and opposed views that might not
agree upon the goals toward which the so-called nonviolent means should be used.
Disagreement concerning goals may indicate that the means used toward them can be valued in
opposed ways, particularly as violent or nonviolent means. A kind of purely nonviolent political
action is likely impossible, given perspectives, scales of relationships between actors, institutions
and states, and the contingency of the future that may turn what were nonviolent actions into
some kind of violence. But, if pure nonviolence is impossible, particularly because there is
disagreement concerning whether it works as a means to goals, such as justice, freedom, and
equality, and whether it works toward such goals as a nonviolent means, then nonviolence is
another kind of violence that aims to eliminate other kinds of violence in the same way that kinds
of violence are thought to work as a means toward defeating other kinds of violence.
In the following, it is shown how some believe that nonviolence cannot exist without
some kind of violence that makes the nonviolence possible. Maurice Merleau-Ponty and René
Girard both define, each according to his own political ideology, a kind of violence that is a
condition for human existence. However, their definitions of this violence disagree.
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4.2 Merleau-Ponty and Violence as a Basic Fact of Human Existence
In his Humanism and Terror: An Essay on the Communist Problem, Merleau-Ponty
argues that “we do not have a choice between purity [i.e. nonviolence] and violence but between
different kinds of violence…[and adds that] inasmuch as we are incarnate beings, violence is our
lot...Violence is the common origin of all regimes. Life, discussion, and political choice occur
only against a background of violence. [So] what matters...is not violence but its sense or its
future.” 181 In other words, Merleau-Ponty defines violence as a condition for human existence,
in the sense of “regimes.” No regime exists without violence; no regime is nonviolent. In
particular, he means to distinguish between the violence of liberalism and communism because
both political ideologies claim to be equivalent to freedom. Their claims that their own uses of
violence are equivalent to freedom only make sense against the background situation from which
Merleau-Ponty writes. Given the Cold War, the French were in a position of having to choose to
take sides with the Soviet Union or the United States.
Even though both communism and liberalism value freedom, how violence is utilized as
a means toward freedom differentiates liberalism from communism. Merleau-Ponty writes,
Violence is the basic fact on which we have to build freedom. We
are not accusing liberalism of being a system of violence; we
reproach it with not seeing its own face in violence, with veiling
the pact upon which it rests while rejecting as barbarous that other
source of freedom – revolutionary freedom – which is the origin of
all social pacts. With the assumptions of impersonal Reason and
rational Man, and by regarding itself as a natural rather than an
historical fact, liberalism assumes universality as a datum whereas
the problem is its realization through the dialectic of concrete
intersubjectivity. 182

181 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror: An Essay on the Communist Problem, trans. John O’Neill
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1990), 109.
182 Ibid. 35.
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The main point is that, according to Merleau-Ponty, without violence, liberalism’s freedom is
impossible. “Violence is the basic fact.” Liberalism hides its violent foundation, and claims that
it only violently protects the freedom that liberalism produces, when it really only defends an
idea of freedom. Liberalism's assumptions of “impersonal Reason and rational Man” are merely
“universality as a datum,” a claim, and liberalism fails to produce actual freedom in concrete,
intersubjective relationships between actually existing humans.
Merleau-Ponty assumes that this actually existing intersubjective freedom is possible, and
agrees with Trotsky, Bukharin, and Stalin, who "are all opposed to the liberal ethics because it
presupposes a given humanity, whereas they aim at making humanity.” 183 The point is that
liberalism hides its violence, merely defending its idea of humanity, while it simultaneously
violently upholds bourgeois capitalistic conceptions of freedom, and not actually existing
freedom between humans. In this sense, “Bourgeois justice adopts the past as its precedent;
revolutionary justice adopts the future. [Revolutionary justice] judges in the name of the Truth
that the Revolution is about to make [historically] true.” 184 So, the key difference is that, on the
one hand, liberalism conceives of its existence as something “well and truly made.” Liberalism
utilizes violence for the sake of defending its existence, imposing itself upon individuals who
cannot refuse liberalism for the sake of freedom, while communism uses violence for the sake of
a future of humanism and actual, free, human relationships, particularly because liberalism has
not succeeded at achieving freedom.
The difference between communistic, revolutionary justice and the bourgeois justice of
liberalism lies in the temporal direction each emphasizes, the future and the past, respectively.
Both justify their own violence in relation to freedom, aiming to preserve the past or to create a

183 Ibid. 96.
184 Ibid. 28.
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future, and since they are political ideologies actually enacted in the post-World War II world,
each person is already on one side or the other, at least indirectly allied with the violence of the
state that protects them. Both liberalism and communism utilize violent means toward a
nonviolent goal of freedom, but whether this freedom exists now, or a different kind is possible
in the future, is a matter of disagreement, and therefore, whether the violent means each uses are
justified is a matter of disagreement.
Nonviolence might be assumed as a choice against this dichotomy, but cannot work
against violence because the violence of the violent will dominate the nonviolent, in any kind of
political system because “violence is the basic fact,” according to Merleau-Ponty. In such a
world, no one who seeks freedom can be nonviolent because it is violence that is defined as
equivalent to that which produces freedom, not nonviolence. One is always already involved in
some kind of violence. Freedom cannot be achieved nonviolently, and the violent defense of an
idea of freedom, no matter how impartial and rational it may be, is not any more justifiable than
the violent defense of actually existing freedom. There is only the disagreement between these
two political ideologies concerning whether freedom exists, and its relationship to justified kinds
of violence. Nonviolence would either allow liberalism to dominate with its violence, or would
fail to achieve freedom in “the dialectic of concrete intersubjectivity.” Merleau-Ponty sums up
his point, stating that “all we know is different kinds of violence and we ought to prefer
revolutionary violence because it has a future of humanism.” 185
So, Merleau-Ponty's distinction between the violence of communism and of liberalism
should be taken as pointing to the inability of an individual to avoid at least being complicit,
even in a minimal and indirect way, in relation to a kind of violence. This puts into question

185 Ibid. 107.
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whether nonviolence is possible, and whether it could work toward goals, such as freedom or
justice, without some kind of violence.

4.3 Political Conflict, Means to Justice, and the Irrelevance of Nonviolence: Bush and bin
Laden's Fundamental Disagreement and Justifications for Violence against Violence
A more recent example than the conflict between liberalism and communism in relation
to freedom and justice is reflected in the words of two adversaries: George Walker Bush and
Osama bin Laden. Both are concerned with sustaining freedom, defending it against the
injustices caused by the other. There is no question of a nonviolent use of means toward their
goals, since both conceive of the other as someone to be destroyed.
For example, in his September 20, 2001 speech, “President Bush Addresses the Nation,”
US President George Walker Bush denies the justice that the enemies of the United States seek
and urges violence against them. In opposition, Al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had argued
in his August 23, 1996 letter, “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of
the Two Holy Places: Expel the Polytheists from the Arabian Peninsula,” that the West, and
“America” in particular, are enemies against whom violence should be directed because they
deny justice. 186 Both claim the other denies justice, and both portray the other as an enemy
against whom violence must be used because there is no other path to take. They nominally have
the same goal, but despite this, they justify the use of violent means against one another, and this
demonstrates their fundamental disagreement. Their arguments do not allow for any
reconciliation because they both define the other as equivalent to an enemy against justice, which
186 Osama bin Laden, Osama, “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy
Places: Expel the Polytheists from the Arabian Peninsula,” in On Violence, ed. by Bruce B. Lawrence and Aisha
Karim (Durham: Duke University Press), 540-44. And, George Bush, “George Bush Addresses the Nation,” The
Washington Post, September 20, 2001, accessed May 16, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wprv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html
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they both define as that which they themselves, with their “people,” achieve. What they really
aim for is the elimination of the threat of the other's violence, and only violence is conceived of
as capable of defeating that threat.
In the following, Bin Laden clearly blames America, accusing it of deception, and of
being the cause of injustices for the people of Islam:
The people of Islam have been struck by oppression, hostility and
injustice...All this happened before the eyes of the world, but the
clear imperial arrogance of America, under the cover of the
immoral United Nations, has prevented the dispossessed from
arming themselves...we work to do away with the injustice that has
befallen our Umma at the hands of the Judeo-Crusader
alliance...We pray to God that He might bless us with victory.
Osama bin Laden defines the injustice experienced by “the people of Islam” as being a result of
the “imperial arrogance of America” that pretends to be moral by appealing to the United
Nations. Nonviolence is not even an option for “the dispossessed.” Bin Laden aims to
delegitimize America's uses of violent means by defining them as unjust and immoral, and
thereby legitimizes the violence of “the people of Islam” by defining it as just, and moral.
For both Bush and bin Laden, the “other” is defined as an enemy, and as an obstacle to
each of their own goals in a way similar to how Merleau-Ponty distinguishes liberalism and
communism in relation to freedom. Bush states, “They stand against us because we stand in
their way,” which accords with liberalism standing in the way of communism. When Bush says,
“either [Nations] are with us or...are with the terrorists,” this describes America as that which all
must recognize as the promoter and defender of “freedom” and “justice.” Anyone who does not
side with the US, or who remains passive or pacific in this situation, is complicit with the enemy.
There is no other choice than to engage in some form of punishment of terrorists: “Terror
unanswered can not only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate
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governments,” Bush says. The implication is that anyone who sides with someone like bin
Laden does not believe in the US government Bush leads. Anyone who is not with Bush, is
against him, and is implicitly an enemy. If the aim is to defeat the violence that threatens one's
own people and way of life, then nonviolence is not the means political leaders choose because
they suspect the violence of their enemy. Again, nonviolence as a means is in question because,
in relation to Islamophobia and ISIS (ISIL) today, nonviolently confronting those who are
willing to utilize violence seems ineffective because then one's own way of life and people are
not violently, aggressively defended. If nonviolence is in principle opposed to violence,
including defensive violence, and the enemy's violence occurs nonetheless, then to be nonviolent
would seem to be a case of granting the enemy victory.
Furthermore, when Bush declares, “whether we bring our enemies to justice or bring
justice to our enemies, justice will be done,” he engages in a fundamental disagreement. The
American occupation of the Middle East is “justice delivered,” from the liberal state's
perspective, and an “invasion of evil,” from bin Laden’s theological one. Bin Laden calls for
“jihad against the enemies of God, your enemies the Israelis and Americans,” adding later that
“you know that your coming-together and co-operation [sic] in order to liberate the holy places
of Islam is the right step towards unification of the world of the Umma under the banner of God's
unity.” Unlike Bush’s liberal ideological conception of political justice, bin Laden’s
eschatological ideology concerns a kind of divine justice.
There is no question for these leaders that if there is an enemy who impedes upon their
own ability to achieve justice, then in practice it is violence that is the means to defeating the
enemy, and not nonviolence. Both agree that violence is justified against enemies, but they
politically disagree on who counts as enemy. Their definitions utilize the same terms, such as
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justice, but these terms are defined in opposed ways that fundamentally, politically disagree. So,
whether nonviolence can succeed against enemies is in question, particularly when those
enemies wield violence. Not to use violence against an enemy’s violence is defined as allowing
the enemy’s violence to succeed. That is, nonviolence cannot be justified against an enemy’s
violence because, by definition, this would grant victory to the enemy’s violence.
Merleau-Ponty's claim is relevant here: “He who condemns all violence puts himself
outside the domain to which justice and injustice belong.” 187 The point that he makes, and that is
reflected by the opposed definitions produced by George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden, is that
anyone who works toward some political goal is already on the side of some kind of violence
that the goal itself justifies, even if one is not oneself engaged in violent actions that pertain to
the paradigm cases. To condemn violence, and to commit to nonviolence is to give up on
pursuing goals of justice and freedom, particularly in a world in which one has enemies.
If one is protected so that one can enjoy living in relation to a defined kind of justice and
freedom, then one is living a life that sides with a kind of violence, even if one is intentionally
nonviolent. Even if nonviolent means are intentionally utilized, as Merleau-Ponty argues, the
ability to be intentionally nonviolent is protected by other kinds of violence. Also, it is possible
that one’s intention to be nonviolent now may later become a kind of violence in the future, since
the future is contingent and we cannot know now what our nonviolence will mean in the future.
One’s intention to be nonviolent can be violent because, as indicated above and below, some
kinds of violence are defined as invisible, systemic, and symbolic. If one avoids engaging in
paradigmatic acts of violence, this is no guarantee that one is not violent in some other way. The
political disagreements concerning what counts as violence mean that one’s nonviolence can
count as violence.
187 Merleau-Ponty, 110.
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In his reflections on liberalism and communism, Merleau-Ponty argues that “once
humanism attempts to fulfill itself with any consistency it becomes transformed into its opposite,
namely, into violence.” 188 The pursuit for the goal of humanism will inevitably result in some
kind of violence, such as that of a humanism's oppressive imposition against those who threaten
the goal of that “humanism.” So, nonviolence cannot work as a means to these goals because
some kind of violence can always be implicated by a pursuit of this kind.

4.4 Girard on Mimetic Rivalry and the Modern Legal System as a Scapegoating
Mechanism
Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of liberalism's masking its own violence with conceptions of
justice and freedom that are meant to serve as justifications for liberalism's violence as instances
of defensive violence is reflected in Girard's anthropological work on violence, though Girard
does not discuss Merleau-Ponty’s arguments. In Girard's view, the modern state, including the
liberal state, veils its own uses of violence by pretending as though its use of violence were for
the sake of achieving nonviolent harmony within a community, when anthropologically,
evidence indicates that states merely engage in violence, violently protecting themselves, and
scapegoating “victims,” i.e. “criminals,” who threaten that nonviolent harmony that states only
claim to achieve, but do not actually achieve. In other words, without violence, nonviolence is
not possible. The violence of modern states is merely a secularized version of an ancient,
primitive logic of sacrificial violence.
In his Violence and the Sacred, through anthropological analyses of primitive and ancient
cultural practices and texts, Girard argues that in both primitive and modern cultures, only kinds
of violence defeat violence, and temporarily establish nonviolent social harmony, and that this is

188 Ibid. 13.
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an inherently religious aspect of human existence. The relationship between ancient, primitive
forms of violence that is thought to be capable of defeating violence and the juridical violence of
modern states lies in their need for groups of people to believe in these kinds of violence as
legitimate and effective toward defeating violence. On religion, Girard writes
Religion invariably strives to subdue violence, to keep it from
running wild. Paradoxically, the religious and moral authorities in
a community attempt to instill nonviolence, as an active force into
daily life and as a mediating force into ritual life, through the
application of violence. Sacrificial rites serve to connect the moral
and religious aspects of daily life, but only by means of a lengthy
and hazardous detour. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that the
efficacy of the rites depends on their being performed in the spirit
of pietas, which marks all aspects of religious life...Primitive
religion tames, trains, arms, and directs violent impulses as a
defensive force against those forms of violence that society regards
as inadmissible. It postulates a strange mixture of violence and
nonviolence. The same can perhaps be said of our own judicial
system of control. 189
Girard indicates how the cultural role of traditional, ritually performed violent sacrifices works in
a way that includes nonviolence, but only in relation to violence, “mixed” with it. The purely
nonviolent is not a means to cultural harmony, since a kind of violence is needed for defeating
the violence that “society regards as inadmissible.” For this reason, it is paradoxical that religion
and moral authorities try to instill nonviolence, since it does so through uses of kinds of violence.
Inadmissible violence is that which threatens the existence of a society. Religion adopts
nonviolent sacrificial rites as means to keeping violent impulses outside of a community, but
nonviolent sacrificial rites only work to the extent that they mimic an original, violent sacrifice.
Additionally, modern culture reflects religion in that it uses violence as a means to
defeating violence. In modern cultures, the guilty party is directly punished “because [the

189 René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. by Patrick Henry (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press:
1977), 20.
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judicial system] possesses a monopoly on the means of revenge.” 190 Due to this monopoly,
revenge against the law is less likely. Though the judicial system directly punishes the guilty, no
one is willing to exact revenge on the judicial system. The judicial system's “control” of
violence via its greater ability to be violent is assumed to keep violence in check. Modern
society's belief in judicial systems lessens fears of vengeful violence that arise from people
pursuing revenge against those who had pursued revenge against them. 191 Like the violent
sacrifices utilized in primitive cultures for various goals, such as gaining a deity's favor or for the
atonement of sins, the legal system of punishment depends on its uses of violence, without which
it would no longer work. Religion tends to mask its dependency on violence, while judicial
systems do not, since they have a practical monopoly on the means of revenge.
The role of religious, violent sacrifices, in Girard's anthropological analysis, is that they
serve to defeat the desire for vengeance against others that leads to reciprocating, vengeful
violence. Without violent sacrifices, the nonviolent harmony of a community would not be
possible. Without the almost universal agreement that the violent sacrifices are wrong, in the
sense of the paradigmatic cases of violence, there would be no nonviolently unified
communities. It may appear that the modern judicial system does not engage in pursuits for
violent vengeance, but this is merely an appearance, since, in the end, as “the most efficient of all
curative procedures,” the judicial system pursues violent vengeance against criminals and
outlaws. 192 Nonviolent harmony in juridically policed communities that do not allow their
members to seek vengeance against other members is secured through the direct use of violence.
Nonviolence is only attained via means that are themselves violent, in the sense defined by the
paradigmatic cases.
190 Ibid. 23.
191 Ibid. 27.
192 Ibid. 21.
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In order to see why only violence is a means to nonviolence, note that Girard argues that
the anthropological cause of violence is mimetic, triangular desire, which produces rivalry. 193
He explicitly disagrees with a “traditional view” of mimetic desire, which claims that violent
conflict results from two or more humans competing for an “object [which] comes first, followed
by human desires that converge independently on this object,” followed by their violent
confrontation when they attempt to possess the object. 194 It is not the case, according to Girard,
that conflict results from two or more competing desires for an object. That is, “it is [not]...the
intrinsic value of the object that inspires...[violent] struggle; rather, it is...violence itself that
bestows value on the objects.” 195 The object itself is only a “pretext” for violent conflict in the
sense that, without the object, one would not see another individual manifest that the object is
desirable through that other individual’s being a violent obstacle to that object.
In this sense, mimetic, triangular rivalry involves three factors: a subject, an object, and a
rival, who “desires the same object as the subject.” 196 Two different subjects compete against
one another in pursuit of being the one who exhibits the desirability of being the one who
demonstrates the desirability of possessing the object. That is, because “the rival alerts the
subject to the desirability of the object...the rival...serves as a model for the subject...in regard to
desires.” 197 This rival-model shows a “disciple” that an object is desirable, which means that we
desire objects only because others demonstrate to us what is desirable. 198 For example, it is not
that a person first desires owning natural resources and then the person competes with a rival for
those natural resources, but that the other person who owns the natural resources demonstrates

193 Ibid. 181.
194 Ibid. 144.
195 Ibid. 144.
196 Ibid. 145.
197 Ibid. 145.
198 Ibid. 146-7.
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that it is desirable to be the one who owns these. One is shown what one lacks, in particular, the
desirability of being the one who possesses the object. 199 The disciple does not want to be the
one who has the object, but to be the one who manifests the desirability of being the one who
possesses the object.
Girard explains that this mimetic, triangular rivalry produces a “double bind,” which is “a
contradictory double imperative...[that] is so common that it might be said to form the basis of
all human relationships.” 200 The contradictory imperatives are “Imitate me!” and “Don't imitate
me!” 201 A model demonstrates the desirability of being able to be an obstacle to expressing the
desirability of having an object. As an obstacle to being the model, this model is a kind of
violence that “commands” others to become the model. The model-obstacle commands “Imitate
me!” However, when the disciple imitates the model-obstacle, they are violent threats in relation
to one another. At this point, there is a double bind, the irreconcilable commands that the
disciple should and should not be the model. This mimetic rivalry occurs such that the disciplerival aims to imitate being a violent obstacle “by means of a mimetic counterviolence” that aims
to overcome the model's being the violent model-obstacle. 202 When the disciple succeeds, their
roles are inverted. The disciple becomes the model-obstacle, and the model-obstacle becomes
the disciple. Thereafter, this particular inversion repeats reciprocally, oscillating back and forth
as they each aim to outdo one another's being the violent model-obstacle.
The worst of possibilities that may result from this mimetic rivalry occurs when there is a
steady growth of violence that “oscillates between the combatants, without either managing to
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lay final claim” to being the model-obstacle. 203 This growth of violence continues to escalate
toward greater and greater kinds of violence in a mimetic, reciprocating process that occurs
because “each person prepares himself for the probable aggression of his neighbors and
interprets his neighbor's preparations as confirmation of the latter's aggressiveness.” 204 The
difficulty of attaining nonviolence internationally is relevant here. In terms of the security
dilemma, this mimetic growth threatens at a global level, given that the increased security of one
state can lead to other states increasing their own security. The other appears as a threat, and this
leads to the building up of defenses, which results in one's increased defenses appearing as a
threat to the other, which results in the other building up defenses and appearing as a threat, and
so on. This continues to spiral as a vengeful reciprocation of aims to mimic the violence of the
other recurs.
Anthropologically speaking, though, Girard describes how cultures have rescued
themselves from this threat of the reciprocating, vengeful violence that arises from mimetic
rivalry. This is the scapegoating mechanism. His assumption is that, due to mimetic rivalry and
the double bind, people “make a duty of vengeance.” 205 The model-obstacle's violence serves as
a reason and justification for violent revenge against it. At a certain point, an epiphany is
reached, at which everyone involved in the oscillation of violence must altogether redirect their
reciprocating, vengeful violence away from one another and toward some single thing so that
their desire for vengeance can be extinguished. At this point “only an act of collective expulsion
can bring this oscillation to a halt and cast violence outside the community.” 206 This requires the
collectively produced sacrifice of a surrogate-scapegoat victim.
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204 Ibid. 81.
205 Ibid. 15.
206 Ibid. 151.

132

When a mimetic rivalry has become violent to the intense degree Girard describes,
differences quickly shift back and forth between individuals intent on overcoming one another's
violence. Then the situation simplifies, as participants increase their being violent and thereby
lose their differences in relation to one another because each is engaged in violence. 207 As
manifestations of violence, they all become the same, and at this point a sacrificial crisis
exists. 208 One can imagine a community in which everyone is engaged in violence to the point
that, what would otherwise distinguish each person from every other, is erased. The differences
required for cultural harmony are erased. At the point when a sacrificial crisis is reached, the
“epiphany” occurs, and “violence...generate[s] unanimity, either in its favor or against it.” 209
Either all continue to spontaneously reciprocate vengeful violence until they destroy themselves,
or they collectively and spontaneously turn their violence onto a surrogate victim who serves as a
scapegoat. 210 Anthropologically speaking, Girard shows that “violence is both the disease and
the cure.” 211 Nonviolent means are not the means to nonviolent consequences. Nonviolence is
not defined as the cure to violence. Only violence can defeat violence, and though in modern
states violent sacrifices of surrogate-scapegoats do not explicitly occur, this scapegoating
mechanism that unifies a community against violence by way of a kind of sacrificial violence is
retained in the juridical structure.
Girard defines the ancient, primitive situation in this way:
Everything suggests a crowd whose intentions were initially
pacific; a disorganized mob that for unknown reasons...came to a
high pitch of mass hysteria. The crowd finally hurl[s] itself on one
individual; even though he had no particular qualifications for this
207 Ibid. 148.
208 Ibid. 49.
209 Ibid. 152.
210 Girard interchangeably uses the terms “surrogate” and “scapegoat.” Both terms are equally appropriate, as will
become clear below, because the sacrificed victim is a substitution for everyone else and because the victim bears
the blame attributed to him/her by everyone else.
211 Ibid. 220.
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role, he served to polarize all the fears, anxieties, and hostilities of
the crowd. His violent death provided the necessary outlet for the
mass anguish, and restored peace. 212
Given Girard's arguments, every society has this kind of violence at its origin, and its nonviolent
existence as a society rests on uses of violence. To claim that nonviolence is possible without
violence, or to claim that there is a society that does not have violence at its origin is to disagree
with Girard’s anthropological theory concerning the role violence plays in societies and with his
analysis of the meaning of the kinds of action he interprets as responses to original violence,
such as sacrifice..
Girard's point is that violence brings people together, either in terms of their unification
or in terms of their self-destruction. Religion “hides” the violence it uses for the sake of
maintaining nonviolent social harmony, but Girard suggests that the religious hiddenness of the
role of the scapegoating mechanism is revealed by the judicial system. Girard argues that,
As the focal point of the system shifts away from religion and the
preventive approach is translated into judicial retribution, the aura
of misunderstanding that has always formed a protective veil
around the institution of sacrifice shifts as well, and becomes
associated in turn with the machinery of the law...As soon as the
judicial system gains supremacy, its machinery disappears from
sight. Like sacrifice, it conceals—even as it also reveals— its
resemblance to vengeance, differing only in that it is not selfperpetuating and its decisions discourage reprisals. In the case of
sacrifice, the designated victim does not become the object of
vengeance because he is a replacement, is not the "right" victim. In
the judicial system the violence does indeed fall on the "right"
victim; but it falls with such force, such resounding authority, that
no retort is possible. 213
Law is defined as a means to the preservation of nonviolence, but it can only do so by using
violence, which law itself justifies, for the sake of defeating the desire for vengeance that leads to
acts of violence. Without violent acts directed against the “right” victim, violence cannot be
212 Ibid. 131.
213 Ibid. 22.
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defeated. The “machinery of law” eliminates the religious veil, making the function of its
violence explicitly obvious, though it would shroud its uses of violence as that which achieves
nonviolence. But, the judicial system cannot escape the fact that, when legal norms are violated,
violent actions are the means used to punish criminals directly. Judicially, the violent actions
justified by a modern state appears to be legal and secular, but they retain this religious character
in that the violent actions justified by the state bind a community together in nonviolent
harmony. In short, Girard's point is that “vengeance, sacrifice, and legal punishment...are
essentially the same [because] they tend to adopt the same types of violent response in times of
crisis.” 214 So, again, but anthropologically (and juridically) speaking, nonviolence can only be
gained as a goal through some kinds of uses of violent means, and not nonviolent ones.

4.5 Can Nonviolence be Achieved in Practice?
Merleau-Ponty's criticism of liberalism demonstrates that no one can seriously claim to
be nonviolently seeking freedom. Someone is imposed upon when means are used toward
sustaining or creating freedom, and such impositions can be experienced as violence. Whether
such impositions actually are violent is a matter of political disagreement. Girard shows that
only by way of kinds of violence, sacrificial and judicial, can peaceful, nonviolent harmonies be
achieved.
A person who argues in favor of nonviolence needs to show that nonviolent means are
capable of achieving nonviolent goals (in the social-political and economic sense), and that those
nonviolent means actually are nonviolent. In the following, we turn to arguments concerned
with nonviolent resistance, nonviolent direct action, nonviolent civil disobedience, pacifism,
forgiveness, and prayer. It will be shown that these arguments, produced by Todd May, John
214 Ibid. 25.
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Rawls, Slavoj Žižek, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Gil Bailie, and Hannah Arendt, disagree with
one another politically. The kinds of nonviolence they define either demonstrate that
nonviolence counts as a kind of violence, or show that whether nonviolence is attained in
practice is a matter of political disagreement.

4.6 The Violence of Nonviolence: Resistance, Disobedience, and Refusal
4.6.1 Todd May, Neoliberal Violence, and Nonviolent Resistance
With a focus on the USA and Europe, instead of the entire global population, Todd May
argues that, since the Great Depression, there has been “a decline of the welfare state...and a turn
to...neoliberalism,” i.e. “Chicago School economics,” which argues for less government
intervention, and contrasts the Keynesian economics that influenced Franklin Roosevelt's
creation of social welfare programs that intervene and invest in the public by providing public
welfare in various ways. 215 With Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher's elections,
neoliberalism arrived in full force.
May cites David Harvey's definition of neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic
practices that proposes that human wellbeing can best be advanced by liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong
private property rights, free markets, and free trade.” 216 Neoliberalism privatizes, deregulates,
and eliminates public services, but intervenes in national and sometimes international markets,
via the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The main goal of neoliberalism is to
“liberat[e] individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills,” but in Harvey's view, neoliberalism
shifts wealth back to economic elites. This shift in the distribution of wealth, and lack of

215 Todd May, Nonviolent Resistance: A Philosophical Introduction (Malden: Polity, 2015), 166-7.
216 Ibid. 167. See David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 19.
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investment in the public means that “where once it was considered an important social duty to
assist one's fellow citizens, now they are left more nearly to their own devices,” May says. 217 As
a result, more people are forced into situations where they are afraid and alone to the extent that
neoliberalism “erodes social solidarity; it contributes to an increasing individualization.” 218 The
government's use of money is distrusted, so neoliberalism privatizes and deregulates, and private
companies do what they want without government interference. It follows, in May's view, that
“neoliberalism leads to more neoliberalism in a cycle of isolated individualism creating more
isolated individualism.” 219 May's intention is to argue that nonviolent political action (i.e.
nonviolent resistance) can confront neoliberalism because such actions bring about “cooperation,
trust, and solidarity.” 220
May characterizes neoliberalism as a kind of violence that extends beyond the
commonsense view and paradigmatic examples. Its violence is “generally more structural than
physical or psychological,” which means that uses of violence against particular persons whose
actions reproduce neoliberalism is uses of violence against victims of that same structural

217 Ibid. 169. See also Brad Evans and Henry Giroux, who scrutinize neoliberalism in a similar way, particularly
emphasizing the point that those who cannot or who refuse to participate in “casino capitalism” [the consumption of
one thing after another for the sake of consumption itself] are condemned, though they already live impoverished
lives. In short, neoliberal ideology blames victims, and this is a kind of neoliberal violence. Giroux and Evans
write, “Neoliberal power is unmediated in its effects on people as it operates throughout the global space of
unregulated flows. Whereas in an earlier industrial period capital was largely rooted and peoples migrated, for the
most part today capital flows while peoples are contained. What becomes of sovereignty in this economically driven
environment is a military and policing protectorate put to the service of global capital in ways that work by
condemning the already condemned. At the same time, neoliberal ideology, policies, and modes of governing are
normalized as if there is no outside or alternative to capitalism. As corporate power replaces political sovereignty,
politics becomes an extension of war and all public spaces are transformed into battle zones. Not only are all
vestiges of the social contract, the safety net, and institutions of democracy under siege, but so too are all public
spheres that support non-market values such as trust, critical dialogue, and solidarity…Paul Buchheit is right in
arguing that "privatizers believe that any form of working together as a community is anti-American. To them,
individual achievement is all that matters. They're now applying their winner-take-all profit motive to our children."
They are also punishing those individuals, groups, and institutions that refuse the individualized and cut throat
values of a market-driven casino capitalism.” Brad Evans and Henry Giroux, “Critique of Violence,” in Disposable
Futures: The Seduction of Violence in the Age of the Spectacle, (San Francisco, City Lights Publishers: 2015), 2.
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violence. 221 Also, using violence against those individuals whose actions defend neoliberalism,
including the police and military, is likely to result in the police and military using their greater
ability to wield violence to stop the violence directed against neoliberalism. 222 So, May looks at
nonviolence as the only way groups of individuals acting in solidarity can work against the
structural violence of neoliberalism. He argues that neoliberalism does not need to be
“overthrow[n],” but “undermine[d], by way of a “refusal of obedience...based upon a
recognition of the dignity and a presupposition of the equality of everyone.” 223
It is because May does not think that violence can succeed against neoliberalism's
structural violence, and the violence of those who support neoliberalism, that he endorses
nonviolence as the means to undermining it. This nonviolent undermining of neoliberalism's
violence is, as a means, a “refusal of obedience.” A refusal like this, in May's view, does not
overthrow, but undermines, in that if neoliberalism openly uses violence against those who
nonviolently refuse to be obedient, then the project of neoliberalism, as a moral, social, and
political project is shown to be an immoral, anti-social, political ideology that violently enforces
individualism, privatization, and economic inequalities, which have the potential to weaken and
damage the ideology of neoliberalism itself.
The assumption is that nonviolent refusal to obey undermines by forcing a change. That
against which the intentional use of nonviolence is directed is either provoked to use violence
against the nonviolent, and thereby reveals the violence of the thing the nonviolence is directed
toward, or the sought change is brought about. This, in May's view, is not an overthrow, since an
overthrow could count as violence, but an undermining. To undermine is to start from the
foundations, from the ground up, with actions that are assumed to be nonviolent in the sense of
221 Ibid. 175.
222 Ibid. 176.
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paradigmatic acts of nonviolence that are intentionally performed without any action counting as
a paradigmatic act of violence.
May's assumption is that an overthrow implies a kind of domination and destruction,
which can be more easily accused of violence. To be nonviolent, according to May, is to
undermine because a nonviolent action assumes the dignity and equality of all, thereby
producing a situation of respectfulness, which neoliberalism would openly violate, if it were to
use violence against a nonviolent resistance or movement. So, in this sense, a nonviolent
political action provokes that against which it is directed into transforming into something else,
such as when the nonviolent political actions of Gandhi undermined British Imperialism and of
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. undermined the oppressive forces that upheld segregation.
In contrast to May's definition of the refusal to be obedient as nonviolent, Sartre defines a
refusal as a kind of violence because it destroys the expectation that one will be obedient. In his
Notebooks for an Ethics, Sartre writes that “violence is not just the refusal of making use of
something, it is the destruction of the possibility of such use for everyone, the refusal of all
lawfulness.” 224 This is because, as opposed to obedient actions that conform to law, and are
therefore nonviolent from the perspective of law, refusal to be obedient breaks lawfulness in
general, and is therefore a kind of violence. Sartre states that “every refusal is likely to be taken
for a form of violence.” 225 So, the refusal of obedience characterized by May as nonviolent
political action can mean that in relation to other things, such as lawfulness, the refusal is a kind
of violence. There is a political, ideological disagreement concerning whether a refusal of
disobedience counts as nonviolence or as violence. In order to see how this nonviolent political
action can count as violence, May's definition of nonviolence is addressed next because the issue
224 Jean-Paul Sartre, Notebooks for an Ethics, trans. David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1992), 182.
225 Ibid. 210.
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concerns whether nonviolent actions can be effective in any way without there being a possibility
of their being interpreted as a kind of violence.
May defines “nonviolence as political, economic, or social activity that challenges or
resists a current political, economic, or social arrangement while respecting the dignity of its
participants, adversaries and others.” 226 He adds that “nonviolence must reject not only
violence but also threats of violence” because such threats “don't actually respect the dignity of
others” and because such threats intend to interrupt a human life. 227 The nonviolent means used,
in the sense that May intends, are human bodies. He states,
In nonviolence, one does not express one's equality with a gun but
rather with one's own body. It is oneself, not one's weapon, which
is the vehicle of resistance...Moreover, in nonviolence it is by
standing up rather than knocking down another that expresses
refusal...That is a form of emancipation that comes not from what
is granted by one's adversary but developed through one's own
activity. 228
Whether a body counts as a weapon is debatable, depending on what is done with the body. A
person’s body could itself be a threat to someone’s dignity, particularly if it “expresses refusal.”
If someone is intentionally nonviolent for the sake of enacting paradigmatic, nonviolent actions,
acting nonviolently as if it were a maxim, standing up and refusing through nonviolent action,
then it is possible that someone may disagree, and interpret an action like this as a kind of
violence. If this conception of acting nonviolently on principle entailed an action completely
devoid of violence, then because it is a matter of interpretation and political, ideological
assumptions that lead a person to think an action is in accordance with a principle of
nonviolence, there can be others who do not necessarily define the actions as nonviolent ones. A
person’s standing up, in the sense of emancipatory refusal, could be that which is interpreted as a
226 May, 59.
227 Ibid. 62.
228 Ibid. 155-6.
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threat, which binds individuals together in opposition to it. One's own idea of nonviolence, no
matter how strongly one intends to actualize it in concrete, paradigmatic actions, does not
guarantee the action will be defined as nonviolent by most people.
No matter how morally wrong it might be for someone to be a white supremacist who
aims to uphold the institution of segregation, the so-called nonviolent direct actions of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. could be experienced by such a person as violence. Nonviolent political actors
put their bodies in the way of things going on as normal, interrupting that normal and bringing
about an abnormal situation that establishes a new normal that some individuals may refuse to
accept as normal. They might sit on a bus, or at a lunch counter, for example. This new normal
can itself be experienced as a kind of violence by those who wish to preserve the past. The
nonviolent refusal of the old normal, as Sartre might put it, is violence against the lawfulness of
the old normal. Once refused, the nonviolence violently destroys the possibility of that old
normal continuing to be normal.
However, May is careful to define nonviolent political actions as nonviolent actions,
emphasizing that it is not merely the intention that matters, but the action itself. That is, if an
action is to count as a nonviolent political action, then it really must be nonviolent as an action,
in relation to what counts as a nonviolent action. Walking down a sidewalk is a paradigmatic
example of a nonviolent action. The action itself is defined as a nonviolent action by most
people. It is not that one must intend to embody nonviolence in principle, but that an action is
nonviolent if it accords with the way that nonviolence is defined by most people. However,
whether an action is nonviolent depends upon the things that a person connects the action to. If
the action is connected to the disruption of some defined normal way of things, then one can
disagree, and define a nonviolent action as a violent one. This would be to extend nonviolence

141

beyond the paradigmatic cases, requiring that actions also not disrupt something defined as
normal. Whether an action is nonviolent is a matter of disagreement, despite agreements that
there are paradigmatic examples of nonviolent actions.
May defines nonviolent actions that undermine as those that are equivalent to expressions
of respect for the dignity of others. He writes that, “to act with dignity in nonviolent
action...involves treating someone with the proper respect...tying together the dignity of the
nonviolent actor with that of his or her adversary.” 229 May frames nonviolent political action as
something that uses the treatment of others with respect as a means to “tying together the dignity
of the nonviolent actor with that of his or her adversary.”
Dignity is tied together when everyone involved, including one’s adversary, is recognized
as commonly sharing,
The ability to engage in projects and relationships that unfold over
time; to be aware of one's death in a way that affects how one sees
the arc of one's life; to have biological needs like food, shelter, and
sleep; to have basic psychological needs like care and a sense of
attachment to one's surroundings. 230
A body’s nonviolent action that respects the dignity of the other is defined as equivalent to the
respect for the other’s living life toward death, with basic biological and psychological needs. If
one does not act with respect for the life and needs of one’s adversary so that this adversary will
reciprocate with respect for the dignity of the nonviolent political actors, then one’s action is not
equivalent to a nonviolent political action that undermines, as defined by May. Respect for the
dignity of others, the presupposition that all equally have basic needs and a life to lead, is defined
as central to how nonviolence is thought to work as a means of refusal that undermines and
emancipates. But, should an individual respect the dignity of an adversary who is physically
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attacking that individual? If the adversary is not giving up, and continues to attack, despite the
individual’s enacted nonviolent refusal, does one simply stand there and continue to receive
those attacks? If one only stands there, is one allowing violence to be used as a means against
oneself for the sake of some higher goal? Can a person use self-defensive violence?
May answers “no”:
Nonviolent action requires that one not physically attack others,
even in self-defense...[because] any form of violent self-defense
involves a significant diminishing of respect for the dignity of the
one attacked...[and] To have to defend oneself violently is to be put
in a situation where one can only retain one's own physical
integrity by disrespecting the other. 231
The respect for the dignity and equality of each individual is central to social solidarity, and
serves as a normative assumption that is enacted by nonviolent political action. This respect, as
May defines it, is the highest value that is to be committed to no matter what happens during a
political action. During such an action, if one is to express this respect, one cannot even utilize
self-defensive violence, since that would eliminate the physical integrity of the political action’s
actually expressing refusal in a nonviolent way. May’s assumption is that the violence of the
other, which might otherwise justify self-defense, should be refused so that it is not reciprocally
returned against that other. This undermines the other by respecting that other even when the
other directs violence against oneself. That is, the assumption is that by refusing violence and
being nonviolent against violence, nonviolence can defeat violence because an action’s
expression of nonviolence is defined as equivalent to the expression of respect for dignity.
However, whether a nonviolent political action is equivalent to this expression of respect
is disputable. An adversary’s violent action may be a reaction to a kind of action that the socalled nonviolent political action put into use. If a so-called nonviolent political action interrupts
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the flow of traffic on a highway, for example, then the ability of people to lead their lives is cut
off, if even momentarily, in such a way that some of those people might claim to have suffered
some kind of violence. Perhaps, for example, someone cannot make it to their job, and loses it as
a result; or, perhaps someone is need in medical assistance, but cannot make it to a hospital
because of the nonviolent political action. A person performing a nonviolent political action has
no control over what nonparticipants think of that action, for example, whether they take it as an
act of solidarity. Ideally, the nonviolent political action makes way for emergency vehicles, but
if any mistake is made, or some individual does some miniscule thing, such as stepping off a
sidewalk into a road, that he ought not to have done because the police had told the participants
to “Stay on that sidewalk! Get off the road! I’m only going to tell you once!,” then the police
and state can claim that the nonviolent political action provoked the police to react because laws
were violated, which then led to the participants arguing with police, all of which can escalate
into police violence against that nonviolent political action. At that point, it is not clear whether
the political action is nonviolent because there are only images of arrests, arguments, physical
struggles, bodies aggressively confronting one another, etc. In short, a nonviolent political
action can appear as violence, given opposed political, ideological assumptions, as do the
“mistakes” that can occur during a nonviolent political action.
Also, following the assumption that a body’s action can count as a refusal, it can count as
violence because it depends on the person acting and the person acted against, who are bound
together, involved in a particular situation, interpreting actions as they see them. A person may
be engaging in a sit-in, lying on the ground, doing nothing, but because the police have told this
person that “the street must be cleared now,” whether the person’s action is nonviolent is
disputable, given disagreements on what counts as violence. From the perspective of the police,
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refusal to perform actions commanded by the police is not necessarily a legitimate, nonviolent
action. Each person’s actions will be interpreted in their relationships to other things. A
nonviolent political action can thus at the same time be a kind of violence, possibly as a
provocation, as a violation of law or of some “normal,” or perhaps due to some actor’s
aggressiveness, or because the actions of some actors failed to express respect for dignity.
An issue for May’s theory of nonviolent resistance is that it is difficult to guarantee that
the actions of the participants in a campaign or social-political movement will not be interpreted
as violent. That is, there are disagreements concerning whether nonviolent political action really
are nonviolent. One analysis might look at the total gestalt of the political action and then decide
whether it is nonviolent, ignoring the particular actions of individuals, and instead focusing on
the overall “action,” and what it, as a totality, did as a means to some end. Another analysis
might begin from each individual’s actions, weighing the degree to which they are violent or
nonviolent, and then adding these up to see whether the violence or nonviolence outweighed the
other. Surely, there are other ways some kind of violence pertaining to a political action could
be defined and measured, such as in terms of police arrests, property destruction, and negative
economic impacts. But the point is that ensuring that a political action is nonviolent is difficult,
if not impossible, because, beyond the paradigmatic examples, there are disagreements
concerning what counts as violence and as nonviolence in the first place.
May’s argument follows a logic of exception. X is a nonviolent political action, except
when Y. Y is defined as actions that are not the embodiment of nonviolent refusal of obedience
that express respect for dignity as a means to the goal of gaining the adversary’s reciprocated
respect. In May’s view, if a person engaged in a political action does not embody the expression
of respect for the dignity of the adversary, then the person’s political action is not nonviolent.
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One is required to embody and enact this respect for dignity. By definition, according to May,
one cannot be nonviolent one’s body expresses this respect. But there is no way to guarantee
that the acts will be taken as this kind of expression.
Note that, since one must act in the way May defines in order for one’s action to count as
a nonviolent political action, one cannot choose to act nonviolently in any way other than how
May defines a nonviolent political action. This itself can be interpreted as an oppressive
imposition of a normative expectation that we must act a particular way. If so, it could be
interpreted as a kind of violence. No one is allowed to be a nonviolent political actor, unless one
does it the way May defines.
We should again note that refusal can count as a kind of violence from other perspectives.
Likewise with respect. For example, Merleau-Ponty condemns respecting those who disrespect
you. He states,
We only know of situated consciousnesses which blend themselves
with the situation they take and are unable to complain at being
identified with it or at the neglect of the incorruptible innocence of
conscience...[A]s soon as we begin to live, we lose the alibi of
good intentions; we are what we do to others, we yield the right to
be respected as noble souls. To respect one who does not respect
others is ultimately to despise them; to abstain from violence
toward the violent is to become their accomplice. 232
The respect for an adversary's equality and dignity in relation to oneself that a nonviolent
political action is supposed to express might be a good intention, and enacted, but this nonviolent
respect still does something against those targeted people and institutions the nonviolent political
actions are directed against. They did not choose for any kind of political action to occur in
relation to them. They are forced. If a person does not disrespect an adversary who disrespects
her in some minimal way, then she is not authentically engaging in the relationship of disrespect
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that exists, and will come to despise that adversary. Once the adversary is despised though, that
is all that has happened. The adversary’s disrespect and violence will remain. So, MerleauPonty does not argue that one should respect those who disrespect others because this does not
work. If kinds of violence are happening and people are disrespecting others, then respecting an
adversary merely allows the kinds of violence and disrespect to continue, in Merleau-Ponty’s
view. This political ideological perspective directly disputes May’s requirement that adversaries
be respected, even when they use violence against us.
Similarly, Sartre argues that respect is violence. In his Being and Nothingness, he argues
that “respect for the Other's freedom is an empty word; even if we could assume the project of
respecting this freedom, each attitude which we adopted with respect to the Other would be a
violation of that freedom which we claimed to respect.” 233 Freedom is violently violated, in
Sartre's sense, because it is always treated as a thing whenever one is respectful toward it. There
cannot be “laissez-faire” tolerance and respect for another person’s freedom because in relation
to one another, each individual limits the freedom of every other. 234 Each individual in relation
to every other is forced into a world of an Other where that Other’s respect and tolerance limit
what each individual may do. Respect and tolerance restrict what is acceptable, and this violates
freedom as a kind of violence. In terms of Sartrean existentialism there is no escape from the
fact that the freedom of consciousness sees others as they are in the world, as things, and to
expect an Other to express respect and tolerate others is to impose an objectified existence as a
thing onto the freedom of that person’s consciousness, violently violating it. Respect as an
imposition of an expectation is merely another means of domination over another, and can count
as a kind of violence.
233 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, translated by Hazel E. Barnes, (New York: Washington Square Press,
1992), 531.
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However, May is focused on the equality of everyone, and not freedom, in the sense that
“to act on the presupposition of equality is to act as though one were already an equal rather
than asking to be treated as an equal.” 235 Sartre means something very precise in his existential
notion of the freedom of consciousness that transcends the existence of that person as a thing, but
for our purposes it suffices to capture his main point, which is that assuming a project of any
kind and then respecting others in relation to that project is an imposition of that project and a
violent violation of anyone who is not likewise persuaded by that project. Any universalization
of such norms, even if they are defined as being nonviolent, might be experienced by some
people as a violent objectification of their existence as an equal. Though May defines respect in
relation to equality, rather than freedom, it is irrelevant because the expectation that an adversary
acknowledge respect for equality can be experienced by that adversary as a kind of violence.

4.6.2 Active and Passive Equality: Challenging the Police Order
May defines two kinds of equality, passive and active, in his The Political Thought of
Jacques Rancière. 236 May writes,
Passive equality [is] the creation, preservation, or protection of
equality by governmental institutions. The animating idea behind
passive equality is that some form of equality is to be ensured by
an institution for the sake of those whose equality is at stake. It is
to be given, or at least protected, rather than taken or enacted by
the subjects of equality. 237
Passive equality is the passive reception of distributed justice or distributed equality, particularly
in the sense of equal consideration. 238 This means that people do not “create, ensure, or protect
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their equality,” but are merely recipients of equality. May writes, “inasmuch as we conceive our
political space in terms of rights…, we conceive ourselves as passive. And inasmuch as we
conceive that space in terms of equal rights, we conceive our equality as passive.” 239 The
passiveness of passive equality lies in that rights and equality are assumed as having been
achieved and sustained through the distribution of these, which citizens passively receive as
recipients. May agrees with Rancière’s description of this passive equality as being a matter of
“policing,” and not of politics. 240
“Policing” is the result of passive equality, and the distribution of equality and rights.
This is “the idea of the police as involving a social ordering that is enforced not merely by
military-style intervention – armed men in uniforms – but more significantly by the idea of a
proper social order.” 241 This kind of policing “seeks…to put everything in its place, through
allotment and through justification. The allotment is the distribution posited by the order. The
justification…is the appeal to equality that founds the particular distribution.” 242 This passive
view of equality overlooks the significance of the active, creative struggles for equality and
rights that were first required before any passive distribution could occur. May means to focus
not on this passive reception of rights, “secured” through policing, but on the active “political
moment of struggle itself” that challenges this. 243
In contrast to passive equality, active equality is “political participation,” which May
defines as that which everyone can engage in. 244 In brief, “equality is not received. It is
made…because to receive equality is already to be less than equal to the one who bestows it.” 245
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Democratic politics is political participation, enacted as a challenge, a “dissensus” in Rancière’s
terms, in relation to the police order. 246 The foundation for political participation is equality in
the sense that each individual speaks from a position. Politics happens, in May’s view, when
“the traditional mechanism of what are usually called “politics” are put into question.” And, it
happens as “an action by the people, the demos, that intervenes upon [a] situation” from which
they have been excluded.” 247 In this sense, “a democratic politics is the appearance of that which
has been excluded…manifests a people…[and] creates a political subject.” 248 In short, “in the
name of equality..., a demos arises that dissents from the position or positions its members have
been allotted…disrupt[ing] the completeness of a police order through an activity that is in itself
an expression of its own equality with those whose own position or actions seek to deny that
equality.” 249 Political expertise is not necessary for this enacted challenge to the “equal” identity
individuals passively receive within a police order because everyone is equally intelligent, in the
sense that Rancière means, namely that “anyone and everyone…is capable of speaking to one
another, understanding one another, reasoning with one another.” 250 “Being able to consider and
act upon our world” is all that is required for one’s being an equal. 251 Actually speaking words,
or having a particular level of intelligence and education is not necessary for being equal. In this

246 Ibid. 47.
247 Ibid. 49.
248 Ibid. 49.
249 Ibid. 49.
250 Ibid. 57.
251 May follows Rancière’s argument that equality does not imply sameness, identification, or unification, but
“declassification,” in the sense that equality of the ability to speak on, act on and in regards to our world occurs from
different positions. Active equality declassifies because democratic politics is based on “a heterogeneity to the
established police order that is not recuperable in the form of a different police order.” The ability to speak,
conceived of as a basic common denominator, binds people together heterogeneously, not attributing any one
identity or distributing particular kinds of equality in the way of passive equality. This is expressive of May’s
anarchistic rejection of all kinds of domination. There is only difference, since homogeneous identifications and
unifications are those imposed by oppressive police orders, which May rejects. May’s conceives of anarchism as
“reducing liberty to equality,” because equality is a presupposition of both liberty as the ability “for one to create a
life [that]…is to go in the direction one seeks to take it,” and as ownership over one’s own life. “Equal intelligence
[is] required to create a meaningful life,” so, equality precedes liberty. See pages 64 and 89-91.
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sense of equality as being able to act upon and consider our world, this is “a form of active rather
than passive equality.” 252 Active equality is enacted equality and, as such, it is democratic
politics, which “unif[ies] those who are oppressed and those who act alongside them and on their
behalf into a single subject” such that a participant is not “a part that has no part” because her
actions actively communicate equality to her oppressors. 253 Altogether, this democratic politics
of participatory active equality is required for a progressive form of politics because it “concerns
the ability of each of us, in concert with others, to engage in the project of a reflective
reconstruction of lives.” 254
May also adds that democratic politics, as a collective action that emerges from the
presupposition that participants are equal to their adversaries and the police order, must be
“nonviolent political action.” 255 However, nonviolence is not passiveness. Violent resistance is
the route typically taken, he argues, because it is “the easy political option” that is the “natural
temptation” that arises such that, when “one is dominated…one dominates; [and when] one is
oppressed…one oppresses.” 256 Nonviolent resistance, though, “reject[s] the type of thinking
fostered by a police order [and]…requires the creation of a non-hierarchical space.” 257 A
collective action that is a nonviolent resistance does not react in the form of resentment, but
creates and is “defined by what [it does] rather than by that [which it] oppose[s].” In particular, a
nonviolent, political, collective action presupposes equality, while “violent struggle requires one
to choose between one’s own worthiness and that of one’s adversary.” 258 Violence harms, which
means that if violence is used, then who counts as deserving of harm, as less than equal, has been
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decided upon. 259 Violence will not work, in May’s view, against a police order, since it
reestablishes a police order of inequality. For this reason, nonviolence is “the most likely path”
to “a point of consensus,” which is “an agreement on the equality of everyone in the [police]
order itself.” 260

4.6.3 The Violence of Self-Preservation or the Violent Recreation of Inequality?
However, May adds that violence can be utilized by a democratic political action. He
writes,
There seems to be no bar to placing side by side the claims that
one’s adversary is one’s equal and that, because of the adversary’s
refusal to recognize one’s own equality, one must injure or kill her.
The analogy here would be one of self-defense. To defend oneself
against another does not require a denial of that other’s equality. It
requires instead an embrace of one’s own. Self-protection is…the
necessity of preserving oneself. So it is with a violent democratic
struggle. The emergence of violence in such a struggle arises on
the basis of a persistence in one’s own equality, of the effort to
maintain the expression of the presupposition of equality in the
face of steadfast refusal to allow that expression…[A]lthough the
effect of violence may be a denial of the other, it is not because of
the attempt to deny the other but to preserve one’s own democratic
expression that violence can be resorted to without violating the
ethical strictures of a democratic politics…[T]he appeal to violence
in the context of democratic struggle lies on a razor’s edge. The
line between self-preservation and the denial of the equality of the
other is a thin one…[I]t is easy to ratify the destruction of the other
out of anger or the denial one has suffered rather than for the
preservation of one’s democratic expression. The deeper the
history of denial of equality, the stronger that temptation is…By
placing the emphasis of violent struggle on self-preservation rather
than destruction of the other, it can help mitigate some of the more
deleterious aspects of violent struggle. This provides no guarantee
of safeguards against abuse. 261
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May’s conception of equality, in Nonviolent Resistance (2015) turns toward respect for dignity in
a way not addressed seven years earlier in this work, The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière:
Creating Equality (2008), as is expressed by this quote. However, the concern is similar, in that
the later work conceives of this active equality in relation to nonviolent political resistance on the
foundation of a presupposed equality concerning the dignity of others, namely that they have
their own lives and needs, rather than on the equality of the ability to speak intelligently and live
life in a way that affects the world. The nonviolence he expects of democratic politics, on the
basis of presupposed equality and the refusal to dominate others in the way of a new police
order, can turn to violence in the form of self-defense, or “self-protection” if the adversary
persistently refuses the equality of the participants who act on the presupposition of equality. He
indicates that the point at which this persistence exists is a “razor’s edge,” since there is a
historical element that may be taken into consideration by those who engage in the political
action. The razor edge difference between self-preservation and denial of the other’s equality,
through a use of violence, depends on historical factors, and the specific situation in which the
violence is used. If it is used for self-preservation or denial of the other’s equality depends on
how it is connected to other things that are not necessarily agreed upon. Whether the violent
action is not productive of inequality, or is the self-preservation of equality is not likely to be
agreed upon. May’s conception thus depends on a political ideal.
May is particularly concerned with actual social-political movements from history, such
as the Indian Independence Movement and Gandhi's insights into nonviolence as a means of
protest, and the American Civil Rights Movement and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s contributions
to the study of nonviolence. However, in order for someone against whom a nonviolent political
action is directed to acknowledge that the action is directed against the wrongness of their
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understanding of equality and freedom, such a person has to forfeit their understanding of
equality and freedom. That is, the history of the British government in India, and the judicial,
police, and cultural systems of the south in the United States was forced to change its course so
that oppression is explicitly on view for everyone to see as oppression and as wrong, thereby
indicating that the institutions of occupation and segregation are themselves seen as things to be
defeated. They are shown as that which breeds the possibility of injustices and violence. People
are forced to acknowledge their own violence, which itself might be experienced as a kind of
violence, no matter how nonviolent the action that forces these people to acknowledge their own
violence happens to be.
However, the individuals who uphold oppressive laws need not to have acknowledged
that they were in the wrong. Instead, they were merely forced to succumb to the goals of the
political action. This force used to acknowledge that one is wrong, is an interesting one in how it
works, but can it work as nonviolence? Being forced to appear wrong in the eyes of the public
has the potential to mobilize groups of peoples in favor of and against the institutions that uphold
these wrongs. If the targeted people and institutions are forced to see themselves as wrong, then
whether this is a kind of violence or nonviolence is disputable. These people and institutions are
imposed upon, which means that even if they are wrong, the actions against them are not
necessarily nonviolent. So, it's not clear that the nonviolent respect of nonviolent political
actions can be nonviolent in the first place, if it is to work against wrongs. Without coercion or
provocation, which can themselves be experienced as kinds of violence, it is difficult to see how
actions could nonviolently produce the kinds of social-political and economic transformations
that May writes about.
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In fact, in Nonviolent Resistance, May admits that it is highly unlikely for any campaign
to be purely nonviolent. He argues that “a shove or a threat does not turn a nonviolent campaign
into a violent one,” but adds that “pure nonviolence is more an ideal than a description of certain
campaigns. If we were to characterize only purely nonviolent campaigns as actually nonviolent,
[May] suspect[s] that no campaign would find itself in that category.”” 262 So, despite all his
argumentation and the definitions he produces, he is not really defining nonviolent resistance as
purely nonviolent. Whether a shove or threat turns a nonviolent political action into a violent
one is debatable.
The issue, then, is that nonviolent means might not actually work as nonviolent means
toward gaining goals. From the perspective of those against whom the campaign is directed, the
“shove or threat” may be exactly that which transforms a nonviolent campaign into a violent one.
For example, the media's coverage of the recent events in Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore,
Maryland focus on the violence of groups of actors, describing those events as “violent,” even
though many participants were not intentionally being violent. Whether one defines a political
action as violent or nonviolent depends on one’s focus, and on what one connects the action to.
So, what May defines is a kind of nonviolent violence that is, perhaps, less violent than other
kinds of violence, such as the structural violence sustained by neoliberalism, but can count as a
kind of violence nonetheless.
Lastly, May argues that because it is difficult to define violence, he only aims to indicate
the kind of violence that nonviolent political actions aim to avoid. In fact, May admits that in
order for a nonviolent political action to work it has to be a kind of symbolic violence. On why a
nonviolent political action counts as symbolic violence, May uses Slavoj Žižek's distinctions
between subjective, systemic, and symbolic violence, found in Žižek’s Violence: Six Sideways
262 May, Nonviolent Resistance, 37.
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Reflections. 263 May’s concern is not primarily with how nonviolence can count as a kind of
violence, but with the kind of violence that nonviolent political action aims to avoid.
Nonetheless, he defines nonviolent political actions as a kind of symbolic violence because, if
they were not a kind of violence, then it would be difficult to see how they could work.

4.6.4 Nonviolence as Žižekian Symbolic Violence: The Nonviolent Violence of JiuJitsu Maneuvers
In relation to the subjective, systemic and symbolic kinds of violence defined by Slavoj
Žižek, May argues that the kinds of violence rejected by a nonviolent political action are
systemic and subjective, but not symbolic violence because he considers it a “stretch” to think of
nonviolent political actions as not utilizing language. 264 If a nonviolent political action is to
work at all, it has to at least communicate something. This means that the nonviolence that May
defines is a kind of action that aims to avoid physical, psychological, systemic, structural, and
subjective violence, but that still counts as a kind of symbolic violence because otherwise the
nonviolent political action would not work as a means. In other words, the nonviolent political
action defined by May still counts as a kind of violence because the purpose of a nonviolent
political action is to demonstrate that an injustice exists, and this can only be communicated via
linguistic, symbolic means, which themselves can be defined as kinds of violence, if they aim to
undermine the status quo and establish a new “normal.” In order to see how so-called nonviolent

263 Žižek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, 1-2. For a more in-depth description of the kinds of violence Žižek
defines, see the previous chapter.
264 May, Nonviolent Resistance, 34-5. Žižek, as indicated in the previous chapter, argues that objective violence
consists of symbolic and systemic violence, both of which are conditions for a “zero-level” “normal” against which
actions are measured as subjective violence because they are “abnormal.” Symbolic violence occurs linguistically,
as a form of communication, when linguistic expressions represent things as superior and inferior. Systemic
violence is the “often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems.”
See pages 1-2, 9, 12-13, and 67-8 of Žižek’s Violence: Six Sideways Reflections.
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political actions are simultaneously symbolic violence, we turn to May's argument for how
nonviolent political action works as a means.
The way in which a nonviolent political action works is described by May (who follows
Gene Sharp on this) in terms of a “moral jiu-jitsu,” which effectively “turns the ethical tables on
an adversary, so that what had once appeared as justified actions or policies turns out to be an
unjustified assault upon the dignity of those who resist them...[and] results in a convergence on a
common moral view that includes protestors and adversaries on the same moral plane.” 265 May
distinguishes moral jiu-jitsu from “political jiu-jitsu,” which is capable of nonviolently forcing
an adversary to involuntarily do something “without violating dignity or presupposing equality,”
and can occur as a nonviolent “refusal of obedience to and even the active disruption of an unjust
political, economic, or social order.” 266 May aims to retain the nonviolent ability of political
actions to convince or force an adversary to admit that they are morally wrong, but the adversary
against whom the nonviolent political action is directed possibly experiences symbolic violence,
particularly if the nonviolent political actions have escalated to the point of forcing a new normal
to come into existence. If this political or moral jiu-jitsu does not occur as a kind of symbolic
violence, then it is difficult to see how nonviolent political action works at all. In such a
situation, the adversary's position is forced to express itself as an abnormal kind of violence by
the symbolic violence of the so-called nonviolent political action.
Merleau-Ponty's following statement reinforces the argument that May's definition of
nonviolent political action shows that nonviolence could only work as a kind of violence,
particularly as symbolic violence. Merleau-Ponty states,

265 Ibid. 163. See Gene Sharp’s How Nonviolent Struggle Works, (East Boston, MA: The Albert Einstein
Institution, 2013).
266 Ibid. 163.
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It is a law of human action that the present encroaches upon the
future, the self upon other people. This intrusion is not only a fact
of political life it also happens in private life...In collective history
the spiritual atoms train after them their historical role and are tied
to one another by the threads of their actions; what is more, they
are blended with the totality of actions, whether or not deliberate,
which they exert upon others and the world so that there exists not
a plurality of subjects, but an intersubjectivity, and that is why
there exists a common measure of the evil inflicted upon certain
people and of the good gotten out of it by others. 267
Merleau-Ponty’s point is that, in a world in which we cannot avoid affecting others as we pursue
our projects, there is always the possibility that those pursuits which are good and nonviolent for
some people are evil and violent for others. Whether such an action succeeds at gaining its goal
depends upon whether it makes those it is directed against acknowledge their “wrongness,” even
if they do not believe they are wrong, and this can be considered a kind of symbolic violence.

4.7 Rawls, Mouffe, and Merleau-Ponty: Nonviolent Civil Disobedience and Political
Liberalism's Pluralism as a Kind of Violence
May's concern with equality and dignity as basic assumptions inherent to nonviolent
political action reflect John Rawls's definition of nonviolent civil disobedience. The challenge
for Rawls is whether the nonviolent civil disobedience that he defines is even possible. Rawls
argues that nonviolent civil disobedience is that which arises when disagreement emerges,
concerning “the principles of social cooperation among free and equal men.” 268 He defines civil
disobedience as
A public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law
usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or
policies of the government. By acting in this way one addresses
the sense of justice of the majority of the community and declares

267 Merleau-Ponty, 110.
268 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 320.
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that in one's considered opinion the principles of social cooperation
among free and equal men are not being respected... 269
For an action to count as nonviolent civil disobedience, it must also be “guided and justified
by...the principles of justice,” and “not...principles of personal morality or...religious
doctrines...[nor] group or self-interest.” 270 The action must be public, and contrary to a
particular law only because justice and “principles of social cooperation among free and equal
men are not being respected.” Any action that is not guided and justified by the principles of
justice defined by Rawlsian political liberalism cannot count as nonviolent civil disobedience.
However, if nonviolent civil disobedience must be truly nonviolent, public, and guided by the
principles of justice, and there is disagreement concerning what it means to be nonviolent
beyond the paradigm cases, what it means for something to be public, or on what these principles
of justice are, then it is not likely that an action could ever count as nonviolent civil disobedience
without political disagreements arising.
In his A Theory of Justice, Rawls derives the principles of justice from an assumed,
fictional, “original position,” in which participants are veiled from knowing anything about who
and what they each are. 271 From this original position, two principles of justice are derived: “the
first [i.e., the liberty principle] requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties,
while the second [i.e., the difference principle] holds that social and economic inequalities, for
example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits

269 Ibid. 320, especially footnote 19. It is significant to note that Rawls acknowledges other theorist's work on civil
disobedience, such as those produced by H. A. Bedau, Henry David Thoreau, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and
Howard Zinn. He asserts that he “do[es] not at all mean to say only [his definition of nonviolent civil
disobedience]...is ever justified in a democratic state.” Rawls's concedes that other kinds of dissent can be
justifiable, but the point holds that his conception of what makes civil disobedience nonviolent in relation to justice
is disputable.
270 Ibid. 321.
271 Ibid. 11.
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for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society.” 272 Agreement upon
these two principles of justice is possible because none of the fictional participants know
anything about themselves, but instead seek rational and fair principles of justice that can attain
among equals who are the same. In short, the original position veils from participants the
conditions that could lead to envy. If some have what others would want, then those who do not
have it is only fair, and those things are not envied, on the assumption of Rawls’ principles.
Only nonviolent, public actions aimed toward these principles count as civil disobedience.
Rawls allows for nonviolent civil disobedience because he acknowledges that reasonable
attempts to seek overlapping consensus do not always work, not even in a fictional state that is
almost perfectly just. In A Theory of Justice, he states,
By engaging in civil disobedience one intends...to address the
sense of justice of the majority and to serve fair notice that in one’s
sincere and considered opinion the conditions of free cooperation
are being violated. We are appealing to others to reconsider, to put
themselves in our position, and to recognize that they cannot
expect us to acquiesce indefinitely in the terms they impose upon
us. 273
However, like May's definition of nonviolent political actions, Rawlsian nonviolent civil
disobedience does not seem to be possible other than as a theoretical abstraction from life. In
particular, this appeal to others to reconsider and “to put themselves in our position” could be
experienced by them as the kind of symbolic violence discussed above. If tables are turned, and
these others are forced to reconsider that they do not actually understand the principles of justice,
then there is already a conflict concerning the kind of justice that is to be pursued, and the
imposition of the principles of justice defined by Rawls could itself be interpreted as violence, at
least in the Žižekian, symbolic sense.

272 Ibid. 13.
273 Ibid. 335-6.
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However, Rawls adds that “by resisting injustice within the limits of fidelity to law, [civil
disobedience] serves to inhibit departures from justice and to correct them when they occur. A
general disposition to engage in justified civil disobedience introduces stability into a wellordered society, or one that is nearly just.” 274 So, Rawls assumes a society in which the
principles of justice are upheld in common by everyone, and that in a just society, only those
who are in some way denied equality or freedom will utilize civil disobedience nonviolently for
the sake of upholding the principles of justice as he defines them. In other words, if someone is
not engaging in nonviolent civil disobedience for the sake of upholding the principles of justice
Rawls defines, then that person's actions do not count as nonviolent civil disobedience. Given
that a person could conceive of justice differently, Rawlsian political liberalism is that which one
cannot choose against. One can only act within the confines of the structures of justice that
Rawls defines. In fact, this is directly argued by Chantal Mouffe, and indirectly implied by
Merleau-Ponty.

4.7.1 On Liberalism’s Rejection of the Freedom to Choose against It
Chantal Mouffe argues that there is a presumed neutrality of Rawlsian-styled political
liberalism, which is precisely the problem with political liberalism. In her Political Liberalism:
Neutrality and the Political, Mouffe argues that Rawls ignores the underlying conflict that results
from the plurality of persons that is upheld by the principles of liberalism in the first place. 275
She states, “a liberal democratic regime, while fostering pluralism, does not put all values at the
same level. It could not do so, since its very existence as a political form of government requires

274 Ibid. 336.
275 Chantal Mouffe, “Political Liberalism: Neutrality and the Political,” in Ratio Juris 7(1994), 314-324.
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a specific ordering of values which precludes a total pluralism.” 276 This means that, despite
Rawls's intention that the participants agree upon neutral, rational principles of justice, the
decision made in the original position behind the veil of ignorance rejects anyone's knowing who
and what they are in the world, and rejects anyone's being committed to anything other than
political liberalism. Political liberalism's “neutrality” is, therefore, not neutral because there is
no freedom to choose against it.
Likewise, Maurice Merleau-Ponty points out that liberalism contradicts itself. In his
Humanism and Terror, he rejects liberalism in favor of communism precisely because
liberalism's so-called “humanism” hides its violence. He states, “the dogmatic basis of
liberalism...[is] the way it only grants certain liberties by taking away the freedom to choose
against it.” 277 Liberalism is contradictory because, “if I wish freedom for another person it is
inevitable that even this wish will be seen by him as alien law; and so liberalism turns into
violence.” For one to make someone free, this freedom is imposed on that person, and the
person cannot choose against that freedom. Freedom imposed is the opposite of freedom. In the
end, Merleau-Ponty admits that “we are not accusing liberalism of being a system of violence;
we reproach it with not seeing its own face in violence.” 278 He decides in favor of communism's
violence because, unlike liberalism, communism does not pretend as though it does not utilize
violence for the sake of gaining freedom. Despite that liberalism defines itself as the flag-bearer
of humanism, its humanism becomes terror because it uses violence while hiding that it does so
at the same time. This means that the principles of justice that Rawls considers to be constitutive
of the legitimacy of political liberalism's neutral conditions for a nonviolent society turn out to be
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a mask that veils its own inclusion of violence against those who are against political liberalism.
So, the nonviolence of political liberalism's justice turns out to be a kind of imposed violence.
This also means that Rawls's expectation that one's nonviolent civil disobedience is not a
refusal to be obedient to the principles of justice, which are not concretely actualized in any
regime, eliminates the possibility of one's being nonviolently civilly disobedient. If anyone
engages in civil disobedience, then it has to be made clear, presumably by the condition that the
action is public and communicates the intention to uphold the principles of justice. For this
reason, civil disobedience is both obedient to the norms of justice and the laws outlined by a
constitution that is supposed to uphold those norms, and simultaneously disobedient in relation to
some of those constitutional laws and norms. But, since one is not supposed to be disobedient to
the norms of justice, but only when those norms do not exist in society, one's nonviolent civil
disobedience could be considered a kind of violence because it is directed against people and
institutions, not the principles of justice themselves. So, Rawlsian nonviolent civil disobedience,
unlike the nonviolent political actions defined by May in terms of symbolic violence and JiuJitsu, is not merely a kind of violence, but is practically impossible, given opposed ways of
conceiving of the principles of justice. In short, if nonviolent civil disobedience must
exclusively aim toward the two principles of justice defined by Rawls, and there is disagreement
concerning those principles, then whether civil disobedience is nonviolent is disputable.

4.8 Žižek on the Violence of Doing Nothing
Žižek also defines nonviolent actions in such a way that they seem barely possible, given
symbolic, systemic, and subjective violence. In his book, Less than Nothing: Hegel and the
Shadow of Dialectical Materialism, Žižek describes a person's “standing still” and “doing
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nothing” as means to doing something, since these can occur as “a sudden interruption of [the]
movement” constitutive of “a harmonious[ly] functioning...Whole.” 279 Intentionally “standing
still” is one's doing something by “doing nothing.” The idea is that, “in order to effectively “do
nothing,” one should not “stand still,” but be active [so that]…one is really active” when one
purposely “stands still.” The result, he argues, is that “this immobility causes havoc and
chaos.” 280
Žižek means that symbolic and systemic violence, as well as the subjective violence that
results from these, are interrupted when individuals intentionally do not engage in the actions
that reproduce them. Doing nothing is a means to this goal. In order not to be or to contribute to
objective and subjective violence, one must really be nonviolent, and this requires intentionally
using “doing nothing” as a means. Being nonviolent requires not being violent in any way at all,
and this requires actively doing nothing. However, unlike May’s definition of a nonviolent
political action as a kind of symbolic violence, Žižek defines “doing nothing” as not being a kind
of symbolic violence. So, there is disagreement on how nonviolently doing nothing is a kind of
violence.
In his book Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, Žižek expands upon this idea of the
nonviolence of doing nothing. He makes three points concerning the “lessons” learned from his
discussion of violence in this book:
1. First, to chastise violence outright, to condemn it as “bad,” is an
ideological operation par excellence, a mystification which
collaborates in rendering invisible the fundamental forms of social
violence.
2. It is difficult to be really violent, to perform an act that violently
disturbs the basic parameters of social life.
3. Violence is not a direct property of some acts, but is distributed
279 Slavoj Žižek, Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (New York: Verso, 2012),
946-7.
280 Ibid. 947.
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between acts and their contexts, between activity and inactivity.
The same act can count as violent or non-violent, depending on its
context; sometimes a polite smile can be more violent than a brutal
outburst. 281
Here, he clearly states that violence can remain hidden, as his definitions of symbolic and
systemic violence indicate. Also, that the same action can count as both nonviolent and as
violent is not a contradiction, given that whether an action is of one kind or another, depends
upon a perspective from which it is contextually described and experienced. What counts as the
nonviolent functioning of capitalistic structures of employment, for example, is not necessarily
experienced as nonviolent by those who are the most exploited. Nonetheless, Žižek intends to
conceive of a kind of act or event that transforms human relationships. Doing nothing is such an
act, but only if it does something. So, doing nothing is not literally doing nothing, since there is
something that is actively and purposely done by one's doing nothing for the sake of a
transformation. Doing nothing is not acting when one would otherwise be expected or
commanded to act, which upsets the framework of systemic and symbolic violence. Since the
nothing that is done is a refusal to be obedient, it is a kind of violent nonviolence, and one that
Žižek believes is capable of transforming social-political and economic structures.
Žižek also defines today's conflicts such that “mass killings are more and more
legitimated in religious terms, while pacifism is predominantly atheist. It is the very belief in a
higher divine goal which allows us to instrumentalise [sic] individuals, while atheism admits no
such goal and thus refuses all forms of sacred sacrificing.” 282 In this sense, Žižek opposes
theorists who argue that there is a theological, transcendent element to the justification of
nonviolent protest, perhaps as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. does. However, this refusal of sacred
sacrificing would itself be an atheistic sort of sacrifice of oneself as well, and this indicates that
281 Žižek, Violence, 206-7, and 213.
282 Ibid. 135.
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the atheist who refuses sacrifice, retains the role played by sacrifice in that the atheist sacrifices
sacrifice by refusing it. So, Žižek veils the fact that the atheist's pacifistic rejection of goals is
itself a goal. Other goals are rejected for the sake of the goal of having no goal that
instrumentalizes individuals toward “divine goals.” It is in this sense that he secularizes the role
of sacrifice played in theology. To see how Žižek disagrees with theologically framed
justifications for nonviolence, we turn to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.

4.9 King's Theological Definition of Nonviolent Direct Action in Relation to Justice
In his Letter from a Birmingham Jail, King defines nonviolent direct action in a way that
shows that it “seeks to create such a crisis and establish such creative tension that a community
that has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue.” 283 He also writes that
“there is a type of constructive, nonviolent tension which is necessary for growth...The purpose
of our direct action program is to create a situation so crisis packed that it will inevitably open
the door to negotiation.” The issue is that King frames the ability of a nonviolent direct action to
produce a change in terms of this “creative tension” and “crisis” that is forced into existence. If
“creative tension” and “crisis” are experienced against the expectations and desires of some
individuals and institutions, then those individuals and institutions may decide that the
nonviolent direct action is not really nonviolent, but perhaps a kind of provocative, symbolic
violence.
However, King aims to argue that, though the nonviolent direct action produces a crisis
and creative tension, the crisis and tension are not the fault of the nonviolent actors. He states,
“we who engage in nonviolent action are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the
283 Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” (speech given April 16, 1963), Stanford University,
The Martin Luther King, Jr. Research and Education Institute, accessed May 23, 2016
https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/letter-birmingham-jail.
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surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out into the open where it can be
seen and dealt with.” So, though the nonviolent direct action brings this tension to the surface, it
is not the fault of the actors' actions, but is already there, and is simply being exposed as what it
already is.
King’s nonviolent actors are not doing something by doing nothing, and are not atheists
without a goal, in the sense defined by Žižek. Instead, King defines a distinction between just
and unjust laws directly in relation to the existence of “the law of God.” To eliminate God from
King's argument would be to eliminate the distinction between just and unjust laws, which is
needed for justifying nonviolent direct actions. Just laws are defined, by King, as equivalent to
God’s laws. Such a conception of justice also disagrees with Rawls’ principles of justice,
derived from an original position, behind a veil of ignorance, where fictional participants arrive
at the principles of justice without any knowledge of a God or religion.
Nonetheless, King argues that “one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust law,” and
“one has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws.” One has a legal and
moral responsibility to obey just laws because these “square...with the moral law or the law of
God,” while “an unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law.” So, for King,
segregation in particular is unjust because it immorally violates “the law of God,” and “degrades
human personality.”
He also writes that segregation treats “persons [as]...things,” and is “not only politically,
economically and sociologically unsound, it is morally wrong and sinful.” Whether or not
people nonviolently act for and against laws because they do or do not square with God's laws is
a matter of dispute, since Žižek can reject religion because it tends to mobilize people to act
toward goals in ways that are not nonviolent, but instead produce mass killings. That is,
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invoking God as a means to justifying nonviolent actions does not guarantee that the actors will
be nonviolent. Insofar as individuals can disagree on what is just and unjust, godly and ungodly,
the actions that they engage in can be violent or nonviolent depending on the context of their
actions, and their beliefs. So, when King argues that “it is wrong to use immoral means to attain
moral ends...[and] it is just as wrong, or perhaps even more so, to use moral means to preserve
immoral ends,” he means to argue in favor of the nonviolence of nonviolent direct actions as a
moral means used toward moral ends, but since whether an action is nonviolent is disputable,
whether the action is moral or immoral is also disputable.
May, Rawls, Žižek, and King, therefore, each define a kind of nonviolent action that is
capable of transforming a social-political or economic status quo. How the action works,
though, is not necessarily nonviolent, because in order for the action to work, it has to be capable
of somehow forcing this transformation to occur. This transformation itself can be defined as a
kind of violence in relation to context and opposed political, ideological perspectives. Anyone or
anything that the so-called nonviolent action is directed against can conclude that the action is
not really nonviolent. So, in the following, I briefly discuss Gil Bailie and Hannah Arendt's
arguments for kinds of nonviolence as useful means toward defeating desires for vengeance and
violence. Like May, Rawls, Žižek, and King, though, Arendt's and Bailie's definitions of kinds
of actions as nonviolent indicate that these actions could only work if they are at least definable
as some kind of violence from an opposed political, ideological perspective.
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4.10 The Destructive Violence of Nonviolent Prayer and Forgiveness 284
Following Girard's view, and a representative of the theological view Žižek likely
disagrees with, Gil Bailie argues, in Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroads, that
It was religion – archaic religion...[that] is humanity's astonishing
instrument for turning murder and madness into a sacralized
bulwark against madness and murder. More or less refined forms
of this same recipe for generating social solidarity and lending it
the requisite solemnity have played a part in cultural existence
since the dawn of human culture. 285
However, he focuses on the issue that “in the foreseeable future, neither religious mystification
nor the solemn and quasi-religious causes of “history” will sufficiently veil our violence from
our own eyes nor keep us from seeing the faces of victims.” 286 Bailie’s worry is that it may
happen that the religious veils that hide our own, underlying desires for vengeful violence will
become unveiled to the extent that the social solidarity brought about in relation to beneficial and
maleficent kinds of violence will itself be threatened, in an apocalyptic (“unveiling”) way. His
view is that “the social stability of...cultures was determined to a considerable degree by the
success with which they were able to experience and interpret the violence which brought them
into being as holy.” 287 Holy violence, i.e. the sacred sacrifice that binds a society together, is
beneficial, but Bailie's worry is that people are “floundering” at distinguishing between
beneficial and maleficent kinds of violence.
Bailie defines the modern crisis in the following:
In today's world, both the political right and the political left, if
they are to remain morally coherent, must speak on behalf of
284 In this section, I draw on a number of ideas and passages that appeared earlier in my paper “The Efficacy of
Scapegoating and Revolutionary Violence," in Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions: A Journal of the World Union of
Catholic Philosophical Societies, ed. William Sweet, 10(2014), 203-219. I am grateful to the editors of the journal
for permission to draw on this material here.
285 Gil Bailie, Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroads, (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 2002
(originally, 1995)), 16.
286 Bailie, 16. Bailie's emphasis.
287 Ibid. 16.
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victims...The left justifies or excuses the violence committed by
the victims of structural violence...The right justifies the violence
necessary to control crime and excuses its occasional excesses as
regrettable but unavoidable. Looking abroad, where the right sees
“freedom fighters,” the left sees the forces of counter-revolutionary
oppression. Where the left sees a liberation movement, the right
sees terrorists...It is a mistake to think of this as a merely political
disagreement. Seen from a larger perspective, it is a
society...floundering in its attempt to determine whether violence
is destructive or beneficial. It is another symptom that we live in a
world no longer able to make a coherent distinction between good
and bad violence. 288
Of course, Bailie assumes himself to have the correct distinction between good and bad violence.
His answer to this modern crisis that lies in the failure of people knowing how to distinguish
between kinds of violence is found in The Lord’s Prayer, where humanity is instructed to
genuinely pray not be led into temptation because this is what secures “immunity to the
contagion of desire.” 289 In particular, Jesus had taught humanity to pray, “Lead us not into
temptation.” 290 This is similar to the last of the Ten Commandments, found in Exodus 20, which
states, “you shall not covet your neighbor's house. You shall not covet your neighbor's wife, or
his servant, man or woman, or his ox, or his donkeys, or anything that is his.” 291 The similarity
lies in that both tell us not to desire what others show us is desirable because otherwise the
mimetic rivalry, defined by Girard, ensues and desires for vengeance increase. One's earnest
prayer not to be led into temptation is a nonviolent means to eliminating the envious desire that
leads to mimetic rivalry and apocalyptic violence being unleashed.
Bailie adds that, for “innately religious beings” bound together by the violence that
founds our culture's unity, there are two religious forms of transcendence that we must choose

288 Bailie, 54. Bailie describes “structural violence” as “the deprivations and indignities to which the poor, the
underprivileged, racial minorities, and those habituated and socialized to ghetto life are often subjected.”
289 Ibid. 207, 270.
290 Ibid. 270.
291 Ibid. 144.
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from: either engage in violence for the sake of transcending (and stopping) violence, or engage
in prayer for the sake of transcending (and stopping) violence. Bailie's solution to the modern
crisis that is the failure to correctly distinguish between kinds of violence, is this nonviolent
prayer. However, this prayer, if it defeats the violence by defeating desire, can be considered a
kind of violence turned against oneself, given the disagreements concerning what counts as
violence and nonviolence.
For example, prayer is assumed to work as a means to defeating temptations. If one has
strong desires, then against these, one prays relentlessly and earnestly in order to defeat the
temptations. If one is not as strongly tempted to seek vengeance, then less prayer is needed to
defeat these temptations. In this sense, the amount a person prays may depend on the strength of
one’s desires. The defeat of desire, therefore, is something that is achieved by the force of the
prayer. Bailie assumes the prayer to be nonviolent, but capable of defeating desires that can lead
to violence. Since the goal is to defeat desires that potentially lead to violence, the use of this
prayer can be experienced as one’s doing violence against oneself, perhaps in terms of
psychological or symbolic violence. If desires are successfully defeated by this prayer, and only
violence is assumed to be capable of defeating violence, and there is disagreement concerning
what counts as violence and whether nonviolence is possible, then this prayer can count as a kind
of violence.
Similarly, Hanna Arendt argues in The Human Condition that forgiveness is efficacious
because it violates one’s desire for vengeance. She first assumes that violence is necessarily
involved in anything that humans make. She writes, “it is true that violence, without which no
fabrication could ever come to pass, has always played an important role in political schemes and
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thinking based upon an interpretation of action in terms of making." 292 Forgiveness can fabricate
new relationships between humans, and this means that forgiveness may also involve violence.
It involves violence because forgiveness violates the desire to seek vengeance, fabricating a
novel relation to the one forgiven. She states, “forgiveness is the exact opposite of vengeance,
which acts in the form of re-acting against an original trespass.” 293 Rather than enacting their
desire for vengeance, people can forgive one another for their trespasses, and thereby violate and
eliminate this desire. As a means, forgiveness, like the sacrificial kinds of violence, can only
work as a violation of the desire to seek vengeance, in accordance with one's idea of justice, or
what kinds of relationships between people should be achieved. As with the prayer not to be led
into temptation, truly forgiving someone means violating one's own desire for vengeance, and
this may occur as a kind of psychological or symbolic violence. So, for this reason, forgiveness
can be interpreted as a kind of violence in the same way as the prayer not to be led into
temptation.

4.11 Conclusion
Here, it has been argued that, given context, perspectives, and political, ideological
disagreements, what counts as a nonviolent means can count as violence. Disagreements
concerning how nonviolence works as a means have been outlined, demonstrating the ways in
which nonviolence can be defined as a kind of violence. Though there are the core paradigmatic
examples of violence, and though there are also commonsense views of nonviolence, when
nonviolence (and violence) is defined as equivalent to other things, such as respect for dignity,
equality, principles of justice, the result of scapegoating violence, and doing nothing, political
292 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974 (originally 1958)),
228.
293 Ibid. 240.
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disagreements emerge. Since even doing nothing, forgiveness, and the prayer not to be led into
temptation can themselves be considered kinds of violence, the weight of the argument leans
toward nonviolent actions, refusals to act, and the intention to do nothing always possibly
counting as kinds of violence. Violent nonviolence is possible because whether a use of means
is nonviolent depends upon the contexts related to that use of means, as well as the goals toward
which the means are utilized. Because there are diverse contexts in relation to which actions, as
means, can be considered violent or nonviolent, and because there is disagreement concerning
the goals toward which nonviolence is utilized, it is always possible to define what would
otherwise be considered nonviolence as a kind of violence. So, for these reasons, nonviolence,
like the concept of violence, is an essentially contested concept for which no politically neutral
definition is possible. From the perspective of the person who defines nonviolence, that person’s
political, ideological assumptions influence how nonviolence is defined, and opposed political
ideologies can define that nonviolence as a kind of violence.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

This dissertation has argued that commonsense views of violence and distinctions
between kinds of violence, including nonviolence, extend the paradigm case core conception of
violence. When the concept of violence is extended beyond the paradigmatic examples of
violence that most everyone agrees count as violence, violence and nonviolence are essentially
contested concepts for which no politically neutral definition is possible. It is difficult to
establish this as a matter of principle, but this dissertation has shown that, inductively, all the
major philosophical theories of violence depend on political preferences that are highly
contestable themselves. A general reason for this might be this: violence is, in the paradigm
cases where its wrongness is evident and uncontested, an interpersonal act; notions of violence
that extend the concept, but claim equivalence with the moral opprobrium attached to the
paradigmatic cases of violence, also involve interpersonal, or, more broadly, social consequences
of the acts construed as violence.
Opposed political ideologies disagree on when an action counts as a kind of violence or
as a kind of nonviolence, even though there is agreement concerning the wrongness of paradigm
cases of violence. Except for these paradigm cases, justifications for violence, and distinctions
between kinds of violence rely on connections to other things, which are themselves contested,
such as freedom, justice, power, equality, and dignity. These are normative terms that
characterize social outcomes; to act on these terms is to act politically; to act politically is to act
in terms of political values or ideas.
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It has not been argued here that any distinction between kinds of violence or that
nonviolence is preferable. Instead, it has only been indicated through an inductive analysis of
available philosophical accounts of violence that the paradigmatic examples of violence serve as
the core exemplars in relation to which disagreements arise, but that extended concepts of
violence depend on political values or ideas and ideologies. Political ideologies oppose one
another, and the kinds of violence defined and justified by a political ideology oppose that of
another political ideology. This indicates two things.
First, in order to avoid the rhetorical pull of political ideologies, paradigmatic examples
of violence and nonviolence should be the focus of philosophical speculation in political
philosophy. Most people consider paradigmatic examples of violence to be wrong. To
undertake defining and justifying extended notions of violence would be to attempt to
rhetorically convince people to engage in actions that they reject. The paradigmatic examples of
violence are wrong without the influence of any political ideology defining them as wrong.
Their wrongness is politically neutral. No political ideology is needed for the sake of convincing
people that it is wrong for one person to intentionally behead another person for the sake of
causing harm and destruction.
Second, the distinctions between kinds of violence defined by every political ideology are
essentially contested. Every political ideology is suspect, including those that define themselves
as superior in relation to others, such as liberal ideology does. Each political ideology aims to
justify its own uses of violence against opposed political ideologies. Each positively values the
kinds of violence that serve to uphold its political ideology. These evaluations produce
conditions for enmity, and real violent conflicts that are paradigmatic examples of violence. If
political philosophy is to move away from actual, paradigmatic kinds of violence, then it would
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need to root a theory of violence in something other than contested political concepts. However,
the question is whether such a political philosophy could be. Perhaps, an ahistorical,
nontraditional, global, and nonviolent kind of cooperation could serve as the foundation for a
future political philosophy, but it may be difficult for this kind of cooperation to avoid counting
as a kind of violence, or for a politically neutral argument to be made for it.
From here, the future project that this dissertation points to concerns the question whether
it is possible for a novel political philosophy to be developed that simultaneously addresses the
wrongness of paradigmatic cases of violence, and avoids justifying kinds of violence. Perhaps
all we can do is inductively list examples of paradigmatic cases of violence. But this does not
solve the problem of justifiable violence, or of whether it is possible to construct a theory that
does not itself lead to and justify political conflict.
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